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FEDERAL RULE 44.1 AND THE "FACT"
APPROACH TO DETERMINING FOREIGN
LAW: DEATH KNELL FOR A
DIE-HARD DOCTRINE
Arthur R. Miller•
l.

T

INTRODUCTION

phenomenal expansion of international trade, communication, and travel following World War II has been accompanied
by a steady increment in the number of lawsuits with international
aspects that have been commenced in American courts. Many of
these cases have raised problems of serving process and other documents in a foreign country, procuring testimony and tangible evidence abroad, proving foreign law or foreign official records, and
enforcing judgments rendered beyond our shores. Unfortunately,
in this country the wholly domestic lawsuit has been the traditional
template for federal and state procedural systems and little attention
has been paid to litigation requiring American courts and counsel
to interact with their counterparts and officials in other lands. As a
result, it frequently has been impossible to adjust existing domestic
procedures to the needs of American litigants and the demands of
foreign legal systems. 1
Responding to a call for reform by the American Bar Association
and a strong presidential recommendation to the same effect, Congress, in I 958, established the Commission and Advisory Committee
HE

• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., Rochester, 1955; LL.B., Harvard,
1958.-Ed.
The author formerly was the Associate Director of the Columbia Law School
Project on International Procedure and one of the draftsmen of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act. Thus, it is necessary to intone the boilerplate
caveat that the opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of any of the groups with which he was associated during
the development of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 and the Uniform Act.
A note of gratitude is extended to Professor John J. Cound of the University of
Minnesota Law School for his comments on an earlier draft of this document. The
extensive research assistance of Linda Silberman, a second-year student at the University of Michigan Law School, and the valuable help of Prudence C. Beatty and
Herman Kaufman, second- and third-year students at the University of Michigan
Law School respectively, also must be acknowledged.
I. The status of international judicial assistance in the United States as of 1961 is
described in SMIT &: MILLER, INTERNATIONAL Co-OPERATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION-A
REPORT ON PRAcrICES AND PROCEDURES PREVAILING IN THE UNITED STATES (Milan, 1961);
Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1031 (1961).
See also Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953); Symposium: Pre-Trial and Trial Techniques in
International Litigation, A.B.A. SEC. !NT'L &: COMP. L., PROCEEDINGS 34 (1959).
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on International Rules of Judicial Procedure,2 to which a distinguished group of judges, governmental officials, scholars, and practitioners were appointed. Between 1958 and 1966, the Commission
collaborated with the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the
Judicial Conference of the United States and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and received the
drafting and research assistance of the Columbia Law School Project
on International Procedure. These labors have produced a complete
revision of the federal schema for international judicial assistance
and led to the adoption of the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act as a model for the states.3
One important facet of the post-war proliferation of international
litigation is a correlative increase in the number of lawsuits in which
the law of a foreign country is germane, either because it governs
the rights and liabilities of the parties under the relevant conflict-oflaws principles or because it bears on a particular issue or issues in
a case otherwise controlled by domestic law. 4 Examination of the
legislative and judicial treatment given the pleading, proof, and
appellate review of foreign-law and a perusal of the decisions delineating the consequences of failing to prove alien law, reveal an
enormous disparity in approach to these matters and a tenacious
retention of archaic dogma by American courts that is inconsistent
2. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1743.
3. These reforms are outlined in Commission on International Rules of Judicial
Assistance, Fourth Annual Report, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963);
Miller, International Co-operation in Litigation Between the United States and Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Accommodation in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REv.
1069-73 (1965). Particular aspects of the recent changes are discussed in 1 BARRON &:
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTlCE AND PROCEDURE § 184.1 (Wright ed. 1961 Supp. 1966); 2A
id. § 693; 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 4.45 (2d ed. 1966); 4 id, ~~ 28.03-.08;
Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (pts. 1-2)
77 HARV. L. REv. 601, 635-37, 801, 811-14 (1964); Leflar, Act IOI-Uniform Interstate and
International Procedure Act, 17 .ARK. L. REv. 118 (1963); Smit, International Litigation
Under the United States Code, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 1015 (1965); Smit, Assistance Rendered
by the United States in Proceedings Before International Tribunals, 62 COLUM, L. REv.
1264 (1962); Smit, The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act Approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: A New Era Commences, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 (1962); Comment, Judicial Notice and Deposition Practice in International Litigation, 1966 DuKE L.J. 512; Comment, Revitalization of the
International Judicial Assistance Procedures of the United States: Service of Documents
and Taking of Testimony, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1375 (1964). As of this writing, the Uniform
Act has been enacted in three jurisdictions. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.2501-07 (Supp.
1965); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1701.01-1706.04 (Supp. 1966); V.I. CooE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 490143 (Supp. 1965). The Judicial Council of Massachusetts has recommended the adoption
of the Act, 41 Mass. Jud. Council (Pub. Doc. 144) 8-20 (1965), as has the Michigan
Law Revision Commission, I M1cH, LAw REv. CoMM'N REP. (1967).
4. The words "foreign law" or "alien law" are used in this article to refer to the
law of a foreign country unless otherwise indicated. Because many state courts treated
the pleading and proof of the law of sister states and foreign countries similarly until
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with current trends in civil procedure. The cases also leave little
doubt that the process of establishing foreign law often has proven
to be tortuous and frustrating for both bench and bar.
The objective of this article is to analyze Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 44.1, which was developed as part of the reforms of the
last decade and became effective on July 1, 1966/1 and to assess its
capacity to rationalize the process of determining foreign law in
the federal courts. What follows is an excursion through the past
doctrine and into the probable future treatment of foreign law in
the federal courts, an exploration of the interrelationship between
the new Rule and other phases of federal civil procedure, and an
analysis of the prospect that the Rule's effectiveness may be partially
emasculated by supervening policies inherent in our federal system.
Although the primary focus of this article will be on foreign law in
the federal courts, the substantial identity between Federal Rule
44.1 and Article IV of the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act, coupled with the probability that states with a procedure patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will
adopt Rule 44.1 in the near future, 6 renders the following discussion
relevant to state practice as well.
II.

THE PRECURSORS OF FEDERAL PRACTICE

A. Common-Law Doctrines
Anglo-American courts and commentators historically have characterized a foreign-law issue as a question of fact to be pleaded and
proved as a fact by the party whose cause of action or defense depends upon alien law.7 Statements to this effect began to appear with
recently, and because some states continue to do so, citations to state cases dealing
with the determination of questions of sister-state law have been included when they
seemed applicable to the foreign-country situation as well.
5. The text of the Rule is as follows:
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country
shall give notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court,
in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43.
The court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a, question of law.
The text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1, which also became effective on
July 1, 1966, is identical except that the words "notice in his pleadings or other" in the
first sentence of Rule 44.1 have been omitted from the criminal rule because there are
no pleadings in criminal cases.
6. Arizona adopted Rule 44.1 at the same time it became effective on the federal
scene. See generally Frank, Arizona and the Federal Rules, 41 F.R.D. 79 (1966).
7. See generally 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 621.2 (1935); 1 CHI'ITY, PLEADING
•221 (1809); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws 1107-16 (7th ed. 1958); REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAws §§ 621-23 (1934); SOMMERICH &: BuscH, FOREIGN LAw-A GumE TO PLEADING
AND PROOF 13-17 (1959); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 175 (3d ed. 1963); WESTLAKE,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 413-14 (1859); 1 WHARTON, EVIDENCE §§ 300-16 (1877);
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2573 (3d ed. 1940); 3 WOODDESON, LAws OF ENGLAND •309 (1794).
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regularity in the eighteenth-century English cases8 and became so
embedded in the literature by the following century that reiteration
of the dogma· during the past one-hundred years has taken on a
pavlovian quality. Despite its prevalence, the fact theory's genesis
never has been isolated or its raison d'etre satisfactorily explained.
Professor Beale suggested that its roots are to be found in the early
English view that the only legal issue before a court was the domestic law relevant to the case, which logically required all else to be
characterized as fact. 9 This explanation seems plausible inasmuch as
English courts, in contrast to their continental counterparts, routinely declined to take jurisdiction over lawsuits having foreign
incidents until well into the seventeenth century.10 This abstemious
philosophy was a natural product of the high degree of jurisprudential isolation afforded by the English Channel, the concept that trial
by jury required trial per pais, which called for a jury whose members were drawn from the vicinage where the facts occurred and
theoretically had no cognizance of matters beyond their own locale,
and the insistence that all causes fit within the existing, highly
stylized forms of action.11 By the time "foreign" issues finally were
granted entree to the inner sanctum of English justice, the long
history of equating "law" with "English law" may well have so obscured the difference between questions involving foreign events or
transactions, which are traditionally factual matters, and issues concerning the municipal law of another country that the courts simply
classified all foreign elements in a case as questions of fact.
Despite its uncertain origin and the highly unsettled character
of the English practice of determining alien law during the American
colonial and revolutionary periods, the fact theory of foreign law
was embraced by the courts in this country without re-examination.12 American adherence to the common-law conception of
8. See Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163, 170 Eng. Rep. 574 (K.B. 1800); Mostyn v.
Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774); Fremoult v. Dedire, I P. Wms.
429, 24 Eng. Rep. 458 (Ch. 1718); Faubert v. De Cresseron, I Show. 194, I Eng. Rep.
130 (H.L. 1698). These cases are discussed at text accompanying notes 235-40 infra.
Current English practice is described in 15 HALSBURY's LAws OF ENGLAND ,I'1 597-603
(3d ed. Simonds 1956).
9. See 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 621.1 (1935).
IO. See Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, in 3 I.Aw: A
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342 (1937).
11. Ibid.
12. Note, Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 18 VAND. L. :&Ev. 1962, 1971-74 (1965).
To the extent that the fact theory is discernible in England at all during the colonial
period, it appears to have been designed primarily for situations involving the law
of foreign countries. Yet, in this country it also has been applied to cases involving
the law of sister states. The absurdity of perpetuating the common-law theory in the
twentieth century is commented on in Hammond Motor Co. v. Warren, 113 Kan. 44,

February 1967]

Federal Rule 44.1 and Foreign Law

619

foreign law cannot be rationalized in the same terms as have been
offered for the English experience because foreign causes of action
never have been viewed as anathema in this country and our jury
institution never has been concerned with the jurors' testimonial
qualifications or tied to notions of fact-venue; most probably our
incorporation of the common-law view of foreign law simply represents blind obedience to entrenched attitudes. On the other hand, a
concatenation of factors can be suggested for our perpetuation of the
English view of foreign law: the enormous size of the United States;
its ingestion during the nineteenth century of several large land
masses having cultural and legal frameworks radically different from
those found in the original Union-events that reinforced the
tendency of state court judges to characterize the law of a sister state
as foreign; the nation's relatively long isolation from other legal systems; the philosophy of state sovereignty, generated during the
colonial and confederation periods and never completely eradicated;
and an admixture of by-products of the polity's federal character.13
On a more mundane but highly pragmatic level, until recently it
has been difficult, and most librarians have been reluctant, to
procure foreign-law materials in this country. Even today, extensive
foreign-law libraries exist only in the important commercial and
legal centers, so that foreign legal materials are not readily available
in substantial areas of the nation. 14 As recently as 1958, a federal district judge in the Eastern District of New York remarked that despite
his discretion to take judicial notice of foreign law under a New
York statute, he did not have sufficient research facilities to justify
departing from the traditional reliance on counsel for a comprehensive presentation on the foreign-law issue.15
The fact that this judge did not feel obliged to resort to one of
the fine foreign-law collections a few miles from his courthouse
suggests that access to foreign-law material was not the sole inhibition operating on him. It may betray an understandable feeling of
inadequacy or insecurity with regard to issues of foreign law and an
unwillingness to venture beyond the perimeter established by the
proof presented by counsel, which, if widespread, also contributes to
the continued vitality of the fact theory. Although we expect judges
46, 213 Pac. 810, 8ll (1923), and in Hartwig, Congressional Enactment of Uniform
Judidal Notice Act, 40 MICH. L. REv. 174, 176-78 (1941). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 257!1 (3d ed. 1940).
l!I. See Comment, Conflict of Laws-Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 30 MICH, L.
REV. 747 (1932).
14. See generally SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 31-41 (2d ed. 1959).
15. Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
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to be conversant with the law of their own, and perhaps related,
jurisdictions, we cannot expect them to be familiar with the substance, let alone the nuances, of the jurisprudence of every state,
territory, and country throughout the world. As Mr. Justice Holmes
stated in Diaz v. Gonzalez, 16 referring to the law of a civil-law jurisdiction:
When we contemplate such a system from the outside it seems like
a wall of stone, every part even with all the others, except so far as
our own local education may lead us to see subordinations to which
we are accustomed. But to one brought up within it, varying
emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences gained only from life, may give to the different parts wholly
new values that logic and grammar never could have got from the
books.17

Even accepting the premise that issues of foreign law create
difficulties of a different magnitude than those caused by issues of
domestic law, what analytic or administrative advantage is served by
cloaking this difference in the trappings of the conclusory law-fact
dichotomy? It is submitted that there is none and that the fact
characterization of foreign law is a misnomer. "Foreign law may be
called a juridical fact with only one quality to differentiate it from
domestic law, namely, that while judges are supposed to know the
domestic law, they are not supposed to know the foreign law." 18
If the fact theory represented only a perversion of nomenclature,
it would be of little consequence. Similarly, if a judicial pronouncement that an issue of foreign law raises an issue of fact was simply
a euphemism for the notion that counsel bear the responsibility for
demonstrating the content of foreign law because judges cannot be
expected to divine alien law on their own, the exercise in semantic
alchemy could be tolerated. Unfortunately, however, the role of the
fact theory has not been a passive one; the courts have become so
entranced by the catechism that it has drastically affected the judicial
treatment accorded foreign-law issues.
One of the primary derivatives of the common-law characterization of foreign law is that a party who relies on such law must plead
it.19 The syllogistic basis for this proposition is self-evident. If foreign
16. 261 U.S. 102 (1923).
17. Id. at 106. See also Pittsburgh, C., C. &: St. L. Ry. v. Austin's Adm'r, 141 Ky.
722, 728, 133 S.W. 780, 783 (1911), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 143 Ky. 70,
135 S.W. 413 (1911); Husserl, The Foreign Fact Element in Conflict of Laws, 26 VA. L.
REV. 243 (1940).
18, Wachtell, The Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L. REv. 526,
535 (1935).
19. See, e.g., Hempstead v. Reed, 6 Conn. 480 (1827); Louisville, N.A. &: C. Ry. v.
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law is a fact and facts must be pleaded, then foreign law must be
pleaded. Several early decisions even insisted that pertinent foreign
statutory material be pleaded in haec verba. 20 Although a modicum
of uncertainty on the point still exists, it probably is unnecessary to
include a verbatim transcript of foreign statutes and court decisions
when pleading in a jurisdiction in which the common-law rules regarding foreign law persist.21 Nonetheless, in these jurisdictions and
in many that have adopted code pleading, a skillful statement is still
required. Otherwise, a foreign-law statement might fall prey to a
demurrer or to the code motion to dismiss for pleading evidence,
when too much has been set forth, or for failure to state a cause of action, when too little has been pleaded.22 In jurisdictions that take a
permissive attitude toward the demands of code pleading formulae
or that have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or some
variant of the "notice" theory of pleading, the technical pitfalls of
pleading foreign law have been ameliorated or entirely eliminated.
At common law, proof of the written law of a sister state or
foreign country generally required the introduction in evidence of
a properly certified or exemplified copy or an official publication of
the applicable law; 23 oral testimony concerning written law was unacceptable.24 This practice was believed required by the best-evidence
Shires, 108 Ill. 617 (1884); Bean v. Briggs, 4 Iowa 464 (1857); Walker v. Maxwell, 1
Mass. 104 (1804); Moe v. Shaffer, 150 Minn. ll4, 184 N.W. 785 (1921), 18 A.L.R. II94
(1922); Gibson v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 225 Mo. 473, 125 S.W. 453 (1910); McKnight v.
Oregon S.L.R.R., 33 Mont. 40, 82 Pac. 661 (1905); Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, 213
N.Y. 429, 108 N.E. 72 (1915); Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 698 (1854). See also Annot.,
Manner and Sufficiency of Pleading Foreign Law, 134 A.L.R. 570 (1941).
20. See, e.g., Holmes v. Broughton, IO Wend. 75, 78 (N.Y. 1833). Statutory relief
from stringent pleading requirements was afforded in some states at a comparatively
early date. See N.Y. Laws 1848, ch. 312.
21. See SOMMERICH 8: BUSCH, FOREIGN I.Aw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 13,
32 (1959), and cases cited therein. But see Record Truck Linc, Inc. v. Harrison, 109
~~~m~~~=~®~~~m~•m~

578 (1964) (dictum); McDonald v. Bankers Life Ass'n, 154 Mo. 618, 55 S.W. 999 (1900);
Martin Bros. v. Nettleton, 138 Wash. 102, 244 Pac. 386 (1926); Lowry v. Moore, 16
Wash. 476, 48 Pac. 238 (1897); McKenzie 8: Sarabia, The Pleading and Proof of Alien
Law, 30 TuL. L. REv. 351, 361 (1956). See also Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138
So. 414 (1931).
22. Compare Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Brandt, 240 Ala. 260, 198 So. 595 (1940),
and Argentine Airlines v. Aircraft Dynamics Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 272, 170 N.Y.S.2d 600
(Sup. Ct. 1957), with Mcijer v. General Cigar Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct.), modified,
273 App. Div. 760, 75 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1947).
23. See, e.g., Robinson v. Clifford, 20 Fed. Cas. 1001 (No. 11948) (C.C.D. Pa. 1807);
Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147 (1838). Proper authentication often was a condition on the
copy's admissibility.
24. See, e.g., Kenny v. Clarkson, I Johns. 385 (N.Y. 1806); Clegg v. Levy, 3 Camp.
166, 170 Eng. Rep. 1343 (K.B. 1812); Millar v. Heinrick, 4 Camp. 155, 171 Eng. Rep.
50 (C.P. 1815); Boehtlinck v. Schneider, 3 Esp. 58, 170 Eng. Rep. 537 (C.P. 1799). But
cf. Ganer v. Lady Lanesborough, Peake 25, 170 Eng. Rep. 66 (K.B. 1790).
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rule and deviation from it was permitted only when an authenticated
copy of the foreign law could not be obtained.20 Unwritten laws,
customs, and usages could be established by testimony of persons
conversant with the relevant foreign law, custom, or usage, or, if
available, by reports of proceedings before the out-of-state tribunals.26
By the close of the nineteenth century, the technique of introducing
a copy of an applicable statute or code provision and using expert
testimony to establish its meaning had become common.21 Some
courts, however, continued to hold oral testimony insufficient.28
Another radiation of the common-law fact theory was the use of
the rules of evidence to restrict the modes of proving foreign law. 29
On innumerable occasions, excessive amounts of time and money
were expended by counsel to obtain copies of statutes and judicial
decisions and to put expert testimony in a form that would satisfy
the technical rules of admissibility. Moreover, much judicial energy
was dissipated in refining the rules of evidence so that they could be
applied to the proof of foreign law.30 The fact characterization of
25. See Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 238 (1804); Charlotte v. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465 (1857); Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173 (N.Y. 1829); State v. Twitty,
9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 441 (1823); Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts 158 (Pa. 1840); Dougherty
v. Snyder, 15 Serg. 8: Rawle 84 (Pa. 1826).
26. See, e.g., Kennett v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181 (1863). The distinction between proof
of written and unwritten foreign law is set out in Newsom v. Adams, 2 La. 153 (1831);
Raynham v. Canton, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 293 (1825); People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349
(1858); Phillips v. Gregg, supra note 25; Woodbridge v. Austin, 2 Tyler 364 (Vt. 1803);
Millar v. Heinrick, 4 Camp. 155, 171 Eng. Rep. 50 (C.P. 1815). See generally Ennis v.
Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400 (1852); STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 640-42 (1st ed. 1834).
27. See The Sussex Peerage, 11 Cl. 8: Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L 1844); 3
BEALE, CONFLicr OF LAws § 621.5 (1935); STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 641-42 (1st ed.
1834). See also Barkman v. Hopkins, 11 Ark. 157 (1850); Greasons v. Davis, 9 Iowa
219 (1859); Wachtell, The Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L. REv.
526, 537-40, 580-85 (1935). Expert testimony on an issue of foreign law always has
been subject to cross-examination. Moreover, the courts have exercised considerable
discretion in determining the qualifications of expert witnesses and the extent to
which their opinions, whether controverted or not, should be honored. See, e.g., Estate
of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P .2d 695 (1950); Barber v. International Co. of Mexico,
73 Conn. 587, 599-600, 48 Atl. 758, 763-64 (1901); H. T. Cottam 8: Co. v. Comision
Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 149 La. 1026, 90 So. 392 (1921); Hall v. Costello, 48 N.H. 176 (1868); Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 254 N.Y. Supp. 439
(1931). See also GRAVESON, CoNFLicr OF LAws 399-401 (4th ed. 1960); Spaeth v. Kouns,
95 Kan. 320, 148 Pac. 651 (1915); Central Consumers Co. v. Ralston, 202 Ky. 94, 259
S.W. 67 (1923). An expert did not have to be a lawyer if he possessed other qualifications. See French v. Lowell, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 34 (1836) (dictum); Massucco v.
Tomassi, 78 Vt. 188, 62 Atl. 57 (1905). See generally Sommerich &: Busch, The Expert
Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law, 38 CoRNELL L.Q. 125, 147-53 (1953).
28. See Robertson v. Staed, 135 Mo. 135, 36 S.W. 610 (1896); Russian Reinsurance
Co. v. Stoddard, 211 App. Div. 132, 207 N.Y. Supp. 574 (1925), rev'd on other grounds,
240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925). But see STARKIE, EVIDENCE •176.
29. See 1 TAYLOR, EVIDENCE § 41 (3d ed. 1858).
30. See, e.g., Nashua Sav. Bank v. Anglo-American Land, Mortgage 8: Agency Co.,
l6~ V,S, ~1 (1903); Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 546 (1882).
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foreign law occasionally was carried to the extreme of leaving foreignlaw issues to the jury for determination, thereby increasing both the
effort devoted to the presentation of evidence on such issues and the
possibility of reversible error.31 Interjection of the jury caused considerable uncertainty and confusion because it was not clear whether
the jury's province was to determine the content of foreign law or
merely to resolve conflicts in the testimony concerning its substance.32
The absence of a sharp demarcation between the role of the trial
judge and that of the jury probably reflected a desire to preserve the
court's competence as an interpreter of legal materials while continuing to utilize the jury's assumed expertise on matters of credibility.33
The fact characterization also complicated the process of reviewing trial-court findings on foreign-law issues. Many appellate courts
went to the extreme of transmogrifying their attitudes toward reexamining findings of fact and held that the trial court's resolution
of a testimonial conflict regarding foreign law was conclusive unless
against the clear weight of the evidence or not supported by any
substantial evidence.34 If the relevant foreign statutes and judicial
opinions were introduced at trial, however, some courts held that
their construction and interpretation were subject to plenary re31. See Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. !H7 (1823); Ingraham v. Hart, 11 Ohio 255
(1842). See also Keeffe, Landis 1k Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice,
2 STAN. L. R.Ev. 664, 674 (1950). The ultimate extension of the fact theory probably is
the thought that a mistake of foreign law is a mistake of fact. See WILLISTON, CON•
TRAcrs § 1592 (rev. ed. 1937); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 27 F.R.D.
255 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469, 102 Eng. Rep. 448 (K.B. 1802).
32. See Bock v. Lauman, 24 Pa. 435 (1855). Cases submitting foreign law to the
jury in the latter context appear to have been more numerous. See Electric Welding
Co. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386, 86 N.E. 947 (1909); Harrison v. Atlantic C.L. Ry., 168
N.C. 382, 84 S.E. 519 (1915); Hite v. Keene, 149 Wis. 207, 134 N.W. 383 (1912), modified
on rehearing on other grounds, 149 Wis. 207, 135 N.W. 354 (1912); Hooper v. Moore,
50 N.C. 136 (1857). See also Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and
Proof, 45 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 23, 27 (1957); Annot., Determination of Question Relating to
Foreign Law as One of Law or of Fact, 34 A.L.R. 1447 (1925).
33. Most jurisdictions have now made foreign law an issue for the court by statute
or judicial decision. See, e.g., Christiansen v. William Graver Tank Works, 223 Ill. 142,
79 N.E. 97 (1906), 20 HARv. L. REv. 575 (1907); Current Legislation, Judicial Notice
of the Law of Foreign States, 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 476 (1920); Comment, Conflict of
Laws-Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 30 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 747, 748-49 (1932). The question of jury trial is considered further at text accompanying notes 231-92 infra.
34. See, e.g., Estate of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950); Hawi Mill 1k
Plantation Co. v. Finn, 82 Cal. App. 255, 255 Pac. 543 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Wylie v.
Cotter, 170 Mass. 356, 49 N.E. 746 (1898); Ames v. McCamber, 124 Mass. 85 (1878);
Hansen v. Grand Trunk Ry., 78 N.H. 518, 102 Atl. 625 (1917): Banco Minero v. Ross
8e Masterson, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915). See also Note, Proof of the Law of
Foreign Countries: Appellate Review and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HAR.v. L. REv.
318, 319-24 (1958). Most state decisions have not permitted an issue of foreign law
to be raised on appeal for the first time. See, e.g., Emanuel v. Feierman, 202 Cal. App.
2d 552, 20 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Donahue v. Dal, Inc., 314 Mass. 460,
50 N.E.2d 207 (1943).
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view. 35 In general, a reviewing court's pronouncements on the
content of a foreign country's law were not accorded precedential
weight in subsequent cases in the same forum. 36
This sketchy panorama of the common-law treatment of foreign
law suffices to demonstrate that the fact theory had ramifications far
beyond the limits of the historical and administrative justifications
offered for it. It is apparent that in an attempt to minimize the
burden that issues of foreign law imposed on the trial judge and to
maximize the assistance rendered by counsel, the common law constructed a procedural microcosm based on an equation between
"foreign law" and "fact." Over the years, the resulting pastiche
became so entangled in detail and so fertile a field for adversarial
machinations that it actually exacerbated the difficulties inherent in
proving foreign law. The original objective of the equation became
mired in a morass of technicalities and ultimately was lost in the
conclusory assertion of epithets that had the sole virtue of being
harmonious with the fact characterization of foreign law.

B. Modification of Common-Law Doctrines
The initial legislative deviation from the common-law view of
foreign law appears to have occurred in 1840 when Connecticut
enacted a statute permitting "the reports of the judicial decisions of
other states and countries ... [to] be judicially noticed ... as evidence of the common law of such states or countries, and of the
judicial construction of the statutes or other laws thereof." 37 Since
1848, Mississippi has provided that foreign law shall be noticed in
the same way as if the question arose under local law.38 Following
the publication in 1898 of Professor Thayer's Preliminary Treatise
on Evidence, in which the author advocated a widened application
of judicial notice,39 dissatisfaction with the common-law treatment
of foreign law became more vociferous and a movement for "re35. See, e.g., Bank of China, Japan &: the Straits, Ltd. v. Morse, 168 N.Y. 458, 61
N.E. 774 (1901); Tarbell v. Grand Trunk Ry., 96 Vt. 170, 118 At!. 484 (1922). But see
Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155 At!. 47 (1931), which discusses the fact-law classification of foreign-law issues and recognizes that it is as much the duty of the judge
to pass upon issues of foreign law as it is to pass upon issues of domestic law.
36. See Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1034-35
(1941); Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARV. L. REv. 318, 324-28 (1958). But see Nicholas E. Vernicos
Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965), in which the court relied
heavily on a discussion.of Greek law in an earlier case.
37. See Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361, 370 (1847). The present version of
the Connecticut statute is CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-163, -164 (1960).
38. MISS. CoDE 1848, ch. 60, art. 10. The present text of the statute is found in
Miss. CODE ANN. § 1761 (1956). See generally Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156
Miss. 567, 126 So. 395 (1930).
39. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 277-312 (1898).
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form" developed. It bore fruit in Professor Thayer's own state in
1926, when Massachusetts enacted a statute requiring that judicial
notice be taken of the law of foreign countries.40 The following year
the California courts were given power to take judicial notice of the
law of sister states.41
In 1936, the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act was
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and by the American Bar Association. 42 The Uniform
Act's judicial-notice provision applies only to the law of sister states
and thus is a less drastic departure from common-law practice than
was the Massachusetts statute of a decade earlier. Moreover, the act
does not expressly apostatize the common-law pleading requirement
but merely provides that "reasonable notice shall be given to the
adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise.''43 The court is
authorized to do independent research "as it may deem proper" and
to call upon counsel for assistance in establishing the law.44 .However, section 4 of the act, which restricts the party's presentation to
"admissible evidence," preserves some of the defects of the commonlaw approach and appears to be inconsistent with the court's power
to do independent research. Only section 5 deals directly with the
law of foreign countries and it simply states that such law "shall be
an issue for the court.'' The Commissioners' Notes make the
section's objective abundantly clear: "we do want to make the
foreign law determinable by the judge, not the jury, thus changing
the absurd old common law.'' 45 The Uniform Act has been adopted
in a majority of the States and the Virgin Islands.46 Although several
states have construed or modified it in ways that perpetuate certain
40. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 70 (1956).
41. See Cal. Stat. 1927, ch. 62, p. 110. See also Laws of Missouri 157 (1927) Qudicial
notice of sister-state law). Missouri now has the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 490.070-.120 (1959). In 1957, California amended its
judicial-notice statute to authorize notice of the law of a foreign country. Cal. Stat.
1957, ch. 249. In 1965, as part of a general revision of its law of evidence, California
again amended its judicial-notice statute to leave the matter within the trial court's
discretion except when requested to take judicial notice by a party who gives notice
to each adverse party and furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it
to take judicial notice. CAL. Evm. ConE §§ 452-56 (effective Jan. 1, 1967). Although
the 1957 and 1965 California statutes appear to be mandatory, in practical effect they
are permissive. See Recommendation and Study Relating to Judicial Notice of the
Law of Foreign Countries, 1 CALIF. I.Aw REv. CoMM'N I-1, I-14, I-19 (1957).
42. 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 569 (1965). See also Annot., Uniform Judicial Notice
of Foreign Law Act, 23 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1952).
43. See Revlett v. Louisville & N.R.R., 114 Ind. App. 187, 51 N.E.2d 95 (1943).
44. See In re Hunter's Estate, 125 Mont. 315, 236 P.2d 94 (1951).
45. 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 318, 329 (1957). See also Franzen v. Equitable Life
Assur. Sec'y, 130 N.J.L. 457, 33 A.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
46. Oklahoma and the Virgin Islands appear to have repealed the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act by implication by enacting the Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act.
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common-law practices, such as the pleading requirement, 47 ·the Act
has upgraded the process of determining foreign law in many jurisdictions. Moreover, a number of states have enacted legislation similar to the Uniform Act48 and more than a dozen states have gone
further and adopted statutes that either authorize or require judicial
notice to be taken of the law of foreign nations. 49 The strict common-law practice or something comparable to it continues to prevail
in only a handful of states. 50
47. See N.J. Laws 1941, ch. 81, § 1, at 193; S.C. CODE ANN. § 26·62 (1962); WASH.
REv. CODE § 5.24.040 (1963). See also Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1955).

The New Jersey statute was amended in 1960, N.J. Laws 1960, ch. 52, § 48, to make
reasonable notice an alternative to pleading. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:82-27 (Supp. 1966);
see In re Damato's Estate, 86 N.J. Super. 107, 206 A.2d 171 (Super. Ct. 1965). See
generally Rafalko, Pleading, Proving and Obtaining Information on Foreign Law, 43
U. DET. L.J. 95, 101-09 (1965); Comment, Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 38 Wash.
L. REv. 802 (1963).
48. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2573 (3d ed. 1940); see Boswell v. Rio De Oro Uranium
Mines, Inc., 68 N.M. 457, 460-61, 362 P.2d 991, 994 (1961).
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27.2504 (Supp. 1965); CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 310-11, 450-60
(effective Jan. 1, 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-163, -164 (1960); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-409 (1964); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 70 (Supp. 1956); MICH. COMP. LAws
§§ 600.2114, .2118 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1762 (1956); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:82-27
(Supp. 1966); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &: R. 4511; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-4 (1953); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, §§ 1704.01-.03 (Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-273 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 5711 (1961) (semble). See also V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4926-28 (Supp. 1966); SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 130 (2d ed. 1959). In Maryland the court may take judicial
notice of the law of any jurisdiction that is "based upon the common law of England."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 47 (1957). A very broad construction was given this statute
in Reisig v. Associated Jewish Charities, 182 Md. 432, 34 A.2d 842 (1943) Gudicial
notice of Palestinian law during period of British mandate).
The New York experience with judicial notice statutes is interesting. Between
1944 and 1963, New York was one of the jurisdictions in which the courts had discretion to take judicial notice of the law of a sister state or foreign country. N.Y. CIV.
PRAc. ACT § 344-a; see Saxe, New York Extends Judicial Notice to Matters of Law,
28 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 86 (1944). Since 1963, rule 4511 of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules requires a New York court to take judicial notice of the law of all jurisdictions
within the United States, including its territories, but leaves judicial notice of the
law of foreign countries to the trial judge's discretion, except when "a party requests
it, furnishes the court sufficient information to enable it to comply with the request,
and has given each adverse party notice of his intention to request it." The New
York provision also permits the court to consider any material, "whether offered by
a party or discovered through its own research,'' and expressly leaves the determination of foreign law to the judge. See generally 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN &: MILLER, NEW YORK
CIVIL PRACTICE 1r,f 4511.03-.04 (1966). The New York provision is very similar to UNI•
FORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 9-10 (1953) and the new California Practice. N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
L. &: R. 3016(e), also enacted in 1963, requires the "substance" of a foreign country's
law to be pleaded. This new formula is intended to liberalize the pleading requirement in that state. See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN &: MILLER, op. cit. supra, 1111 3016.13-.17; 5
id., 11 4511.05. A retrogressive construction of N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &: R. 3016(e) and 4511
is suggested in Sommerich &: Busch, Judicial Notice of Law Under New Civil Practice
Law and Rules, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 18, 1962, p. 4, col. 1. The debate over the statute's
interpretation may now be academic because of the forward-looking and commendable
decision in Gevinson v. Kirkeby-Natus Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 71, 270 N.Y.S.2d 989
(1966).
50. SoMMERICH &: BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PR.OOF, app. C
(1959) lists seven states in which the "common law prevails" and one state, Louisiana,
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The trend toward judicial notice of foreign law was accompanied
by the adoption in 1920 of the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act,151
which gives prima fade evidentiary effect to foreign publications
printed with "the authority of" or "commonly recognized in" the
courts of a foreign jurisdiction. This Uniform Act has been enacted
in twenty states and the Virgin Islands; similar legislation exists
in many other jurisdictions.152 In addition, several states extend
prima fade evidentiary effect to volumes containing foreign judicial
opinions as well as to foreign statutory materials.153 Still another
group of statutes permits judicial notice of special classes of foreign
written law and its construction.154 Although primarily intended to
eliminate the need for authentication of copies of foreign legislative
materials, these acts also facilitate proof of the law's content.
Unfortunately, many state statutes have not succeeded in overcoming the common-law conception of foreign law; for example,
state courts frequently have taken the position that judicial-notice
statutes do not affect pleading requirements.155 In Greiner v.
Freund, 56 a New York appellate court rejected the plaintiff's request
that judicial notice be taken of Austrian law and affirmed the dismissal of his complaint, characterizing its failure to set forth the
substance of the applicable passages of Austrian law as a "complete
disregard of the requirement of the plain and concise statement of
material facts ...."157
Adherence to common-law precepts despite statutory modification has been discernible outside New Yark. The Massachusetts
judicial-notice statute, which is mandatory in tone, has been renin which the "common law prevails" except for the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act.
In point of fact, there is legislation in each of the seven named states that deviates in
one or more respects from common-law practice and Louisiana enacted the Uniform
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act after the publication of the book.
51. 9B Uniform Laws Ann. 401 (1957).
52. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 599.02 (1957). The Virgin Islands appears to have repealed the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act by implication when it enacted the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act.
53. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &: R. 45ll(d).
54. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. ConE § 6602.
55. See, e.g., Greear v. Paust, 202 Minn. 6!13, 279 N.W. 568 (1938).
56. 286 App. Div. 996, 144 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1955).
57. Id. at 997, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 767. But cf. Pfleuger v. Pfleuger, 304 N.Y. 148, 106
N.E.2d 495 (1952) (Pennsylvania law); Olson v. Kilian, 203 Misc. 847, 119 N.Y.S.2d 94
(Sup. Ct. 1953) (Ontario statute). The difficulties of pleading foreign law were compounded by the formalism of code pleading, which resulted in considerable time and
energy being devoted to the classic question whether the pleading set out the desired
"facts" or contained "conclusions" or "evidence." See, e.g., Meijer v. General Cigar Co.,
73 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 273 App. Div. 760, 75 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1947). See
also Andretto Bank A.G. v. Goodbody &: Co., 15 Misc. 2d 395, 181 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
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dered permissive in application by a judicially imposed requirement
that counsel direct the court's attention to the relevant portions of
foreign law before it will be noticed. 158 To generalize, the accumulated experience in New York, Massachusetts, and other states
during the first half of this century indicates that judicial notice has
not been taken, regardless of statutory language, unless the parties
furnish the court a reasonable amount of information about the
foreign law. What constitutes a sufficient quantum of information
to activate the court seems dependent on the esoteric quality of the
foreign law in issue and the level of the trial judge's self-confidence.
The explanation for the tenacity with which the courts have
retained the primeval attitude toward foreign-law issues probably
lies in (I) a continued judicial reluctance to engage in the often difficult process of ascertaining alien law, (2) the fear that the average
trial judge cannot be fully entrusted with the job but must be given
the fullest possible assistance of counsel, and (3) a refusal to believe
that the proof-of-foreign-law statutes require a departure from the
traditional modes of pleading and proof or that they represent an
attempt to establish a degree of equality between the proof of
domestic and foreign law. 159 These inhibitions are exemplified by
the following dictum from Arams v. Arams60 concerning the effect
of New York's first judicial-notice statute:
[I]f cases can be decided according to whatever law the judge sees
fit to apply and is able to discover by his own private researches
undisclosed to the parties, then much that hitherto has been regarded as essential to the right to pronounce judgment-the raising
of an issue determinable by reference to the law of a specified place,
and an opportunity to know what the deciding tribunal is considering and to be heard with respect to both law and fact-would seem
to have been abolished. I am unwilling to assume that a power so
contrary to the plainest principles of fair dealing and due process of
law was intended or has been conferred....
I think this new enactment was intended merely to dispense with
certain formalities respecting the manner in which the law of the
State or country, whose law is first appropriately invoked and determined to be applicable, may be brought to the attention of the court
by the parties, and, in case they omit something pertinent, to give
the judge the right to make further researches in order to supplement or round out what the parties have presented so as to make an
58. See Kynch v. Trustees of New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 320 Mass. 339, 69 N.E.2d
575 (1946); Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N.E. 673 (1934); 32 MASS. L.Q. No.
II, at 20 (1947). See also Comment, Judicial Notice and Deposition Practice in
International Litigation, 1966 DuKE L.J. 512, 517-23.
59. See Mangrelli v. Italian Line, 208 Misc. 685, 144 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
60. 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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accurate determination as to what the law of that State or country
really is. In short, the enactment was intended as a safety valve
against miscarriages of justice due to mistake, and not as a charter
to every judge to apply whatsoever law he likes and can find ....61

This oft-quoted passage from Arams completely ignores the possibility that the statute was intended to recast the basic methodological
premises for proving foreign law. Regrettably, Arams has given
succor to those who believe that judicial notice of foreign law places
too great a research burden on the court and is unfair to the litigants
because it does not guarantee early formal notice that an issue of
foreign law is present and does not provide any restraint on the
court's unsupervised independent investigations. 62
The saturnine judicial experience under the first generation of
statutes dealing with the proof of foreign law suggests the propriety
of re-examining the assumption that judicial notice is the most efficacious technique for the determination of alien law. One's uncertainty as to the workability of the judicial-notice method is reinforced by a perusal of the secondary literature, which indicates that
the subject has generated a debate of considerable intensity among
numerous protagonists. The leading critic of the common-law approach condemns it as "over-expensive, time-consuming, cumbersome and often confusing." 63 Arguing that foreign-law experts are
costly, biased, and insufficiently instructive, and that the technical
rules of evidence prevent a full elaboration of the issues, he goes
beyond the judicial-notice technique and advocates court-appointed
61. Id. at 3!10-31, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 253-54.
62. For example, in Matter of Mason, 194 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S.2d 2!12 (Surr. Ct.
1948), the court refused to undertake any research into Italian banking regulations.
See also Sonnesen v. Panama Transp. Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948); SoMMERICH &: BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 64-69 (1959). In
Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 11 Misc. 2d 397, 173 N.Y.S.2d 509
(Sup. Ct. 1958), however, the court took judicial notice of Italy"s foreign exchange laws.
Generally ignored is the actual holding in Arams:
Where the complaint alleges facts which fairly may be assumed to create an
obligation under the law of any civilized country, the plaintiff need not specifically allege the law of the State or country in which the things relied upon
as giving rise to the asserted obligation took place, considerations of justice and
convenience making it proper in such cases to cast upon the defendant the burden
of showing, if that be the fact, that the law of such State or country is contrary
to that assumption; but where the complaint alleges facts which do not make it
reasonably certain that any civilized country would regard them as creating the
asserted obligation, the plaintiff must allege the law of the State or country in
which the things relied upon as giving rise to such obligation took place, considerations of justice and convenience making it proper in such cases to cast that
burden upon the plaintiff.••.
182 Misc. at 3!15, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
63. Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 60, 66
(1954). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2573 (3d ed. 1940); Nussbaum, The Problem
of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018 (1941).
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experts who will be compensated initially by the government and
ultimately by the losing party. 64 On the other side, two of the most
vocal defenders of traditional notions sum up their views as follows:
Honesty requires admission on the part of bench and bar alike of
relative unfamiliarity with th~ laws of civil code countries and of
other foreign jurisdictions. Our law imposes no duty upon lawyer
or judge to know the laws of other jurisdictions. Under such circumstances, "initiative" could well become rashness, and although
well meaning, could easily be disastrous to the rights of the parties.
On the other hand, our present system of proving foreign law
offers a practical procedure whereby a judge may familiarize himself
with the relevant details of a foreign system of laws by playing the
part of audience and then inquisitor, while the foreign law experts
are exposed to the truth-searching effects of direct and cross-examination. It is a fact that many a trial judge operating under present
procedures does use the parties or their advocates as his assistants
in establishing the content of the law. 65

Given this intransigence on basic issues, it is not surprising that the
developments over the past half-century have been somewhat eclectic,
producing a hybrid of common-law and statutory techniques and a
rather ambivalent judicial application of the latter.
The debilitation of the judicial-notice provisions is unfortunate,
inasmuch as many of the more vituperative broadsides issued by
animadverters of the statutory developments miss the mark. In
the context of determining foreign law, judicial notice is not utilized as a device to exclude proof of a fact assumed to be within
the court's knowledge, but rather is employed to simplify proof
by permitting the use of approximately the same procedures as
are available for ascertaining domestic law. 66 Thus, judicial notice
of foreign law does not encourage an unthinking extension of the
assumption of judicial omniscience as to certain facts or act as a
substitute for proof; it is merely a shorthand description-perhaps
an unfortunate one-for rationalizing the process of proving foreign
law. This distinction was articulated in the Ninth Annual Report of
the Judicial Council of the State of New York: 67
64. See Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York: A Proposed Amendment,
57 COLUM. L. REV. 348 (1957).
65. SOMMERICH & BUSCH, FOREIGN LAW-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 120·21
(1959). See also Drachsler, Judicial Initiative in the Proof of Foreign Law, A.B.A. SEC.
INT'L & COMP. L., PROCEEDINGS 126 (1956); McKenzie &: Sarabia, The Pleading and
Proof of Alien Law, 31 TuL. L. REv. 353 (1956); Stem, Foreign Law in the Courts:
Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 23 (1957).
66. See Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 12 MINN. L. REv. 439, 466 (1928). See also McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 326 (1954);
Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. REv. 269 (1944).
67. 9 N.Y. Jun. COUNCIL REP. 267 (1943).
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Rather than a dispensation from the need of proof, a dispensation from technical mles of proof is intended by the proposed extension of the doctrine [of judicial notice]. It is submitted that
although rules of evidence serve their purpose well when ordinary
facts are being proved to a lay jury, they unduly hamper the court
when it seeks to determine the rule of law (whether it be a "foreign"
law or a local ordinance) applicable to a case. Under the proposed
new section [N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act§ 344-a], the courts will be enabled
to proceed directly to the determination of applicable rules of law,
instead of wasting time, money and effort on such collateral questions
as whether the rules of evidence have been satisfied and the "proof"
of such law has been properly made. 68

Furthermore, the fear that judicial-notice statutes permit a court
to surprise the litigants with a decision based upon its own private
research seems more apparent than real. As will be developed more
fully at a later point,69 except in the most unusual circumstances, a
court would be remiss if it did not apprise the parties of the result
of its research and offer them a chance to refute it or introduce
further material; a failure to do so might even constitute reversible
error.70 As long as a proper judicial respect for the adversary system
can be assumed, it is difficult to perceive any objection to widening
the scope of the court's investigation into the substance of foreign
law.
These were the premises of the authors of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, which, in conjunction with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, represents a second-generation
deviation from the common-law fact theory and presages a new
chapter in the history of proving foreign law. Article IV of the new
Uniform Act was drafted on the assumption that judicial attitudes
regarding the character of foreign law have matured and that the
fear of the difficulties of ascertaining foreign law has substantially
abated. Consequently, it abandons both the common-law fact theory
and the somewhat schizoid practice under the judicial-notice statutes
in favor of an isotopic relationship between the determination of
foreign law and the determination of domestic law. The act substitutes a reasonable-notice requirement for the former pleading prerequisite, widens the scope of inquiry to permit examination of
everything relevant to the foreign-law issue, allows the court to do
its own research, leaves the determination of foreign law to the
68. Id. at 272.
69. See text accompanying notes 186-90 infra.
70. See Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 7 RECOR!> OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 280, 294-95 (1952). See also SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 142 (2d ed.
1959).
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court, and authorizes plenary review on appeal. Article IV of the
Uniform Act is reinforced by article V, which is a modernization
and expansion of the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act that attempts to
minimize the formality and detail involved in proving foreign
official records. 71 In almost all respects, the new practice under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 44 and 44.1 will parallel that under
the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act. Although
the new act's relative youth and the lack of experience under it
prevent confident appraisal of its future, it is worth noting (after
disclaiming any design to engage in self-directed encomiums or
panegyrics), that several recent state cases completely reject the facttheory dogma72 and seem to confirm the judgment of the act's draftsmen that the time is ripe for a volte-face regarding the fact character•
ization of foreign law.
C. Consequences of Failing To Establish Foreign Law
The problem of affixing consequences to a failure to establish
the applicable foreign law is of sufficient magnitude to warrant brief
independent treatment. Because this facet of determining foreign
law lies in the penumbra! area between conflict of laws and evidence,
it has proven to be an extraordinarily complex question, and a
uniform judicial treatment of the subject has not emerged in the
United States. 73 With only a few exceptions,74 the problem has not
71. Article V of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act eliminates
the need for certification of the authority of the attesting official and permits chain
certification of the attested copy. Chain certification allows a consular official to issue
his certificate on the basis of his knowledge concerning a signature appearing on any
certificate in a chain of certificates beginning with the certificate relating to the orig•
inal attestation and proceeding up the authentication hierarchy; each official in the
chain certifies the signature on the preceding certificate. The act also provides the
court with discretionary power to admit a document that is uncertified, although
attested, or a summary of the record rather than a copy. This provision represents a
departure from the common-law rule and numerous statutes, which require a literal
copy of the record. Section 5.03 of the act is a modification of the Uniform Proof of
Statutes Act and provides an alternative, simplified method for proving the written
law and the executive, legislative, and judicial acts of any jurisdiction. Finally, article
V expedites proof of the lack of any record and preserves a number of other methods
for proving foreign official records.
72. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. O'Grady, 97 Ariz. 9, 396 P.2d 246 (1964); Choate v.
Ransom, 74 Nev. 100, 323 P.2d 700 (1958); Gevinson v. Kirkeby-Natus Corp., 26 App.
Div. 2d 71, 270 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1966). In Gevinson, Presiding Justice Breitel commented:
"non-forum law is not and never was a question of fact except in an artificial procedural sense. Today, all such non-forum law in this State and in most States is treated
as if it were a question of law in the court of first instance and on appellate review."
26 App. Div. 2d at 74, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
73. See generally Sommerich &: Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 125, 138-44 (1953); Annot., Presumption as to Law of
Foreign Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529 (1961). Professor Currie has suggested that much
of the judicial confusion is attributable to the fact theory, which he believes caused
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been dealt with in the judicial-notice statutes and neither the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act nor Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 44.l expressly purports to come to grips with it.
The abbreviated discussion in the next few pages is designed merely
to complete the statement of the historical antecedents of current
attitudes toward foreign law and to set the stage for later analysis 75
of what may prove to be one of the most perplexing aspects of the
new federal practice.
In an apparent minority of American jurisdictions (the number
undoubtedly was larger when the common-law view of foreign law
commanded greater allegiance from American judges), a plaintiff's
failure to prove foreign law is equivalent to an inability to establish
a cause of action under domestic law and requires dismissal of his
complaint, usually on the merits.76 Courts in these jurisdictions also
will strike a defense based on foreign law unless it is shown to be
cognizable under the relevant law.77 These Draconian consequences
are a natural outgrowth of the formerly pervasive vested-rights or
territorial philosophy of conflict of laws78 and, more directly, the
progeny of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cuba
R.R. v. Crosby, 79 in which an employee's action against his employer
for personal injuries sustained in Cuba was dismissed because
Cuban law was not established. In his opinion for the Court, Mr.
Justice Holmes said:
With very rare exceptions the liabilities of parties to each other are
fixed by the law of the territorial jurisdiction within which the
wrong is done and the parties are at the time of doing it.... That,
and that alone, is the foundation of their rights.
[T]he only justification for allowing a party to recover when
the cause of action arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a wellthe question of the consequences of a failure to establish the law of the jurisdiction
referred to under a choice-of-law rule to be "ceded by the domain of conflict of laws
to the domain of evidence." Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 964, 970-77 (1958).
74. E.g., CAL. Evm. ConE § 3ll(a) (effective Jan. I, 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:82-27
(Supp. 1965).
75. See text at notes 306-31 infra.
76. See, e.g., Rositski v. Rositski, 329 Mo. 662, 46 S.W.2d 591 (1931); Riley v.
Pierce Oil Corp., 245 N.Y. 152, 156 N.E. 647 (1927).
77. See Aslanian v. Dostumian, 174 Mass. 328, 54 N.E. 845 (1899) (dictum). See also
Dainese v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13 (1875); McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REv. 296,
308 (1952).
78. See 1 BEALE, CoNFucr OF LAws § 5.2 (1935); 2 id. § 377.2; REsTATEMENT,
CONFucr OF LAws §§ 1, 378-79 (1934). The effect of the recent changes in conflicts
doctrines on the consequences associated with a failure to prove foreign law are
discussed at text accompanying notes 320-31 infra.
79. 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
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founded belief that it was a cause of action in that place. The right
to recover stands upon that as its necessary foundation. It is part
of the plaintiff's case, and if there is reason for doubt he must allege
and prove it.so
The Crosby approach is most commonly applied when the foreign
cause is statutory-wrongful-death actions, for example-or the
foreign law is not based on the common law.81 It is rarely employed
when the law of another common-law jurisdiction is involved.82
One of the most questionable applications of the vested-rights
theory appears in Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 83 which involved a tort action instituted by an Arkansas plaintiff against a
Delaware corporation in a New York federal court. The lawsuit
was dismissed at the close of the plaintiff's case because he was
unwilling, and perhaps unable, to prove the law of Saudi Arabia,
the adventitious locale of the accident. On appeal, the Second Circuit felt bound by New York law, which placed the burden of proving foreign law on the plaintiff, and affirmed the dismissal, although
Judge Frank's opinion expressed considerable displeasure with the
result. Further discussion of Walt on, which has achieved the status
of a cause celebre among comparativists and conflicts cognoscente,
will be deferred to a later point. 84
The harsh effects of either a dismissal on the merits or the striking of a defense for failing to establish alien law have been avoided
in most states by employing one of a series of judicially created
presumptions that reject the assumption that a default in proof
demonstrates that the asserted right of action or defense does not
exist under foreign law. The effect of these presumptions is to permit the court to decide the case on its merits85 and, in theory, their
goal is to enable a court to reach the same result that would have
80. Id. at 478-79.
81. See Annot., Presumption as to Law of Foreign Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529,
532-34 (1961). See also Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861).
82. See Langdon v. Young, 33 Vt. 136 (1860).
83. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956), 43 IowA L. R.Ev. 125,
32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 377 (1957).
84. See text accompanying notes 109-12, 325-28 infra.
85. See generally 3 BEALE, CoNFLicr OF LAws §§ 622A.l-23.l (1935); SoMMERICH 8e
BUSCH, FORlllGN LAW-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 75-80 (1959); Currie, On the
Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 964, 977 (1958); Kales,
Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1906); von Moschzisker, Presumptions as to Foreign Law, 11 MINN. L. R.Ev. 1 (1926); Wachtell, The Proof of
Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L. REV. 526, 580, 585-88 (1935); Current
Legislation, Judicial Notice of the Law of Foreign States, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 476
(1920); Comment, Judicial Notice and Deposition Practice in International Litigation,
1966 DUKE L.J. 512, 513-14; Comment, Conflict of Laws-Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law, 30 MICH. L. R.Ev. 747, 755-61 (1932).
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been achieved had the case been heard by a court in the appropriate
foreign country. The actual utilization of the presumptions, however, seems to reflect a desire to apply the law of the forum absent
a strong showing that another law controls.86 If this is true, the use
of presumptions rather than a direct application of domestic law
probably represents a form of deference to the "vested rights"
theory, from which, until recently, there has been little open deviation.
Perhaps the oldest and most convenient device for bypassing the
need to prove foreign law in order to avoid the harsh consequences
of a failure of proof, and a device that has been a progenitor of a
number of other evasive procedures, is the postulate that when
the principle of law at issue is "rudimentary," it can be presumed
to subsist in all civilized jurisdictions. This view is supported by
dictum in Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in Crosby and is most frequently applied in cases involving intentional torts. 87 The absence
of any extensive reliance on this presumption over the years reflects
the obvious fact that no consensus exists as to which principles of
law are "rudimentary."
The most frequently invoked presumption appears to be that
foreign law is identical to the law of the forum. 88 An extreme example of this approach is Louknitsky v. Louknitsky, 89 in which Chinese marital-property law was presumed to be the same as California's community-property law. Although this particular decision
86. In Monroe v. Douglass, 5 N.Y. 447, 452 (1851), the court observed: "[T]he laws
of the country to whose courts a party appeals for redress, furnish, in all cases, prima
facie, the rule of decision; and if either party wishes the benefit of a different rule or
law ••• he must aver and prove iL" See also Hill v. Wilker, 41 Ga. 449 (1871); Leavenworth v. Brockway, 2 Hill. 201 (N.Y. 1842).
87. Sec, e.g., Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Rivers, 211 Fed. 294 (2d Cir.
1914); Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (19ll). See also Mackey
v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 78 N.Y. Supp. 966 (N.Y. City Ct. 1902). An interesting corollary of
the "rudimentary principles" doctrine is that the court need not apply the lex loci
when a tort occurs in an "uncivilized" country but is free to apply the law of the
country that has the closest nexus to the parties. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S.
120, 129 (1904); Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 872 (1956).
88. See generally 3 BEALE, CONFUCT OF LAws § 622A.2, at 1679-80 (1935); CHESHIRE,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (5th ed. 1957); Note, Evidence: Presumptions as to
the Law of Foreign Countries, 42 CAuF. L. REv. 701 (1954). Some states have codified
the presumption. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:82-87 (Supp. 1965).
89. 1211 Cal. App. 2d 406, 266 P.2d 910 (Dist. CL App. 1954). See also Doiron v.
Vacuum Oil Co., 164 La. 15, II!! So. 748 (1927); Gallard v. Winans, Ill Md. 434, 74 Atl.
626 (1909); Annot., Presumptions as to Law of Foreign Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529
(1961). Section 3II(a) of California's Evidence Code expressly authorizes the application
of California law when the law of a foreign country "cannot be determined," if the
court can do so consistently with the United States and California Constitutions.
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may be preferable to a dismissal for failure of proof or even to a
Herculean, but time consuming and ex.pensive, effort by court and
litigants to devine and decipher foreign law, it hardly represents an
aesthetic or rational application of the identity presumption. Given
its use in Louknitsky, qualms about the presumption assuming
Frankenstein qualities are understandable, especially when it is realized that the task of overcoming it usually will fall on a party who,
absent the presumption, would not have the burden of establishing
the existence of a cause of action or defense under foreign law.
Thus, a plaintiff with a valid cause of action under forum law but
none under the governing foreign law may reap the benefits of the
presumption at the expense of a somnolent defendant or one who
lacks the resources to investigate foreign law. Moreover, the party
who normally has the burden of showing that domestic and alien
law diverge often will remain silent because domestic law is favorable to him, although in many instances he may be the party in the
best position to prove the foreign law.
Most states hav.e accorded more limited dimensions to the identity presumption than California did in Louknitsky. For example,
the presumption usually has not been applied when the foreign
cause is based upon a statute or when damages include a penal element;90 in some cases it has been limited to the law of a sister state
or of those foreign countries that still adhere to the common law.91
Some jurisdictions have been even stricter and held that the presumed identity applies only to that part of a foreign country's jurisprudence that is analogous to "common law" or have extended the
presumption only to those countries whose law is "fundamentally"
the same as forum law.92 Another variation of the identity presumption calls for the application of forum law when no other law has
been brought to the court's attention.93 T~is use of local law usually
90. See generally Grow v. Oregon S.L. Ry., 44 Utah 160, 138 Pac. 398 (1913).
91. See Banco de Sonora v. Bankers' Mut. Cas. Co., 124 Iowa 576, 100 N.W. 532
(1904); Savage v. O'Neil, 44 N.Y. 298 (1871); Stokes v. Macken, 62 Barb. 145 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1861). When the roots of a state's jurisprudence are traceable to a foreign
country, the general presumption of identity usually will override this common-law
limitation. E.g., Bostrom v. Segnros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963),
modified on other grounds, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965) (Texas and Mexico); cf.
Record Truck Line, Inc. v. Harrison, 109 Ga. App. 653, 137 S.E.2d 65 (1964).
92. See generally Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19- HARv. L. REv. 401,
410-13 (1906); Annot., Presumption as to Law of Foreign Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529,
538-39 (1961). One curious presumption identifies the foreign law only with the forum's
common law, even when the forum's common law has been changed by statute. See
Reidman v. Macht, 98 Ind. App. 124, 183 N.E. 807 (1932). The net effect may be the
application of a set of legal principles that is not in force either in the foreign country whose law is to be applied or in the forum.
93. See Van Wyck v. Hills, 4 Rob. 140 (La. 1843); Burgess v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 92 Tex. 125, 46 S.W. 794 (1898).
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is predicated upon the hypothesis that the conduct of the partiestheir failure to assert foreign law-represents acquiescence in the
court's application of forum law. 94
Although many commentators have referred to the use of these
presumptions as "naive" or "unrealistic," they generally have applauded the application of forum law out of sympathy for the results
achieved or because of their antipathy toward the vested rights
theory of conflict of laws. Several scholars have offered conceptual
frameworks to rationalize the application of the forum's law. One
effort of this type is Professor Arthur Nussbaum's "Substantial
Justice Theory," which permits a court to apply domestic law whenever the parties appear content with local law or whenever the application of forum law would be "just," as measured by the difficulties
and costliness of proving foreign law under the common-law methods
and by whether forum law provides "a perfectly reasonable disposition of the litigation."95 Professor Nussbaum, however, would apply
foreign law, under something akin to the public-policy concept, in
matrimonial disputes and whenever a substantial disparity exists
between the philosophy underlying the relevant portions of local
and foreign substantive law.
Perhaps the most penetrating analytical rejection of the treatment accorded a failure to prove foreign law under Crosby and
Walton has been advanced by Professor Brainerd Currie, who advocates the use of forum law absent a request by one of the parties that
another law be applied. 96 According to the Currie thesis, if a party
does request the application of foreign law, he has the burden of
establishing the relevant rules of decision under that law.97 Unlike
94. See, e.g., Watford v. Alabama-Florida Lumber Co., 152 Ala. 178, 44 So. 567
(1907): Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951). See also SoMMERICH &: BuscH,
FOREIGN I.Aw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 78-80 (1959). The parties' tacit agreement that the court apply forum law in this context should be distinguished from
a stipulation by the parties that their contract be governed by the law of a particular
country. See Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018,
1039-40 (1941).
95. See Nussbaum, supra note 94, at 1039-44. Note that if the recent statutory
modifications of the common-law proof methods effectively reduce the cost and difficulty of proving foreign law, one of the legs of Professor Nussbaum's theory will be
weakened.
96. Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964,
1001 (1958). English practice after the seventeenth century seems to have been of
like tenor. See id.. at 967-70.
97. A result not too different from that suggested by Professor Currie was reached
in Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 267, 84 A.2d 725, 728 (1951), 37 CORNELL L.Q. 748
(1952). Both Professor Currie and the Leary court argue that the deficiencies of the
"territorial" or "vested rights" approach to determining and applying foreign tort
cases is best exemplified by Walton. See also 5 WEINSTEIN, KoRN &: MILLER, NEW
YORK CML PRACTICE ,r,r 4511.02, .06 (1966). One of the important objections
pointed out by Professor Currie to the Crosby-Walton approach is that it calls for a
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the use of presumptions, this approach is not based on the fiction
that foreign law is being applied by proxy; it is an unabashed utilization of forum law. Direct application of forum law absent a request
to apply foreign law is advantageous in terms of administrative
simplicity, certainty, and, because it avoids a forfeiture of rights
for a failure of proof, fairness. A traditionalist might object to Professor Currie's thesis on the ground that it may result in a reversal
of the burden of going forward and perhaps even the ultimate burden of persuasion when a request to apply foreign law is made. Yet
this already has occurred in jurisdictions employing one of the identity presumptions. An even more fundamental retort to this objection
to the Currie approach is that traditional notions about burdens of
proof on issues of fact are relevant to the proof of foreign law only
if the fact characterization of foreign law is accepted. I£ it is rejected,
as it should be, a number of pathways to follow on the quest for a
governing law become manifest. But more of this later.98

III.

PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

A. Raising an Issue of Foreign Law

I. The Traditional Pleading Requirement
Prior to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts
embraced the fact theory of alien law and insisted that a party
intending to rely on foreign law give formal notice in his pleadings.99 As did the state courts,100 the federal courts required the substance and effect of foreign law to be pleaded; it was not necessary
dismissal for a failure of foreign-law proof without it being certain that there is any
foreign law on the point or, even if there is, that the foreign law expresses an important
public policy. Currie, supra note 96, at 1003. Therefore, the vested-rights approach
may result in the dismisal of a cause when foreign law is so uncivilized that the forum
would not have applied it even if it had been established. See note 87 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 306-31 infra.
99. See, e.g., Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912); Liverpool &: Great W. Steam
Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889); Rowan v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 515
(5th Cir. 1941); cf. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irrigation Co., 265 Fed. 594 (8th
Cir. 1920). The generally accepted notion that a federal court judicially notices the
laws of all the states, see text accompanying notes 146, 149-50 infra, eliminates the
need to plead the law of the state in which the court is sitting or the law of any
other state. See, e.g., Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218 (1885); United States Rubber Co. v.
Poage, 297 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1962); Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio
1960); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952); Straub v. Jaeger,
9 F.R.D. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1950). But cf. Anderson v. National Producing Co., 253 F.2d
834 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958). The party relying on the law of another
state does have the obligation to call its applicability to the court's attention, however. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 126 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1942). See also Jannenga v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 288 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
100. See text accompanying notes 19-22, 55-58 supra.
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to include a verbatim transcript of the foreign law or the materials
supporting the pleader's interpretation of it. 101 In several cases, however, the pleader was required to set forth a reasonably specific
abstract of the controlling provisions of foreign law. 102 A failure to
plead foreign law in the requisite detail generally resulted in a
dismissal with leave to replead. 103
This pattern persevered virtually unchallenged for many years
after the Federal Rules were adopted. 104 Finally, in 1955, the Second
Circuit, in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 105 sanctioned the
taking of judicial notice of the English law of estoppel under section 344-a of the New York Civil Practice Act, which the court applied pursuant to Federal Rule 43(a), even though the parties neither
pleaded nor attempted to prove the content of English law. The
court concluded that inasmuch as Federal Rule 8(a) requires only
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief," it is unnecessary to plead the legal theory on
which the claim is based. 106 Siegelman was characterized as "a bombshell" and disapproved of by some commentators107 but received the
101. See, e.g., United States v. National City Bank, 7 F.R.D. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1946);
cf. Coronet Phosphate Co. v. United States Shipping Co., 260 Fed. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)
(admiralty). Under the Conformity Act, 17 Stat. 196 (1872), the pleading rules of the
forum state guided the federal courts in determining the sufficiency of a foreign-law
statement. See, e.g., Panama Elec. Ry. v. Moyers, 249 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1918).
102. See Poras v. Gabor Bano, 24 F.R. Serv. 8a.474 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Lehnertz v.
Societe Anonyme Beige d'Exploitation de Ia Navigation Aerienne, 8 F.R.D. 319
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); Keasbey &: Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, I F.R.D. 626 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
In McKenzie&: Sarabia, The Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 TuL. L. REv. 353
(1956), the authors suggest that the preferable practice is to include detailed allegations concerning the applicable foreign law in the pleadings.
103. See, e.g., Harrison v. United Fruit Co., 143 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Keasbey &: Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, supra note 102. See also Supine v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 100 F. Supp. 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
104. See, e.g., Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1952); Harris v. American
Int'! Fuel 8: Petroleum Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1954); Empresa Agricola
Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Chemacid,
S.A. v. Ferrotar Corp., 3 F.R.D. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). But see Keeffe, Landis &: Shaad,
Sense and Nonsense about Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664, 685 (1950). The pleading requirement also survived in admiralty. See Prol v. Holland-America Line, 234
F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); text accompanying notes 113-14 infra.
105. 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
106. Id. at 196.
107. SOMMERICH 8:: BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 26
(1959); Busch, When Law Is Fact, 24 FoRDHAM L. REv. 646 (1956). One commentator
opined that Siegelman did not eliminate pleading and proof of foreign law. Drachsler, Judicial Initiative in the Proof of Foreign Law, A.B.A. SEC. !NT'L 8: COMP. L.,
PROCEEDINGS 126, 128 (1956). In view of the plain language of the opinion concerning
pleading, the statement seems difficult to support as an absolute proposition.
The cries of surprise seem inappropriate since a similar conclusion was reached
in Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950), although the opinion in
that case did not contain an extended analysis of the question and was rendered
without reference to Rule 8(a). See also Rosenthal v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
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approbation of others. 108 Moreover, the text of the court's opinion
created considerable uncertainty as to the proper scope to be given
the case.
Approximately a year after Siegelman, the Second Circuit was
confronted by Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., which has
previously been briefly described.109 In Walton the court refused to
take judicial notice of the law of Saudi Arabia under the same state
statute that was applied in Siegelman. After noting the criticism that
had been levelled at the earlier case, Siegelman was distinguished
because it involved English law-a body of law "an American court
can easily comprehend"; Walton was said to require the application
of a jurisprudence "not easy" to ascertain.11° As to its failure to
invoke section 344-a of the New Yark Civil Practice Act, the Second
Circuit stated:
a court "abuses" its discretion under that statute perhaps if it takes
judicial notice of foreign "law" when it is not pleaded, and surely
does so unless the party, who would otherwise have had the burden
of proving that "law," has in some way adequately assisted the court
in judicially learning it.111

This passage is the court's only direct reference to the pleading
question.
The impact of Wal ton on the pleading of foreign law in the
federal courts prior to 1966 is unclear. Perhaps its significance was
that it demonstrated the limitations on the discretion a federal district
court might exercise in employing judicial notice in the absence of
pleading, a point left very much in doubt by Siegelman. The case also
may be viewed as a ukase to the federal courts not to invoke a state
judicial-notice statute under circumstances in which it would be inatlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The decision in Rosenthal seems to be based
upon the rudimentary-principles concept, which was used to excuse not only a failure
to plead French law but a failure to prove it as well. The court stated:
The rule seems to be that a plaintiff asserting a rudimentary right generally
recognized in civilized countries may assume like recognition in the applicable
jurisdiction and need not affirmatively allege the existence of the right and the
imposition of liability for its violation.
Id. at 35. The court relied on Cuba R.R., Jansson, and Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Rivers, 211 Fed. 294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 727 (1914). In Harris
v. American Int'! Fuel & Petroleum Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 0fl.D. Pa. 1954), the court
mistakenly referred to Jansson in concluding that foreign law must be pleaded.
108. Note, 69 HARV. L. REv. 563, 564-65 (1956).
109. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956); see text accompanying
notes 83-84 supra.
110. 233 F.2d at 544. Only one of the three judges on the Walton panel, Judge
Frank, the author of the opinion, also was a member of the Siegelman panel.
111. Id. at 544. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr § 344-a has been replaced by N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
L. & R. 4511. The numerous implications of Walton are analyzed in Currie, On the
Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964 (1958).
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appropriate for a state court to do so. Finally, Walton may have had
no bearing on the pleading of foreign law in the federal courts
because it turned on the plaintiff's refusal to prove Saudi Arabian
law rather than his failure to plead it. A dismissal for lack of proof
as to the existence of a cause of action under foreign law is not
necessarily inconsistent with the Siegelman notion that Federal
Rule 8(a) does not require foreign law to be pleaded. In view of
the plethora of theses that can be conjured up, it is not surprising
that the post-Siegelman and Walton foreign-law pleading decisions
were somewhat inconsistent and re.fleeted the uncertainty generated
by the two cases. 112
The admiralty pleading practice before the promulgation of
112. This was particularly true in the district courts in the Second Circuit. In
Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1958), the court ignored
Siegelman and stated, in dictum, that the pleader must set out the substance of foreign
law and "appropriate citations of the applicable statutes and one or more citations of
decisional law, if there be any." Id. at 730. See also Poras v. Gabor :Bano, 24 F.R.
Serv. 8a.474 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (pleading requirement said not changed by Federal Rules;
Siegelman not cited). The Walton court also noted that section 344-a of New York's
Civil Practice Act did not affect the Federal Rules. Cf. Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). In Luckett v. Cohen, 145 F. Supp. 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), Judge Murphy, again in dictum, stated that pleading foreign law was
not required in view of Siegelman, but went on to say:
However, assuming Mexican law is the law to be applied, why should not plaintiff
plead ~e law he thinks applicable. His answer is that the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in so many words has said it was not necessary. Although he
might not have to plead it under Siegelman he would be better advised to do
so since he will eventually have to prove it, if in fact Mexican is the applicable
law.
Id. at 157. See also :Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co., 211 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (Iranian law not pleaded). A square holding dismissing the complaint with
leave to amend for failure to plead the foreign law upon which the claim was based
is found in Harrison v. United Fruit Co., 143 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The decision
is consistent with Siegelman and Walton only if those cases are read as requiring
pleading whenever it would be improper for foreign law to be judicially noticed by
a federal court pursuant to state law-a strained interpretation because of the weak,
if not nonexistent, interrelationship between what should be pleaded under Rule 8(a)
and the propriety of using Rule 43(a) to take judicial notice under state law.
Outside the Second Circuit, the post-Siegelman and -Walton and pre-1966 status
of pleading foreign law also was unclear. In Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945 (9th Cir.
1958), the Ninth Circuit rejected a request to take judicial notice of Peruvian law,
concluding that in light of Crosby "appellant's complaint, having failed to allege his
right to recover," had to be dismissed. Id. at 948. The court cited Walton but did not
refer to Siegelman. The same year the Second Circuit wrestled with Siegelman, the
District Court of Delaware decided F.A.R. Liquidating Corp. v. :Brownell, 130 F. Supp.
691 (D. Del. 1955), a case involving the Trading With The Enemy Act. At a pretrial
conference following the Third Circuit's reversal of an earlier grant of summary
judgment by the trial court, a foreign-law issue was interposed by the defendant for
the first time. The court held that because it had not been pleaded, foreign law
could not be interjected at that point and would not be listed as a triable issue in
the pretrial order-a result somewhat inconsistent with Siegelman. The decision actually may turn on the district court's belief that its freedom to define the issues for
trial was circumscribed by the prior decision of the court of appeals. In Pederson v.
United States, 191 F. Supp. 95 (D. Guam 1961), the court expressly applied Siegelman
and held the pleading of foreign law unnecessary.
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Federal Rule 44.1, which applies to both civil and admiralty litigation, appears to have been less confused but slightly more burdensome than the practice on the civil side of the court. Whereas Civil
Rule S(a) required only a short and plain statement of the claim,
former Admiralty Rule 22 required the pleader to set forth "the
various allegations of fact upon which the libellant relies." This
standard was interpreted as requiring more than conclusory statements as to the substance and effect of foreign law; 113 an unadorned
statement that a right of action existed under the laws of a foreign
country was insufficient.114
An evaluation of the conflicting judicial views on pleading foreign law will provide a useful transition to a discussion of Federal
Rule 44.1. A pleading requirement is supported by the metaphysics
of the fact theory of foreign law1115 and numerous federal decisions
rendered prior to Siegelman. The significance of the latter point
is somewhat questionable, however, because Siegelman was the first
decision rendered under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
analyze the impact of Rule S(a) on the pleading requirement. Earlier
post-1938 cases were content to intone the common-law rule and
cite pre-1938 decisions or other post-1938 cases that had relied exclusively on cases decided before the Federal Rules were adopted. 116
A pleading requirement also might be justified as a notice device.
Simply put, it is unrealistic to expect a court to sense the presence
113. See Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Cia. Nav., S.A., 291 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1961);
Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also
Wall Street Traders, Inc. v. Sociedad Espanola de Construccion Naval, 236 F. Supp. !158
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). Prior to the advent of the Admiralty Rules, a federal admiralty court
was not bound to follow state practice under the Conformity Act but could develop
its own pleading practice. In Coronet Phosphate Co. v. United States Shipping Co.,
260 Fed. 846, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), the court seems to have done precisely that with
regard to foreign law by stating that the pleader "is bound to set out its substance
so that the court may judge whether it has the effect which he ascribes." See also
The Jean Jadot, 14 F. Supp. 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). But cf. The Alps, 19 Fed. 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1883) (pleading of English law not required because plaintiff's claim was
small and defendant could not have been misled).
114. See Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Cia. Nav., S.A., supra note 113; Iafrate v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
115. The two most important federal-practice texts lend credence to the fact theory
as a basis for a pleading requirement. See IA BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 253 (Wright ed. 1961); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i 8.17[9] (2d ed.
1966). Professor Moore suggests a rapprochement between the conflicting views whereby
foreign statutes "if easily accessible" would be referred to in the pleadings but foreign
decisions would not. This suggestion does not obviate any of the basic objections to
a pleading requirement and interposes an unnecessary fount of contention.
116. See, e.g., Rowan v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 515 {5th Cir. 1941); Empresa
Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
Even the pre-Siegelman opinions in the Jansson litigation, see note 107 supra, focused
on the fact that both parties knew foreign law controlled the case and did not mention the possibility that former practice had been changed by the Federal Rules.

February 1967]

Federal Rule 44.1 and Foreign Law

643

of a foreign-law issue without any guidance from the litigants, and
it is desirable to eliminate the possibility that parties will be surprised
by a sudden invocation and application of foreign law. But whether
the pleading stage is either the only or the most advantageous point on
the litigation spectrum for requiring that notice be given of the
relevance of foreign law is questionable. This doubt is reinforced by
the fact that the Federal Rules represent a drastic departure from the
practices current when the common-law rule relating to pleading
foreign law was formulated, 117 and the perpetuation of the original
rule can be justified only if it is harmonious with the norms and
objectives of the existing pleading mandates.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that foreign law does raise an
issue of fact, the Federal Rules do not call for the pleading of facts
or recitals of the type required by the pleading systems in vogue
during the gestation and maturation of the fact theory. Moreover,
the pretrial center of gravity of present day federal litigation has
moved from the pleadings toward the deposition and discovery
phase. This shift in emphasis was designed to alleviate the pleadings
of some of the manifold burdens they formerly carried and to eliminate much of the hypertechnicality and time consuming motion
practice that was characteristic of code and common-law pleading;
aspects of the former systems that rarely furthered the disposition of
cases on their merits. Nothing in the Federal Rules indicates that
these policy objectives are inapplicable when the pleader is trying to
raise an issue of foreign law or that actions involving an issue of alien
law are to be encumbered by a heavier pleading burden. Indeed, as
the Second Circuit pointed out in Siegelman, the unqualified text
of Rule 8(a) is evidence to the contrary. 118
Perhaps even more fundamental is the questionable utility of a
pleading requirement. It is futile to require a party to identify the
governing foreign law and elaborate on its content at the pleading
stage; an attorney cannot be expected to have a sufficient mastery of
the operative facts at an embryonic stage of the litigation to enable
him to discharge a pleading requirement meaningfully. A rule that
requires counsel to engage in extensive and expensive forays into the
complexities of the jurisprudence of one or more foreign countries
before the viscera of the action have been exposed is of dubious
117. See generally IA BARRON &: HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 251
(Wright ed. 1961); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,J 8.05 (2d ed. 1966); cf. Fernandez v.
Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
118. The federal courts generally have rejected the argument that certain classes
of litigation allegedly having peculiar characteristics should be governed by "special"
pleading requirements. See, e.g., Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
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value. Moreover, a mandatory pleading requirement often will have
the effect of intimidating an uncertain pleader into alleging the
relevance of foreign law in order to protect himself against the possibility of waiver, which in turn engenders reliance on the part of his
adversary and causes him to devote energy to a foreign-law issue that
is formally raised in the pleadings but may later prove to be vaporous. Another weakness of a pleading requirement is that it does not
guarantee a definitive or binding statement concerning foreign law
because the Federal Rules take a liberal stance regarding pleading
amendments119 and hypothetical and alternative statements;120 moreover, a party is not compelled to elect among several potentially
applicable laws at the pleading stage.121 Given the pitfalls of pleading alien law, a federal court would be remiss if it did not take a
liberal attitude toward requests to amend a pleading containing a
statement of foreign law.
Inasmuch as the objective of providing notice of a party's intention to rely on foreign law can be secured at any reasonable point
anterior to or during trial and the pleadings do not bind the parties
to any particular theory or statement of foreign law, there is little
justification for a mandatory pleading rule. A pleader is not required
to cite local statutes or decisions or set forth their substance and
effect in an action predicated upon domestic law. Why should he be
required to do so in an action involving foreign law? No satisfactory
answer is readily apparent. Indeed, it is difficult to identify any
reason other than the historic tendency to characterize the law of a
foreign country as a fact-a characterization whose genesis is obscure
and whose significance lies outside the pleading orb.122 Even conceding that foreign-law issues often present unique problems of identifying and procuring source materials or of divining the intent of
legal materials written in a strange language and predicated on a
jurisprudence and history variant from our own, these are insuffi- cient bases for departing from the basic precepts of Federal Rule
pleading. Long before the appearance of Rule 44.1, the federal courts
should have distinguished the giving of notice of a foreign-law issue
-a legitimate, but by no means exclusive, pleading goal-from the
process of ascertaining and applying the content of foreign law; it is
only in the latter context that the difficulties presented by alien law
119. FED. R. Crv. P. 15.
120. FED. R. Crv. P. S(e).
121. See Finne v. Koninklinjke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 11 F.R.D. !1!16
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
122. See text accompanying notes 7-18 supra.
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might justify some departure from the treatment accorded domestic
law.

2. The Reasonable Written Notice Requirement
of Federal Rule 44.1
In preparing its proposals regarding the determination of foreign
law for submission to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Commission and Advisory Committee on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure and the drafting group
of the Columbia Law School Project on International Procedure
extensively debated and finally rejected a suggestion that a subparagraph requiring the pleading of foreign law be added to Federal
Rule 9. Variations on the following formulation were considered:
When setting forth a claim or defense governed by the law of a
foreign country or its political subdivision, the pleader shall identify
the country or subdivision and state generally the substance of the
foreign law.
It was decided that a provision of this type would be antithetical to
the basic premises of Federal Rule pleading and that it might encourage unfruitful motion practice directed to the sufficiency of the
foreign-law statement or require the court to determine foreign-law
issues at too preliminary a point in the lawsuit. Once the notion of
a special pleading rule was abandoned, it was agreed that a rule
covering a range of foreign-law problems in a manner consistent
with the treatment accorded analogous problems by the Federal
Rules should be proposed to the Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The first sentence of Rule 44.1 reflects that philosophy. It requires a party who intends to raise an issue of foreign law to "give
notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice." 123 This
passage is designed to minimize the opportunity for unfair surprise
and to eliminate the confusion that followed Siegelman and Walton
by making it clear that pleading is not a prerequisite to raising an
issue of foreign law. An attorney who intends to invoke foreign law
now has sufficient temporal flexibility to investigate his client's case
fully before raising the issue; the absence of any compulsion to plead
foreign law should avoid premature conclusions and poorly-timed or
wasteful research efforts. 124 When a pleader is uncertain whether
123. As a result of the unification of civil and admiralty procedure in 1966, Rule
44.I applies also to admiralty cases. The notice requirement in criminal cases is
discussed in note 5 supra.
,
124. The new Rule seems consistent with a number of state statutes, see, e.g.,
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foreign law applies or is in doubt as to which country's law controls,
he may refrain from asserting foreign law until it is convenient for
him to do so. In many instances, of course, the relevance of foreign
law is apparent from the outset and an attorney will find it relatively
simple and desirable to satisfy the first sentence of Rule 44.1 by
giving notice in his pleading of his intention to raise a foreign-law
issue.
Rule 44.1 simply calls for "reasonable written notice"; neither the
statutes nor the judicial decisions of a foreign country need be cited or
set out in haec verba. Since the Rule does not require the "substance"
or "effect" of foreign law to be pleaded, it is evident that the primary
function of the notice is not to spell out the precise contents of
foreign law but rather to apprise the court and the litigants of its
relevance to the lawsuit-an objective that can be achieved with a
minimum of formality and without a high degree of specificity.125
The Rule does insist upon a certain quantum of information, however. A notice merely announcing that "counsel intends to raise an
issue concerning the law of a foreign country" obviously would be
insufficient. The spirit of the "reasonable written notice" standard
requires the notice giver to specify the segment of the controversy
he believes is governed by foreign law and to identify the country
whose law is thought to control. When it is unclear whether foreign
law is in issue or when the identity of the relevant law is uncertain
at the time compliance with Rule 44.1 is attempted, the party giving
notice may protect himself by stating his intentions alternatively or
hypothetically. 126
Should events" following the service of the notice prove its contents to be inaccurate, the liberal amendment provisions in Federal
Rule 15 provide a safety valve for modifying a notice given in the
pleadings, 127 and these provisions can be used by analogy to establish
CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 310-11, 450-60 (effective Jan. 1, 1967); Mn. ANN. ConE art. 35,
§ 50 (1957); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &: R. 45ll(b), and the tenor of judicial construction
given the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act in some states, see, e.g.,
Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1955); Colozzi v. Bevko, Inc., 17 N.J. 194,
110 A.2d 545 (1955).
125. The conclusory words "substance" and "effect" have generated considerable
confusion when used in some state foreign-law pleading provisions. See, e.g., 3
WEINSTEIN, KoRN &: MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRAcnCE ,J 3016.16 (1966).
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2); cf. Tsangarakis v. Panama S.S. Co., 197 F. Supp.
704 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57
F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
127. Cf. Daniel Lumber Co. v. Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465, 470 (5th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955). See also IA BARRON &: HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 442 (Wright ed. 1961); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE
,r 15.08(2) (2d ed. 1966).
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standards for modifying a notice given outside the pleadings. A trial
court's willingness to permit a party to deviate from his notice will
depend upon a variety of factors, including (I) the length of time
that has elapsed between the original notice and the attempt to
amend, (2) the notice giver's good faith in submitting the first notice
and seeking its correction, (3) the complexity of the foreign-law
issues, (4) the extent to which other parties have relied on the original notice or may be prejudiced by the change, and (5) the court's
attitude toward the mandates in Rule 15 directing that amendments
be allowed whenever the interests of justice would be served.
The specific content of the notice should not be viewed as immutable or used to restrict a party's proof at trial unreasonably.
Once an issue as to a certain country's law has been raised, the notice
giver's proof should not be limited to the particular statutes or decisions that may have been identified in the notice. An adverse party
cannot complain if the court looks beyond those references to other
portions of the applicable foreign law or if the party who gave notice
seeks to support his position with additional materials. 128 The variance problem becomes more complex when a party seeks to depart
from his notice by interjecting the law of a nation other than one
mentioned in the original notice. In this situation, the court must
consider the same factors that are pertinent to a pleading amendment or a variance between pleading and proof and, when the shift
is sought after trial has commenced, an attempt must be made to
evaluate the amendment in light of the impact it may have on the
parties and their trial preparation.
The new Rule is properly silent as to when the notice should be
served inasmuch as that is a function of the circumstances in each
case. Obviously, the timing of the notice is one aspect to be considered in determining whether a notice is "reasonable." According
to the Advisory Committee's Note to the Rule:
The stage which the case has reached at the time of the notice, the
reason proffered by the party for his failure to give earlier notice,
and the importance to the case as a whole of the issue of foreign law
sought to be raised, are among the factors which the court should
consider in deciding a question of the reasonableness of a notice.129
The court thus has broad discretion to accept or reject a notice
tendered at any point in the proceedings and, as is true of an attempt
128. Cf. Continental Assur. Co. v. Henson, 297 Ky. 764, 181 S.W.2d 431 (1944).
129. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.1, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. ll7, US (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
&: AD. NEWS 807, 808.
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to modify a notice, can draw upon its experience in analogous contexts, such as pleading amendments and variances.130 Generally, however, a party should not be permitted to raise a foreign-law issue after
the pretrial conference is held, absent extenuating circumstances.131
Notice may be given by any party who "intends to raise" an
issue of foreign law. Normally, this means that the party whose cause
of action or defense is based on foreign law is responsible for calling
the relevance of foreign law to the attention of the court and the
other litigants. When the foreign-law issue is of a collateral nature
in an otherwise entirely domestic action-for example, a question
in an American naturalization controversy of the validity of a marriage or the legitimacy of a child under the law of another country
-the notice-giving burden will fall on the party who plans to rely
on foreign law when the particular issue ultimately is litigated.
The problem becomes more complex when the action appears to
depend upon foreign law but the plaintiff chooses to proceed as if it
were governed by forum law and does not give notice under Rule
44.1. If the defendant believes that the applicable foreign law provides no redress for the plaintiff's grievance, he will probably challenge the latter's right to recover on that basis. Does this mean that
the obligation to give notice has shifted to the defendant, or is he
free at any point in the litigation to spring his defense that the plaintiff's action is governed by an alien law that affords no relief? Since
the defendant is a party who "intends to raise" an issue of foreign
law, the text of the new Rule seems to require his giving notice. The
conclusion is the same from a policy perspective. The function of
the first sentence of Rule 44.1 is to insure that the presence of a
foreign-law issue is called to the attention of the court and the
litigants as early as possible. It would be atavistic to permit the
defendant, or any party, to secrete an issue of foreign law until his
adversary has irretrievably relied on domestic law. The defendant
must be obliged to assert his belief that the plaintiff's right to recover depends on foreign law. There do not appear to be any considerations warranting an antipodal conclusion. The burden of
130. Cf. Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 246 F. Supp. 634, 636 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). In Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Gorter, 254 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1958), the
defendant mistakenly relied on the law of British Columbia. Just as the case was being
submitted for decision, the defendant moved to amend its answer to show that the
law of the Dominion of Canada was applicable. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial
court's denial of the motion because the defendant's reliance on the law of British
Columbia was excusable error and permitting the amendment would not prejudice
the plaintiff.
131. See Valdesa Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Frota Nacional de Petroleiros, 848 F.2d
33, 36-38 (3d Cir. 1965). The relationship between the pretrial conference and foreign
law is discussed at text accompanying notes 226-30 infra.
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givmg notice is a light one and compliance does not affect the
choice-of-law rules or bear on the consequences flowing from a
failure to establish foreign law. Thus, if the defendant is obliged
to give notice, he does not thereby assume the burden of persuading
the court on that issue132 or waive the effect of the plaintiff's failure
to establish his rights should the court ultimately decide that -the
case is governed by foreign law.133
According to the Advisory Committee, once notice is given by
one party, it "serves as a basis for presentation of material on the
foreign law by all parties" without the issuance of subsequent
notices. 134 However, if a party believes that a markedly different
portion of the law referred to in the original notice is relevant or
wishes to assert the law of a different country, the text of the Committee's Note does not seem apposite and it is advisable for him to
serve his own notice. A second notice presumably is not necessary
when a party merely intends to challenge the first notice giver's construction and suggested application of foreign law, as would be the
case when the defendant wishes to base his defense on a portion of
the code that the plaintiff claims furnishes him with a cause of
action.135
B. Determining an Issue of Foreign Law

I. Proof of Foreign Law
a. The pattern prior to Federal Rule 44 .1. Shortly after the establishment of the federal judiciary, the United States Supreme Court
put its imprimatur on the fact characterization of foreign law136 and
the federal courts predictably adopted the common-law pattern of
proof. As a result, the party alleging the applicability of foreign law
was assigned the burden of proving it by competent evidence and
132, See Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grasso, 186 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1951). See also
Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
133. The consequences of failing to establish foreign law in the federal courts are
discussed at text accompanying notes 306-31 infra.
134. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.I, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 117, 118 (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE CoNc.
&: AD. NEWS 807, 808; cf. Wilson v. Dailey, 191 Md. 472, 62 A.2d 284 (1948).
135. Cf. Continental Assur. Co. v. Henson, 297 Ky. 764, 181 S.W.2d 431 (1944);
H. &: J. Gross, Inc. v. Fraser, 140 Mont. 95, 368 P.2d 163 (1962). Although they occasionally may provide useful analytical pegs, the notions of "estoppel" and "waiver"
should not be overworked in this context. See also Comment, Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 38 WASH. L. REV. 802, 805, 815 (1963). In order to avoid the type of calcification that so often accompanies these verbal shorthands, the court always should
return to the objectives of the first sentence of Rule 44.I and to considerations of
fairness.
136. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) I, 38 (1801).
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the federal courts rejected all supplications to the effect that they
had inherent power to take judicial notice of foreign law.137
The federal courts have recognized four exceptions to the proof
requirement. The first applies to so-called rudimentary principles of
law. In Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Rivers138 this notion
was invoked in an action by a female passenger against a French
steamship company for injuries incurred as a result of a vicious and
wanton attack by one of the defendant's employees. The Second
Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the action failed
because the plaintiff did not plead and prove French law, stating
that it would be "almost an insult to any self-respecting, civilized
country" to fail to assume that the employee's conduct was redressible
under its law. 139 The court put the burden of proving the lack of a
cause of action under French law on the steamship company. Further
elaboration of the rudimentary principles doctrine is found in Judge
Learned Hand's opinion in E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.: 140
The extent of our right to make any assumptions about the law of
another country depends upon the country and the question involved; in common-law countries we may go further than in civil
law; in civilized, than in backward or barbarous. We can say more
in the case of France or Italy, than of Abyssinia, or Afghanistan ... ,
less, than in the case of England or Australia. No doubt, when there
137. See, e.g., Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S.
397 (1889); Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400, 426 (1852); Armstrong v. Lear, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 52 (1834); Strother v. Lucas, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 763 (1832); Commissioner v.
Hyde, 82 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1936); In re Circle Trading Corp., 26 F.2d 193 (2d Cir.
1928; Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Chantry, 136 Fed. 316 (5th Cir. 1905); Mexican Nat'l R.R.
v. Slater, 115 Fed. 593 (5th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 194 U.S. 120 (1904). See also United States
ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1943) (habeas corpus petition); Normann
v. Schmidt, 125 F.2d 162 (C.C.P.A. 1942); Ex parte Hing, 22 F.2d 554 (W.D. Wash.
1927); Hockett v. Alston, 3 Indian Terr. 432, 58 S.W. 675 (1900) (law of Cherokee
Nation); Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. Is. 46 (1915). The attitude of
the federal courts toward foreign law and its proof is exemplified by the following
passage from Shapleigh v. Mier, 83 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1936), afj'd, 299 U.S. 468 (1937):
It [Mexican Law] remains foreign law to be proven as a fact when written by
production of copies of the Constitution and statutes, and in other respects by
the testimony of experts. The writings are to be construed by the judge as other
writings in evidence, but if uncertain in meaning or application evidence of
experts is again admissible to aid the construction. . • • Any other rule would
not work, for the judge could hardly be truly conversant with the law of Mexico
and would have no access to the forum; and if he were free, as in case of taking
judicial notice, to consult any book or person in his discretion, the parties litigant would have no means of knowing what he relied on and no sure means of
putting the truth before him.
Id. at 676. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, 210 Fed. 810 (2d Cir. 1913);
Shelton v. Canadian No. Ry., 189 Fed. 153 (C.C.D. Minn. 1911); Seton v. Delaware Ins.
Co., 21 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 12675) (C.C.D. Pa. 1808); Robinson v. Clifford, 20 Fed, Cas.
1001 (No. 11948) (C.C.D. Pa. 1807).
138. 211 Fed. 294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 727 (1914).
139. Id. at 298.
140. 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931).
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is no evidence, we are always much limited in cases where the
common-law does not prevail; but we are not quite without power
in commercial matters arising in one of the great commercial countries of Western Europe.... We can assume that in Italy an agreement of carriage creates obligations, generally measured by the language used... ~ We may not, however, assume anything as to how
far a carrier by contract is allowed to set a value upon the goods he
carries; as to that we know nothing. Prima facie, the agreement is
a contract; he who maintains that in a given situation it is not, must
prove the law of Italy.141
At first glance, the rudimentary principles theory appears to be
an attractive mechanism for eliminating the need to prove foreign
law, especially if it is applied with the reasoned flexibility suggested
by Judge Hand. It is curious, therefore, that despite the recognition
of the doctrine for the better part of a century--certainly an adequate time for it to mature and expand-it has been used, except in
a handful of cases, only in actions involving grossly antisocial conduct on the part of the defendant. Relatively few judges have invoked it and the federal courts have yet to agree on the propriety of
applying it in such basic contexts as negligence142 and the masterservant relationship. 143
The second exception to the proof requirement permits the federal courts to take judicial notice of the principles of international
law and the maritime law of western nations. 144 According to a number of decisions, only the well established and widely recognized
rules of international and maritime law are within the aegis of this
exception.145 For example, the federal courts have refrained from
taking judicial notice of deviations from general maritime law
adopted by individual nations.
The two remaining special rules are isomorphic and can be considered together. Under the third exception, a federal court is
obligated to apply the judicial decisions and statutes of the several
states, not merely the law of the state in which it happens to be
141. Id. at 117.
142. Compare Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 872 (1956), with Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962),
and Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950), and Rosenthal v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
143. See Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
144. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The New York, 175 U.S. 187
(1899); The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 370 (1885); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170
(1871); Lawlor v. Incres Nassau S.S. Line, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 764 (D. Mass. 1958). See
also McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. R.Ev. 296, 310 (1952).
145. See, e.g., Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart &: Sons, Ltd., 336 U.S.
386, 396 (1949). See also Yang-Tsze Ins. Ass'n v. Furness, Withy &: Co., 215 Fed. 859
(2d Cir. 1914), appeal dismissed, 242 U.S. 430 (1917).
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sitting.146 The fourth exception actually is a group of closely related
incursions on the proof requirement. Collectively they permit the
federal courts to notice the foreign law in force in an area prior to
its accession by the United States, the law in force in a territory
before it became a state, the law common to a foreign country and a
territory that has become a state,147 and the law in the colonies and
in England prior to the American Revolution. 148
A reasonably persuasive rationale for each of the four exceptions
is easy to articulate. Considerations of administtative convenience
and fairness presumably underlie the rudimentary principles doctrine. The notion that a party asserting a "fundamental" or "rudimentary" right should not be forced to prove that foreign law
recognizes the obvious has a certain appeal. The intemational-andmaritime-law exception apparently assumes that these principles are
widely recognized, have the approbation of the courts in most nations, are easily ascertainable, and, for all practical purposes, have
been assimilated into domestic law. Accordingly, it is deemed appropriate to ask the federal courts to apply this body of rules without
formal proof. The relatively few cases applying these two exceptions
may well be a testament to their limited value. In most instances it
probably is easier to prove foreign law than to establish that it is
"rudimentary" in character or, in the case of international or maritime law, "well-established."
Exceptions three and four are based on very different considerations and are really by-products of our federal polity and the role of
the federal judiciary under the Constitution rather than aspects of
any policy relating to the proof of foreign law. Because the Supreme
Court's power to review state court decisions brings it into daily
contact with the law of one or more states, it is inconceivable that
146. See, e.g., Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218 (1885); Pennington v. Gibson, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 65, 81 (1853); Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607, 625 (1835) (Louisiana law
applied). See also Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 151 U.S. 678, 678 (1894);
Salsberg v. Modern Transfer Co., 824 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1963); Parkway Baking Co. v.
Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958); McDermott v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 935 (1959); Colello v.
Sundquist, 137 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), afj'd, 229 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1956); lA
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE t;f 0.316[2] (2d ed. 1961). But see Anderson v. National Producing Co., 253 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452 (1895); United States v. Perot,
98 U.S. 428 (1878); Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 557 (1854);
United States v. Turner, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 663 (1850); Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Marshall,
91 Fed. 933 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 173 U.S. 705 (1899) (dictum); cf. Lokpez v. Sotelo,
70 P.R.R. 475 (1949). See also Panama Elec. Ry. v. Moyers, 249 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1918);
Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Glover, 107 Fed. 356 (5th Cir. 1901).
148, See, e.g., Loree v. Abner, 57 Fed. 159 (6th Cir. 1893).
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the Court would treat issues of state law differently than other questions of law. In addition, all levels of the federal judiciary are required to determine issues of state law when sitting in diversity
jurisdiction and, by virtue of the Rules of Decision Act, 149 must do
the same in a variety of contexts when adjudicating federal-question
cases. Moreover, from the inception of the national judicial system,
the federal courts, without any concern for the technicalities of proof,
have referred to the laws of the several states-and to English lawfor guidance in determining what state and federal law is or should
be in a variety of contexts.15° Courts that have grown accustomed
to this process cannot be expected to pay serious attention to an
argument that they are incapable of performing a comparable function when they are asked to apply state law.
It obviously is eminently sensible to permit the federal courts
to take notice of the law of each of the nation's constituent units,
whether it be their current law or their ancient law. But does it
make sense to denominate the Spanish or French law formerly in
force in parts of the South and Southwest, or the )aw of Louisiana,
as "law" when it must be applied by a federal court in New York,
and then to characterize the present law of Spain or France as "fact,"
when the consequence of this nomenclature is to superimpose on the
latter the same rules of proof as are used to determine an automobile's
speed or a traffic light's color? 151 The two situations certainly cannot
be distinguished on the basis of the burden they will impose on the
court. Of course, it is plausible to argue that absent the type of
policy justifications that are at the root of the third and fourth
exceptions to the proof requirement, the federal courts should not
be burdened with the task of delving into foreign law and should be
permitted to rely on adversarial presentations. Beyond this hypothesis, for which there is little existing empirical evidence or judicially
articulated support, there is little to commend the existing distinction.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not deal directly with
the proof of foreign law prior to 1966. Between 1938 and 1966 most
149. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
The relationship among the Rules of Decision Act, a number of related statutes, the
proof of foreign law in the federal courts, and Rule 44.1, is discussed at text accompanying notes 431-519 infra.
150. Between the decisions in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the federal courts frequently engaged in this
type of an investigation to ascertain general federal common law. E.g., Baltimore 8c
O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
151. See United States v. Turner, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 663, 668 (1850).
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federal courts adhered to prior practice by refusing to take judicial
notice of foreign law and insisting that it be proved as a fact. 152 The
four exceptions to the proof requirement retained their limited
virility but the courts manifested no proclivity to expand them. 153
A few courts departed from the common-law rule and took judicial
notice of foreign law, but usually only of extremely primordial legal
principles and without any enlightening discussion.154
Several federal courts deviated from common-law techniques by
relying on the passage in Federal Rule 43(a) providing that all
evidence
shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the
United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in
the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or
under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States Court is held. 155

The first two grounds for admissibility are of little relevance to this
discussion since there are no general federal statutes dealing with
proof of foreign law156 and the pre-1938 practice of proving alien
law in equity seems to have been the same as it was on the law side
of the federal courts. The third basis for admission-the "rules of
152. See, e.g., Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 872 (1956); Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955);
Esso Standard Oil, S.A. v. The Gasbras Sul, 239 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Prol v.
Holland-America Line, 234 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Tsangarakis v. Panama S.S.
Co., 197 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Nicolas Eustathiou &: Co. v. United States, 154
F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Va. 1957); The Vulcania, 32 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See also
Emmerich v. May, 130 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
153. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962); Lawlor v.
Incres Nassau S.S. Line, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 764 (D. Mass. 1958); Rosenthal v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
154. See Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1958) (judicial notice that
person born in Japan is a Japanese citizen); Guzman v. Gleason, 234 F. Supp. 145
(D.D.C. 1964) (common-law marriages not recognized in the Philippines); Fianza CIA
Nav. S.A. v. Benz, 178 F. Supp. 243 (D. Ore. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d
490 (9th Cir. 1960) (judicial notice that certain commercial transactions were bona fide
and in due course under Panamanian law).
155. FED. R. C1v. P. 43(a) is intended to favor the admissibility of evidence. Pro•
fessor Moore has stated that it "revolutionizes federal evidence, and in general places
admissibility upon the sole basis of relevancy and materiality." 5 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE ,J 43.02[3] (2d ed. 1966).
156. Two federal statutes of somewhat limited application are worthy of mention.
According to the Federal Register Act, 49 Stat. 502 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 307 (1964), any
material concerning foreign law that appears in the Federal Register can be judicially
noticed. Similarly, § 1741 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1741 (1964), which incorporates the practice under FED. R. C1v. P. 44, facilitates the introduction in evidence of
foreign official documents and records, including various documents relating to the law
of a foreign country such as statutes, administrative regulations, and judicial decisions.
See Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLOM. L. REv.
1015, 1042-46 (1965). Because of the great freedom Rule 44.l gives the trial judge,
§ 1741 and Rule 44 will be of limited utility in the proof of foreign law.
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evidence" applied in the courts of the state in which the district
court is sitting-proved to be more fruitful. It enabled a federal court
sitting in a state with a liberal attitude toward the introduction of
foreign-law materials to exercise the same freedom as a state court
in that jurisdiction even if the material was technically inadmissible
under some widely accepted principle of evidence. For example, a
federal court in a state that had enacted the Uniform Proof of
Statutes Act could accept an official publication of a foreign statute
without further proof. 157 In those states that had enacted a permissive or mandatory judicial-notice statute, a federal court theoretically
could apply it to foreign law under Rule 43(a). Indeed, a number
of cases assumed that Rule 43(a) permitted a federal court to take
judicial notice of facts whenever a state court would,158 and this
construction was extended to judicial notice of foreign law without
hesitation; 159 this was done even though Rule 43(a) is only a rule
of admissibility and it is not self-evident that the judicial-notice
doctrine falls within its ambit. Doubts about this use of Rule 43(a)
were alluded to in Siegelman but the court endorsed Professor
Moore's view that the Rule applies to judicial notice because "the
statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence govems"; 160
the Second Circuit concluded that "the most convenient method of
presenting the foreign law is obviously not to have to introduce
evidence on it at all, but simply to treat it in the same fashion as
domestic law." 161
But the willingness to employ state judicial-notice statutes under
Rule 43(a) did not radically alter the established pattern. The federal courts tended to be conservative in their use of the forum state's
judicial-notice statute and generally refrained from resorting to it
unless a state court would have taken judicial notice in a comparable
157. Conceivably, a copy of a foreign statute could satisfy the Uniform Proof of
Statutes Act but not qualify under the pre-1966 text of Federal Rule 44.
158. E.g., Golaris v. Jewel Tea Co., 22 F.R.D. 16 (N.D. Ill. 1958). See also Insurance
Research Serv., Inc. v. Associates Fin. Corp., 134 F. Supp. 54 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
159. See Lady Nelson, Ltd. v. Creole Petroleum Co., 286 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1961)
(dictum); Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955); Petition
of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Telesphore Couture v.
Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). See also Gediman v. Anheuser
Busch, Inc., 299 F.2d 537, 544 n.6 (2d Cir. 1962); Krasnow v. National Airlines, Inc.,
228 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955).
160. See 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1[ 43.09 (2d ed. 1966).
161. 221 F.2d at 196. One writer has complained that the Siegelman decision goes
beyond the limits placed on N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr § 344-a by the New York courts, particularly Sonnesen v. Panama Transp. Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949). See Busch, Reply to Report on "Judicial Initiative in the
Proof of Foreign Law," A.B.A. SEC. INT'L &: COMP. L., PROCEEDINGS 136 (1956).
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case.162 Moreover, even today, only about one-fourth of the states
permit or require judicial notice to be taken of foreign law and in
many of these states the courts have been parsimonious in their
utilization of the statutes.163 Thus, in most federal courts proof of
the law of foreign countries continued to follow the same inefficient
and needlessly prodigal pattern employed prior to 1938-the introduction of some combination of official publications, duly authenticated copies of documents concerning foreign law, oral expert testimony, formal depositions of experts who were unavailable to testify,
and a variety of other miscellany.164
b. The effect of Federal Rule 44.1. The procedure for proving
foreign law has been substantially changed by the second sentence
of Federal Rule 44.1, which provides a uniform procedure for all the
district courts-thereby eliminating the need to rely on state practice
in those states in which it has been advantageous to do so in the
162. This restraint is best exemplified by several decisions in the New York federal
courts. In Hausman v. Bailey, 22 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), a stockholder's derivative
suit, the court declined to take judicial notice of Venezuelan law on a motion to
dismiss, preferring to treat it as a fact to be proved at trial. See also Bakhshandeh
v. American Cyanamid Co., 211· F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Harrison v. United
Fruit Co., 143 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp.,
111 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 203 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1953). Again, in Telesphore
Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1958), a request to take judicial notice
of certain Quebec statutes was rejected; the court felt it lacked the "facilities" to
do so and believed that counsel had the duty to research Quebec law and present
the fruits of their efforts to the court. Much the same reasoning led the court to
refrain from noticing Greek law in Petition of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Wall Street Traders, Inc. v. Sociedad Espanola de Construedon Naval, 245 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (admiralty case involving law of Spain).
Only in Royal Exch. Assur. v. Brownell, 146 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), afj'd, 257
F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1958), did the Southern District of New York reject conflicting expert testimony and assert its power to take judicial notice; as in Siegelman, however,
English law was involved. Cf. Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349
F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965).
During the period embraced by these federal cases, New York state courts took
judicial notice of the laws of Quebec, Estate of McDougald, 272 App. Div. 176, 70
N.Y.S.2d 200 (1947), Holland, In re Baruch's Estate, 131 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Surr. Ct. 1954),
Ontario, Olson v. Kilian, 203 Misc. 847, 119 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1953), and Italy,
Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 11 Misc. 2d 397, 173 N.Y.S.2d
509 (Sup. Ct. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.2d 454, 160 N.E.2d 836, 190 N.Y.S.2d
352 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959). See also Mangrelli v. Italian Line, 208
Misc. 685, 144 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (dictum); Matter of Grant-Suttie, 205 Misc.
640, 129 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Surr. Ct. 1954); Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York:
A Proposed Amendment, 57 CoLuM. L. REv. 348 (1957). In Southwestern Shipping,
the court received considerable aid from counsel.
163. See text accompanying notes 49, 55-58 supra.
164. See, e.g., Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 199 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C.
1961), rev'd on other grounds, 319 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965
(1964). The court always has been the ultimate arbiter of the admissibility of foreignlaw material. In Federal Ins. Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), the court rejected as insufficient an attempt to establish the law of
Italy by introducing the digest of Italian law appearing in Martindale-Hubbell Law
Directory.
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past and liberating the federal courts in the remaining states from
the common-law practice.165 The new Rule permits the court to
consider any material that is relevant to a foreign-law issue, whether
submitted by counsel or unearthed by the court's own research, and
without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence.166
The purpose of this provision is obvious. One of the objectives of
Rule 44.l is to abandon the fact characterization of foreign law and
to make the process of determining alien law identic with the method
of ascertaining domestic law to the extent that is possible. Thus the
trial judge's freedom of inquiry no longer is encumbered by restraints
on his research or by the rules of admissibility, which may be useful
in the context of fact issues tried to a jury but are of no utility in
establishing the content of foreign law.
Since the new Rule dissipates former inhibitions, the court may
consider any material the parties wish to present. Statutes, administrative material, and judicial decisions can be established most easily
by introducing an official or authenticated copy of the applicable
provisions or court reports supported by expert testimony as to their
meaning. 167 The task of procuring an acceptable copy of a foreign
official record has been facilitated substantially by the extensive revision of Federal Rule 44, which was adopted with Rule 44.l
in 1966.168 In addition to primary materials and expert testimony, a litigant may present any other information concerning
foreign law he believes will further his cause, including secondary
sources such as texts, learned journals,169 and a wide variety of
unauthenticated documents relating to foreign law. The trial judge
is free to accept these items and ascribe whatever probative value he
165. The second sentence of Rule 44.1 states: "The court, in determining foreign
law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or
not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43." The full text of the Rule is
set out in note 5 supra.
166. Cf. UNIFORM RUI.ES OF EVIDENCE 10(2).
167. See Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400, 426 (1852); Chemical Bank N.Y.
Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 199 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 319
F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965 (1964); The Atlanta, 82 F. Supp.
218 (S.D. Ga. 1948). See also Esso Standard Oil, S.A. v. The Gasbras Sul, 239 F. Supp.
212 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). It obviously is inadvisable to rely on an unelaborated text of a
foreign statute or decision. Counsel should offer the court enough background information to permit it to comprehend the relevance of the proffered material to the
litigation. See, e.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 191 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), aff'd, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
168. FED. R. C1v. P. 44.1 is virtually identical to Article V of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, which is outlined in note 71, supra.
169. Although some of the early cases contain debate on the point, the federal
courts have relied on foreign-law treatises for some time. E.g., The Maggie Hammond, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 435, 452 (1869); The Pawashick, 19 Fed. Cas. 5 (No. 10851) (D.
Mass. 1872).
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thinks they deserve; early decisions limiting the court's power to
consider legal materials that were not properly attested or were
inadmissible under the rules of evidence have no precedential value
under Rule 44.1.110
Written or oral expert testimony accompanied by extracts from
foreign legal materials probably will continue to be the basic mode
of proving foreign law. 171 A foreign-law expert is not required to
meet any special qualifications; indeed, he need not even be admitted to practice in the country whose law is in issue. 172 It is not
surprising, therefore, that federal courts have not felt bound by the
testimony of experts and upon occasion have placed little or no
credence in their opinions. 173 In Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A.,174
for example, the court commented on the plaintiff's Mexican law
expert as follows:
The witness was a native of Germany and studied law there. He
left Germany during the period of the exodus in the middle
thirties. . . . He has never obtained a license to practice law anywhere. . . . The only official recognition of his law study was the
action in 1960 of his native state of Bavaria in conferring on him
the honorary title of "Landgerichstrap," which means Judge of the
Superior Court. The honorary appointment was given, to use his
170. See Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400, 426-30 (1852); Church v. Hubbart,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804). See generally The Pawashick, supra note 169.
171. See Jose Taya's Sons v. Compania Arrendataria de Tobacos de Espana,
280 Fed. 825 (2d Cir. 1922); Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D.
Mass. 1966); Esso Standard Oil, S.A. v. The Gasbras Sul, 239 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Maiorino v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). A number of the
deficiencies of expert testimony are outlined in GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAw 48-50
(2d ed. 1949). See also SoMMERICH & BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND
PROOF 41-48 (1959); Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J.
1204, 1243-44 (1966); Stem, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof,
45 CALIF. L. REV. 23, 38 (1957).
172. See Nicolas Eustathiou & Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Va.
1957); Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 111 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), afj'd,
203 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1953). There is an intimation in Panama Elec. Ry. v. Moyers,
249 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1918) that the trial judge could have qualified as an expert in
Panamanian law if he had been called to testify.
173. E.g., Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465 (2d
Cir. 1965); Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1949); Merinos Viesca y
Compania, Inc. v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co., 83 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 547 (1936); Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 191 F. Supp. 206
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), afj'd, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Daniel Lumber Co. v.
Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927
(1955); Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d
Cir. 1930). In Panama Elec. Ry. v. Moyers, 249 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1918), the trial court's
refusal to admit evidence on the law of Panama offered by a judge of that country
was held to be reversible error. The lower court had rejected the testimony on the
ground that it did not want "to delegate . • • the right to pass upon the issues
involved in this case." Id. at 22.
174. 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963), modified on other grounds, 347 F.2d 168
(5th Cir. 1965).
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words, in "the course of what is called 'restitution' ". He is foreign
law librarian for one of the large county law libraries in California,
which has a collection of books on the laws of some foreign countries, including Mexico. He has had no· formal education in the
Spanish language; but he has studied it on his own to the extent
that he considers he can read and translate it, though he cannot
speak it well. He has written "articles on the law of the Republic
of Mexico," and has testified in two· cases on the laws of that country
as well as in one case on those of Norway. There was no indication
of the nature of such writings and testimony or that they had any
relation to the questions involved in this case. As far as the evidence goes, the articles might have been of such general nature that
a government professor could have written them. A good lawyer or
law professor from Mexico could have been produced at practically
the same expense; and a deposition of one of them would have cost
considerably less. In a case involving questions of foreign law, a
party owes the court the duty of producing an expert witness whose
learning and experience equal or surpass custody of law books, a
general interest in the subject, and a willingness to testify on any
phase of the laws of any foreign country....11 5
As intimated in Bostrom, the federal courts expect adequate expert
testimony on foreign law and the failure to produce it may damage a
litigant's case. The latter point is illustrated by Dulles v. Katamoto,176 in which the United States government attempted to prove
Japanese law by producing a statement written by one Japanese
official to another and two opinions from nonlawyers. The court
concluded that the absence of "the testimony of an experienced
Japanese practitioner" raised an inference that the law was contrary
to the construction advanced by the govemment. 177
The passage in Rule 44.1 expressly authorizing the court to engage in its own foreign-law research, a prerogative frequently exercised on issues of domestic law, is an improvement over prior practice for a number of reasons.178 All too often counsel will do an
175. Id. at 230-31. When the expert seems qualified, the court usually will honor
his testimony. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, 210 Fed. 810 (2d Cir. 1913).
176. 256 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1958).
177. Id. at 547. See also Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart &: Sons,
336 U.S. 386, 397 (1949) (court unimpressed by personal consultations with three
Belgian maritime lawyers that were not on the record). Some courts have insisted that
written expert testimony must be sworn. E.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank,
191 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
178. A number of federal courts exercised considerable independence in examining
foreign law on their own before receiving express authorization to do so. E.g., Bostrom
v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963), modified on other grounds,
347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965); cf. Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd.,
281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407 (1933). See also Daniel Lumber Co. v.
Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927
(1955). In Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.
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inadequate job of researching and presenting foreign law or will
attempt to prove alien law in such a partisan fashion that the court
is obliged to go beyond their offerings. On occasion, the trial judge
will have better foreign-law resources than counsel or, because of his
personal background or prior exposure to a particular country's
law, have greater expertise in researching and applying foreign law
than the attorneys. In these circumstances it would be foolish to
restrict the court's line of vision to the materials formally presented
in evidence by the parties.
The trial judge's freedom to engage in his own research gives
him maximum flexibility as to the material to be considered and
the methodology to be employed in determining foreign law in a
particular case. To exercise his discretion under the new Rule
responsibly, the judge must take account of a variety of factors, including the importance of foreign law to the case, the complexity
of the foreign-law issue, and how best to meet the needs of and be
fair to both litigants. In many instances the judge will not utilize
the prerogatives found in the second sentence of Rule 44.1. Nothing
in the Rule requires him to engage in private research; his right to
insist upon a complete presentation by counsel on the foreign-law
issues has been preserved. The Rule recognizes that judges are
reluctant to research and determine foreign law without some assistance from the attomeys179 and does not obligate them to undertake
that burden.180 At a minimum, however, federal trial judges pre1965), Judge Friendly undertook the task of investigating Greek law when the expert
testimony proved unsatisfactory. He eventually relied on a discussion of the same
issue in an earlier federal case. Doubt as to the propriety of this practice was expressed in Di Sora v. Phillips, 10 H.L. Cas. 624, 639-40, 11 Eng. Rep. 1168, 1175 (1863)
and in SOMMERICH & BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 64-69
(1959). See also note 295 infra.
179. See, e.g., Petition of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Wall Street Traders, Inc. v. Sociedad Espanola de Construccion Naval, 236 F. Supp.
358, 359 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727
(E.D.N .Y. 1958).
180. The Rule also refrains from using the term "judicial notice" because of the
widespread confusion and controversy concerning the character of that doctrine. See
Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 964, 9811001 (1958), for a brilliant "expose" of the vagaries and deficiencies of the use of
the judicial-notice doctrine in this context. If the court is so disposed, it may be able
to secure aid in determining foreign law from the foreign ministry or department
of justice of the foreign country, see, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 218
(1942); SMIT, ITALIAN AND AMERICAN PROCEDURES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 15-17 (1962); Miller, International Cooperation
in Litigation Between the United States and Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Accommodation in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1069, 1107-08 (1965); cf. WestfalLarsen & Co. v. United States, 41 F.2d 550 (N.D. Cal. 1930), or from a reliable private
agency, such as the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law
in Germany, that is willing to prepare an opinion on the law of a particular country.
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sumably should continue to take judicial notice under the four
traditional exceptions to the proof requirement.181 Moreover, it
must be remembered that one of the policies inherent in Rule 44.1
is that, whenever possible, foreign-law issues should be resolved on
their merits and on the basis of a full evaluation of the available
materials. To effectuate this policy, the court is obliged to take an
active role in the process of ascertaining foreign law. The notice
requirement and the mode of proof were deliberately left flexible
and informal to encourage court and counsel to regard the determination of foreign law as a co-operative venture requiring an open
and unstructured dialogue among all concerned.182 Thus, a judicial
practice of automatically refusing to engage in research or to assist
or direct counsel would ·be inconsistent with one of the Rule's basic
premises.
In many respects, proof of foreign law under the new Rule is
similar to the pattern employed in a number of foreign countries.
Because the rules of evidence are less of an impediment in civil-law
countries than in common-law jurisdictions, most European courts
are extremely flexible in receiving information concerning foreign
law183 and a number of them permit their courts to engage in ex
parte foreign-law investigations.184 In Latin America, courts in naSee also GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAw 51 (2d ed. 1949). Some of the deficiencies of
relying on opinions furnished by foreign officials are outlined in Rafalko, Pleading,
Proving and Obtaining Information on Foreign Law, 43 U. DET. L.J. 95, 97-98 (1965).
See also SOMMERICH &: BuscH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 55-57
(1959). To date nothing of consequence has materialized from a number of suggestions that the United States enter into arrangements with other countries for the
exchange of legal materials and opinions. See, e.g., Part VII, Art. 12, Harvard Research
in International Law, Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance, 33 AM. J. INt'L L. 112
(Supp. 1939). See also Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and
a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 546-47, 552-53, 556-62 (1953).
181. See text accompanying notes 138-51 supra.
182. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.1, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 117, 118-19 (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG.&: Ao. NEWS 807, 808-09.
183. See generally KUHN, PRIVA'IE INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-03 (1937); Shaper &:
Smit, The Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN LITIGATION: EUROPE 382,
394-95 (Smit ed. 1965); Sommerich &: Busch, op. cit. supra note 180, at 105-16; Kuhn,
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 86 (1945); Miller, supra note 180,
at 1127-29; Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1027
(1941).
184. For example, § 293 of the German Code of Civil Procedure states:
The law prevailing in another country, the customary law and charters need to
be proved only in so far as they are unknown to the Court. In ascertaining these
legal norms the Court is not confined to the evidence adduced by the parties;
it may use, also, other sources of information and may make any orders necessary
for their utilization.
See I STEIN-JONAS-SCHONKE, KoMMENTAR ZUR ZMLPROZESSORDNUNG (18th ed. 1953). See
also Kassationsgericht of the Canton of Zurich, Oct. 12, 1951, 11 SCHWEIZERISCHES
JAHRBUCH FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT (ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL) 302-
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tions that adhere to the Bustamente Code must judicially notice the
law of any other country that has adopted the Code. 185 A more
cautious attitude toward the proof of foreign law prevails in those
nations with a Napoleonic Code tradition.186
A question that frequently generates debate is whether the trial
court should be required to give notice to the parties whenever it
examines foreign-law materials not submitted by counsel or whenever it espies a foreign-law issue not raised by the parties, researches
the question, and then applies alien law. Although Rule 44.1 is
silent on the point, the Advisory Committee's Note negates the
existence of any such duty. This conclusion finds support in the
analogous treatment now accorded to domestic-law issues in the
federal courts. Since a court often applies the product of its private
research into domestic law without prior notice to the litigants, it
should not be required to give notice in the foreign-law situation
as a matter of course.
Common sense and the same policy considerations underlying
the notice requirement in the first sentence of Rule 44.1 necessitate
some qualification of the proposition that the court need never give
notice, however. If the court either unearths material that varies
markedly from that offered by the parties or plans to utilize foreign
law in a way not contemplated by the parties, notice and an opportunity to react to the court's research should be given.187 A similar
obligation exists when the trial court raises an issue of foreign
law on its own or decides that the case is controlled by the law of
a country other than the one whose law the parties believed to be
applicable. 188 As a practical matter, the interaction between counsel
03 (1954); GINSBURG &: BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN ,I 12.06 (1965); Dolle,
De l'application du droit etranger par le juge interne, 44 REvuE CRITIQUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONALE PRIVE 233 (1955).
185. Sixth International Conference of American States, Code of Private International Law, Jan. 16-Feb. 20, 1928, arts. 408·13, reprinted in Pan Am. Law and
Treaty Ser. No. 34, at 38, 65-66.
186. See, e.g., Herzog & Smit, France, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN LmGATION:
EUROPE 119, 149-52 (Smit ed. 1965); Rigaux &: Miller, Belgium, in id. at 30, 50-51.
Although the fact theory is prevalent in Europe, a number of civilian scholars have
rejected it. E.g., MEILI, DAS INTERNATIONALE CIVILPROZESSRECHT 134-40 (1904). See also
Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1019-20 (1941).
187. See SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 142 (2d ed. 1959); Wyzanski, A Trial
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1296, (1952). See also
GINSBURG &: BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN ,I 12.06(b) (1965); Davis, Judicial
Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 945, 974-78 (1955).
188. In either of these situations, the court's obligation to apprise counsel of what
it is doing may well be of due-process dimensions. Cf. Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317
(1917). The failure to give notice in these situations also might violate the parties'
right to stipulate as to the controlling law.
The second sentence of FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1, which is identical to the second sen-
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and trial judge throughout the lawsuit makes it likely that the
parties will have knowledge of the judge's intentions and research
activity. 189 Consequently, a blanket requirement that the trial court
give formal notice whenever it goes beyond the presentation by
the parties regardless of the triviality of the issue or the deviation
from the record is unsound and was properly characterized by the
Advisory Committee as "an element of undesirable rigidity . . . [in]
the procedure for determining issues of foreign law." 190

2. Foreign Law Prior to Trial
a. Pretrial discovery. Issues of foreign law can be framed,
molded, and even resolved prior to trial in a number of ways. Many
of the most important mechanisms for accomplishing this are found
in the deposition and discovery practice set out in Federal Rules 26
through 37. Oral and written examinations, interrogatories to
parties, and requests for admissions often are used to refine and
sharpen disputed issues, record expert testimony on foreign law,
and gather information and foreign legal materials.
Federal Rule 28(b) enumerates several methods for securing
testimony or opinions from people in a foreign country for use on
a summary-judgment motion or at trial. 191 The least expensive but
probably the slowest and most cumbersome of these is the letter
tence of Rule 44.1, does not violate tbe right of confrontation in tbe sixtb amendment
if foreign-law issues are viewed as matters of law ratber tban fact. See 4 BARRON &:
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2191 (Wright ed. 1961 Supp. 1966); Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1276, 1307 (1966).
189. The problem of counsel not being aware of tbe court's independent activities
may be more serious on tbe appellate level. See notes 301-05 infra and accompanying
text.
190. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.1, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89tb
Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 52 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 117, 119 (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. &: AD. NEWS 807, 809. An unnecessary degree of concern over the Advisory
Committee's position regarding notice is voiced in Cohn, The New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1245-46 (1966).
The new California Evidence Code takes a more cautious position tban does Federal
Rule 44.1. Section 454(b) of California's code provides tbat when a "court resorts to
tbc advice of persons learned" in tbe law of a foreign country, "such advice, if not
received in open court, shall be in writing." Section 455(a) goes on to state tbat before
tbc jury is instructed or tbe case submitted, tbe parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present "information relevant to ..• tbe tenor of tbe matter to be
noticed.'' Subdivision (b) of tbe same section adds tbat "if tbe trial court resorts to any
source of information not received in open court . . • such information and its source
shall be made a part of tbe record in tbe action and tbe court shall afford each party
reasonable opportunity to meet such information before judicial notice of tbe matter
may be taken.''
191. See, e.g., Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 19 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). See also Harris v. American Int'l Fuel &: Petroleum Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 (W.D.
Pa. 1954).
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rogatory. In the past, federal courts were reluctant to issue a letter
rogatory to obtain expert testimony from abroad without a showing
that comparable testimony was unavailable in this country. 192 Because Rule 44.1 permits the court to use any material relevant to a
foreign-law issue, a more permissive attitude toward securing testimony by letter rogatory is likely in the future. Moreover, the precedential value of pre-1963 cases denying the use of a letter rogatory
for procuring information concerning foreign law is questionable
since these cases were decided when Federal Rule 28(b) stated that
"letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or convenient,"
a passage that was construed to permit a letter rogatory only when testimony on notice or by commission was impossible or impracticable
to obtain. 193 Since 1963, Rule 28(b) has provided that the absence of
another means of securing testimony is not a prerequisite to the use
of a letter rogatory; a trial judge may now issue a letter whenever it
would be advantageous to do so. 194 If sounder, more impartial, or
less expensive testimony can be procured by letter than is available
in this country or than is obtainable pursuant to a notice or commission, a letter rogatory should be issued.
The scope of discovery on a foreign-law issue is not unlimited.
For instance, a party may not be able to interrogate his adversary
as to the details of the foreign law relied upon by the latter. In
Fisherman & Merchants Bank v. Burin, 1915 a request for citations to
relevant portions of English law was denied. In an opinion somewhat at variance with the common-law fact theory of foreign law,
the court rejected the argument that the defendant was entitled to
the information because "foreign law must be pleaded and proven
as any other evidentiary matter" and held that since the applicability of foreign law is a question for the court, the opinion of
another party as to its content is an improper subject for interrogatories under Federal Rule 33. "Parties are not called upon to express
opinions or conclusions." 196 A decision contrary to Burin is Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschap192. See American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 32 F.R.D. 372
(D. Minn. 1963); United States v. Dunn, 55 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). See also
Holliday &: Sons v. Schultzeberge, 57 Fed. 660 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Matles, 154 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Branyan v.
Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, 13 F.R.D. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
194. See Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963
(II), 77 HARV. L. REv. 801, 812-13 (1964); Comment, Revitalization of the International
Judicial Assistance Procedures of the United States: Service of Documents and Taking
of Testimony, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1375, 1391-92 (1964).
195. 11 F.R.D. 142 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
196. Id. at 145.
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pij,191 in which the plaintiff filed interrogatories asking the defendant to specify the foreign law upon which its defenses were based.
The defendant refused to respond, claiming that the necessary information was wholly within the knowledge of his attorney. The court,
emphasizing the fact characterization of foreign law and expressing
the belief that interrogatories are designed to narrow the issues,
ordered the defendant to state "the substance of the foreign law
relied upon ... with appropriate citation of applicable statutes and
one or more citations of decisional law, if any." 198 It seems ironic
that Burin, a case that rejected the fact theory, denied discovery
whereas Bernstein, a straightforward application of the fact theory,
resulted in a liberal utilization of discovery.
A request that a party divulge the passages of foreign law or the
legal materials he intends to rely on technically falls within the
scope-of-examination standard in Rule 26(b). Nonetheless, a number
of federal decisions in contexts analogous to foreign law have agreed
with Burin that legal opinions are not a proper discovery subject199
and have refused to allow a party to depose his adversary's experts or
to inspect reports prepared by them. 200 On the other hand, discovery
has been permitted when essential to the moving party's case and
when comparable testimony cannot be obtained elsewhere; 201 in the
realm of foreign-law issues, this standard might be satisfied if one
party's expert on a particular country's law is the only one readily
available. Reluctance to permit discovery in this context stems from
the belief that it is unfair to permit one litigant to obtain the fruits
of his opponent's diligence without contributing his own effort. In
addition, the lofty conception of the role of trial counsel and of the
integrity of the adversary system that emerges from the work-product
197. 11 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
198. Id. at 49; cf. Kendall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)
(expert opinion compelled from engineer in defendant's employ).
199. See generally 2A BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL ·PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 768,
at 321-26 (\Vright ed. 1961); 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1111 26.16[4], 33.17 (2d ed.
1966).
200. See, e.g., Hoagland v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 34 F.R.D. 458 (E.D. Tenn.
1963); E.I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.R.D. 237 (D.
Del. 1959); Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 313 (\V.D.N.Y.
1948). But see Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. United States, 39 F.R.D. l (D. C~Io. 1966).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y.
1960); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio
1947), afj'd sub nom. Sacks v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir.
1948); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (\V.D. Pa. 1947). See
also 2A BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 652.5 (\Vright ed.
1961); 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 26.24 (2d ed. 1966); Friedenthal, Discovery and
Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455 (1962); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1031-32, 1038 (1961).
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concept of Hickman v. Taylor202 acts as a powerful restraint on
examinations into an adversary's trial preparations.
An immutable rule that foreign law is not a fit subject for pretrial examination probably is unwise. Although this article advocates the abandonment of the common-law approach to foreign law
and the substitution of an equation between foreign and domestic
law to the extent feasible, it would be disingenuous to ignore the
burden often entailed in investigating and preparing foreign-law
issues for trial. In light of the high cost of procuring foreign-law
materials and experts, a party should be permitted to use discovery
to mark off the periphery of the foreign law in issue, even if it results
in a slightly wider scope of inquiry than is available on issues of
domestic law.
It might be useful to distinguish between pretrial discovery inquiries that serve to define or narrow the scope of a foreign-law issue
and those that attempt to commit a party to a particular construction
of foreign law or require him to do research that could as easily be
undertaken by the party seeking disclosure. Admittedly this dichotomy is vulnerable to the charge that it will prove to be highly
evanescent in many contexts or that it represents little more than
an abdication to the trial court's judgment of the balance to be struck
between an interrogator's bona {ides and the possible salubrious impact discovery may have on the litigation's progress. Yet, the latter is
exactly the type of judgment federal district judges are thought
competent to make. It also is true that the court may have to exercise more than the normal amount of control during discovery to
avoid abuse but this will be a relatively transitory drain on judicial
energies and should become inconsequential once guidelines for
discovery have been established.
The same elastic approach is useful with regard to discovering
the opinions of foreign-law experts. Whenever there is a significant
discrepancy in the litigants' ability to gain access to experts or whenever a party can make a persuasive showing that examination of his
adversary's expert or of the expert's opinion is necessary to prepare
for trial, discovery should be allowed on appropriate terms and
conditions. For example, it would be entirely appropriate for the
court to direct the examining party to reimburse his opponent for
part of the expert's fee. 203 Another possibility is a court-appointed
202. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). An exhaustive analysis of the considerations relevant to
the discovery of information obtained from an expert appears in Friedenthal, supra
note 201, at 469-88.
203. See Henopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 33 F.R.D. 306 (D. Del. 1963);
United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963).
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expert who would be examined by both parties and whose fee could
be assessed in any manner that seems equitable.204
In some instances the scope of pretrial examination has been
limited by the contents of the pleadings. The oft-cited decision in
Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp. 205 held
that absent a foreign-law issue in the pleadings, written interrogatories on foreign law are improper because they are not relevant to
the subject matter of the action, as is required by Rule 26(b). The
propriety of restricting discovery to matters that are raised by the
pleadings was dubious even at the time Empresa Agricola was decided, inasmuch as Rule 26(b) defines "relevant" for purposes of
pretrial examination in terms of the "subject matter" of the litigation, which clearly embraces more than what is found within the
four corners of the pleadings.206 Now that Rule 44.l eliminates any
need to plead foreign law, the limitation on discovery voiced in
Empresa Agricola makes no sense and should be ignored. Moreover,
satisfaction of the new Rule's notice requirement certainly is not a
prerequisite to using discovery to gather information, documents
relevant to foreign law, or facts. 207 If Rule 44.1 were thus interpreted, the flexibility of its notice-giving mechanism would be badly
compromised, for in many instances discovery will be needed in
advance of notice to enable a party to make a reasoned judgment as
to the applicability of foreign law.
Federal Rule 36, which permits a party to ask another litigant to
admit facts and concede the genuineness of documents, is another
discovery device occasionally used to ascertain foreign law. 208 At a
minimum, Rule 36 is an appropriate vehicle for eliminating controversy as to the authenticity of copies of foreign legislative, administrative, and judicial materials and for facilitating their use at
trial. 209 Inasmuch as Rule 44.1 renders the rules of admissibility
inapplicable to foreign-law materials, this use of Rule 36 usually will
204. Cf. Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York: A Proposed Amendment,
57 CouJM. L. R.Ev. 348 (1957).
205. 57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
206. See 2A BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 647 (Wright
ed. 1961); 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 26.16 (2d ed. 1966).
207. See text accompanying notes 128-31 supra.
208. Technically, Rule 36 is not a discovery device since it presupposes knowledge
by both parties. See Conway, Admissions of Fact Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 26 J.B.A.D.C. 421, 422 (1959); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74
HARV. L. R.Ev. 940, 968-70 (1961).
209. See McKenzie, The Proof of Alien Law, in A.B.A., SEc. INT'L &: COMP, L., PRO•
CEEDINGS 50, 52 (1959); McKenzie &: Sarabia, The Pleading and Proof of Alien Law,
30 TuL. L. R.Ev. 353, 365·67 (1956).
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be of little moment to the determination of foreign law. 210 A more
rewarding utilization of Rule 36 would be to procure admissions as
to the interpretation or relevance of specific portions of foreign law.
But there is some question as to whether this is an appropriate
application of the Rule. In Fuhr v. Newfoundland-St. Lawrence
Shipping Ltd., 211 a request was made for an admission that the word
"code" in the Panamanian Labor Code is equivalent to "title." The
request was vacated, the court holding that Rule 36 requires only
that a party admit material within his knowledge or reasonably
ascertainable by him. The defendant also was asked to admit that
the plaintiff was covered by the Panamanian Labor Code, a seminal
issue in the case. In rejecting this request the court stated that the
"expression of opinions of the opposing attorney or party, or the
interpretation or applicability of foreign law to the particular facts
appear not to be within the purview of the Rule," 212 an attitude consonant with the view, previously encountered in connection with
the Burin and Bernstein decisions,213 that legal opinions and conclusions are beyond the scope-of-examination standard of Rule 26(b).
Had the Fuhr court wanted to bring the request within the
compass of Rule 36, it could have done so by feigning obeisance to
the fact characterization of foreign law. It therefore seems slightly
perverse that simply because Rule 36 refers to "matters of fact,"
strict application of the fact theory permits a request to admit an issue
of foreign law whereas the domestic-foreign law analogy leads to a
contrary conclusion. Although the text of Rule 36 makes it clear
that the draftsmen of the Federal Rules did not wish pure questions
of law to be the subject of a request to admit, it is unlikely that they
intended Rule 36 to be governed by a strict application of the
210. A request under Rule 36 could be of some tactical significance when a party
wishes to use unauthenticated copies of foreign legal materials and fears that the
court will give them less weight than they would receive if their accuracy and authenticity were acknowledged by all parties.
211. 24 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
212. Id. at 13. The court did permit requests for admissions as to the accuracy of
translations. Curiously, it apparently did not occur to anyone that an admission as to
the accuracy of a translation is itself premised on opinions and conclusions of law.
See also Moumdjis v. The Ionian Trader, 157 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Va. 1957) (requests
for admission of opinion letters denied under the admiralty counterpart of Rule 36).
In Princess Pat, Ltd. v. National Carloading Corp., 223 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1955), the
defendant refused to admit or deny certain requests concerning Brazilian customs regulations and attempted to justify this refusal with the assertion that the requests raised
questions of law and not fact. The district court treated the unanswered requests as
admitted and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
213. See text accompanying notes 195-204 supra.
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nebulous law-fact distinction or, for that matter, that they had the
question of the Rule's relationship to foreign-law issues in mind
when they formulated it.
It might be possible to rationalize the matter by differentiating
between situations in which foreign law is relevant to a factual issue,
which often occurs in litigation governed by domestic law, and instances in which foreign law provides the rules of decision for the
entire lawsuit. A request under Rule 36 would be proper only in
the former context. Unfortunately, this distinction has a highly
arbitrary and artificial tone to it. A better approach might be to
employ the type of flexibility suggested for defining the proper scope
of discovery on an issue of foreign law; 214 that is, to permit a request
to admit whenever it appears that it is made in good-faith, that it
will serve to narrow the scope of the foreign-law issues, and that it
is not a ruse to weld a party to a particular construction of foreign
law.211s For example, when a defendant is unable to prepare his case
efficiently because of uncertainty as to the governing law, it might
be appropriate to allow him to use Rule 36 to obtain a disclaimer
from the plaintiff as to the applicability of a particular country's
law. Since a party served with a request to admit is free to deny if he
disagrees with his opponent or if he is legitimately uncertain as to
the proper response, the plaintiff need not be burdened or disadvantaged by the request. 216
b. Summary judgment. The summary-judgment motion has
provided a forum for determining issues of foreign law prior
to trial. In Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 211 the question whether one of the plaintiffs had a right of action under
Portuguese law was decided on the basis of the defendant's affidavits
from experts in Portuguese law. The plaintiff had sought to fend off
summary judgment by arguing that foreign law was a fact and could
not be determined on affidavits, but failed to present anything persuasive contradicting the defendant's affidavits. Thus, the court,
which had asked and had granted time for the submission of evidence on Portuguese law, felt it had no alternative but to conclude
that there was no genuine issue concerning Portuguese law. The
court opined that if such an issue existed, the plaintiff would have
214. See text accompanying notes 202-04 supra.
215. See Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 YALE
L.J. 371, 409-16 (1962).
216. See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 14 F.R.D. 219 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
217. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954).
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offered something indicating that the defendant's experts were in
error.218
Despite Komlos, successful summary-judgment motions directed
toward issues of foreign law have been infrequent. Almost invariably, the motion has been denied when there is a conflict in the
papers presented on the motion or among the foreign-law experts
or when any doubt exists as to the tenor of the foreign law; the use
of these standards derives from the theory that factual disputes are
not to be resolved on a summary-judgment motion but must be
reserved for trial. 219 In Pisacane v. Italia Societa Per Azioni di
Navigazione, 220 for example, the question was whether the suit was
time barred under Italian law. The answer depended on the validity
under the Italian Civil Code of a provision in a steamship passage contract limiting the time for commencing suit against the carrier. The
court denied the motion because the "question is one of fact," which
the court felt could not be adjudicated on summary judgment. In fairness to the court, its resolution of the motion probably was influenced by the presence of only one affidavit on Italian law.
218. See also Bachmann v. Blaw-Knox Co., 198 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. Pa. 1961); Born
v. Norwegian America Line, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Werkley v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 110 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y.), complaint dismissed,
111 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Egyes v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 71 F. Supp. 560
(E.D.N.Y. 1947), afj'd, 165 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1948). Summary judgment can be granted
against a defendant who fails to establish a defense under foreign law. See Chemical
Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 199 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 319 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965 (1964).
219. See Albert v. Brownell, 219 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1954) (semble); Hausman v.
Bailey, 22 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (motion to dismiss); N.V. LevensverzekeringMaatschappij van de Nederlanden v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 116 (D. Conn. 1954)
(dictum); Mosbacher v. Basler Lebens Versicherungs Gesellschaft, 111 F. Supp. 551
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); Heiberg v. Hasler, 1 F.R.D. 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). See also Wall Street
Traders, Inc. v. Sociedad Espanola de Construccion Naval, 245 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 56.17(25) (2d ed. 1966); SoMMERICH &: BUSCH,
FoREIGN LAw-A GumE TO PLEADlNG AND PROOF 81-89 (1959). But see Caribbean S.S.
Co. v. La Societe Navale Caennaise, 140 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Va.), afj'd, 239 F.2d 689
(4th Cir. 1956). Some federal courts have taken the position that foreign law "is a
problem for factual determination" and that a summary-judgment motion is "inappropriate." E.g., Eastern Commercial Bank, S.A.L. v. General Mut., Inc., 34 F.R.D.
260 (E.D. Pa. 1963). These cases are little more than variations on the "fact" syndrome
and may mask a judicial feeling of insecurity when confronted with foreign law.
There also has been a judicial disinclination to determine an issue of foreign law in
advance of trial on motions addressed to the court's discretion when the resolution of
the issue would not terminate the litigation. See, e.g., Markovic v. National City Bank,
12 F.R.D. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (court refused to investigate Yugoslavian law on a motion for permissive intervention). See also Wendell v. Holland-America Line, 30 F.R.D.
162 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). This attitude seems defensible on the ground that if the case is
destined for trial, there is no point in determining a foreign-law issue that might
become moot.
220. 219 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also Caruso v. Italian Line, 184 F. Supp.
862 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 111 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), afj'd, 203 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1953).
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The propriety of deferring determination of a foreign-law issue
from summary judgment to trial, as is true of the propriety of the
treatment given alien law in other contexts, partially depends upon
the validity of the common-law fact approach. If the fact characterization is replaced by an analogy between foreign and domestic law,
as is being advocated in this article, then a conflict over foreign law
is not a dispute over a material fact within the meaning of Federal
Rule 56 and a court should feel free to resolve a foreign-law issue on
a summary-judgment motion.
The argument in favor of the domestic-foreign law analogy in
the summary-judgment context is reinforced by the statement in the
last sentence of Rule 44.1 that the court's determination of foreign
law is to be treated "as a ruling on a question of law.'' 221 This passage
is intended to encourage the processing of foreign law in the trial
court in a way that will insure proper appellate review222-an objective that obviously applies to the handling of summary-judgment
motions. It would not be consonant with the Rule's philosophy to
conclude that the determination of a foreign-law issue at trial is to be
treated as a question of law but is to be treated as a question of fact
when the resolution is sought on a summary-judgment motion. To
carry out the mandate in Federal Rule 44.1, conflicts concerning the
content of foreign law should not automatically be held to raise a
"genuine issue as to any material fact" and prevent summary judgment under Rule 56.
In cases such as Pisacane, therefore, when the proof before the
court on a summary-judgment motion is not harmonious or is unpersuasive or inconclusive, the court should request a further showing by counsel, engage in its own research, or direct that a hearing
be held, with or without oral testimony, to resolve the issue. 223 A
combination of these courses will insure as detailed a foreign-law
presentation as might be anticipated at a full trial on the merits. 224
221. The full text of Federal Rule 44.I is set out in note 5 supra.
222. See text accompanying notes 293-98 infra.
223. In Heiberg v. Hasler, 45 F. Supp. 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), a special master was
appointed to ascertain French law in aid of a summary-judgment motion.
224. The approach suggested in the text seems to have been employed in Caribbean S.S. Co. v. La Societe Navale Caennaise, 140 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Va.), afj'd, 239
F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1956), in which the defendant moved for summary judgment against
the plaintiff's claims based upon breach of contract, warranty, and fraud. The court
rejected the plaintiff's contention that a dispute as to French law precluded summary
judgment.
It is fundamental that, if there be a disputed issue of a material fact, the
Court should not grant summary judgment. In this case there is no dispute as to
the factual situation, although experts on French law have disagreed as to the
interpretations to be placed thereon. Should the case be heard on its merits, these
same "disputes" would exist and the Court would then be obliged to accept the
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When the grant or denial of summary judgment turns on an issue
of foreign law, there is no reason to permit the respondent to rest
on his pleadings or to rely on the placebo that the issue cannot be
resolved until trial, at which time oral testimony and cross-examination will be available. This suggestion is consistent with the 1963
amendment to Rule 56(e), which eliminates reliance on the pleadings and obliges a party to defend against the motion with whatever
competent material is at his disposal. The 1963 change expresses the
almost universal understanding that summary judgment is designed
to probe a formal paper dispute to see if a litigable issue actually is
present.225
The advantages of resolving a foreign-law issue at the summaryjudgment stage are obvious. In Pisacane, a decision as to the validity
of the contractual condition might well have terminated the litigation without trial and effectuated the primary purpose of the summary-judgment procedure-adjudication without trial of cases in
which material facts are not in dispute and in which a full evidentiary display to a trier of fact is unnecessary. In addition to situations
similar to Pisacane, a determination of foreign law on a summaryjudgment motion would be desirable when the facts are stipulated
and the issue is either whether a cause of action exists or whether an
action is barred because of some affirmative defense.
c. Pretrial conference. A final device for dealing with foreignlaw issues before trial is the pretrial conference. 226 Inasmuch as the
conference usually takes place after both parties have prepared for
trial and have had a chance to appraise their cases realistically, it
often provides a good occasion for reaching agreement on alien
law. 227 Even if the foreign-law questions cannot be determined at the
interpretation of one or more of the experts or, in the alternative, arrive at its
own conclusion upon a review of the French law and decided cases.
A disputed interpretation of a foreign law does not raise a material issue of fact
sufficient to preclude action on a motion for summary judgment where, as in this
case, counsel agree that all of the pertinent foreign law has been properly submitted as evidence.
Id. at 20-21. See also Werkley v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 100 F.
Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y.), complaint dismissed, Ill F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (decision
on motion reserved pending submission of affidavits of experts on Indian law).
225. See Dressler v. MV Sandpiper, 331 F.2d 130, 131-35 (2d Cir. 1964); 3 BARRON
&: HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1235, 1235.1 (Wright ed. 1961); 6

MOORE, FEDERAL PRACIICE ,I,I 56.22-.23 (2d ed. 1966).
226. See FED. R. C1v. P. 16; Harris v. American Int'! Fuel &: Petroleum Co., 124 F.
Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1954). See also McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REv. 296,
308 (1952).
227. The parties are at liberty to stipulate as to the content of foreign law and
frequently will be encouraged to do so by the court. See, e.g., Harris v. American Int'!
Fuel &: Petroleum Co., supra note 226.
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conference, they can be identified, the scope of inquiry defined, the
number of expert witnesses limited, and the modes of proof delineated. In some instances, the judge may appoint a special master to
aid in ascertaining the content of foreign law. 228 As a practical matter, the pretrial conference may afford a party his last opportunity
to raise a foreign-law issue and to satisfy the notice requirement in
the first sentence of Rule 44.1.229 Any request to depart from the
pretrial order by raising a foreign-law issue or altering its contours
will be carefully scrutinized by the court. 230
3. Determination of Foreign Law by Judge or Jury
The drafts of the new Rule prepared by the Columbia Project
and the Commission and Advisory Committee on International
Rules of Judicial Procedure provided that the determination of
foreign law "shall be made by the court and not by the jury." A
similar passage was included in the Commission and Advisory Committee's drafts of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, and section 4.03 of that act as promulgated states: "The
court, not [the] jury, shall determine the law of any governmental
unit outside this state." In the course of redrafting the Federal Rule,
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules deleted the reference to
court determination in the Commission's drafts. The Committee's
Note accompanying Rule 44.1 explains the Rule's silence on the
point with the assertion that "the rules refrain from allocating functions as between the court and the jury," but it goes on to indicate
the advantages of judicial, rather than jury, determination of foreign
law. 231 Another possible implication of the Advisory Committee's
decision not to include in the Rule an express provision delegating
foreign-law questions to the judge is that such a statement possibly
might infringe the constitutional right to jury trial in federal civil
actions. 232 Since the Rule's text leaves the question at large and the
228. Cf. Heiberg v. Hasler, 45 F. Supp. 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
229. See Valdesa Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Frota Nacional de Petroleiros, S.A., 348
F.2d 33, 36-38 (3d Cir. 1965).
230. A court's willingness to permit a foreign-law issue to be raised after the pretrial conference will depend in part on the detail with which the pretrial order defines the legal issues and on whether the relevance of foreign law was discussed at
the conference. In districts in which foreign-law issues appear with any frequency, it
might be advisable for the judges at pretrial to inquire as a matter of course into
the possible presence of such an issue.
231. Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 44.1, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 51, 52 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 117, 119 (1966), 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &:
AD. NEWS 807, 809. See also 2B BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 998 (Wright ed. Supp. 1966).
232. The second paragraph of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964),
expressly removes the jury-trial right from the domain of the rulemakers. The con-
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courts presumably are free to develop the practice as they see fit, it
is necessary to explore the topography of these constitutional considerations. The odyssey begins, as do almost all inquiries concerning the reach of the Constitution's jury-trial guarantee, with an
examination of the treatment accorded issues of foreign law at the
time the seventh amendment was adopted.
a. The English and American experience. The English authorities are sparse and shed little light on the jury-trial question. This
dearth of precedent probably stems from the English courts' reluctance
until comparatively recently to take jurisdiction over foreign causes
and from their penchant for applying common law even after they
finally began to adjudicate these controversies.238 Despite the paucity of authority, many of the English secondary sources penned
after the middle of the nineteenth century cavalierly assert that such
issues are for the jury; others simply state that foreign law is to be
proved as a fact and do not speak to the jury issue. 234 Nonetheless,
the cases cited by the text writers for the jury-issue conclusion are
not very persuasive.
However, several decisions do illustrate somewhat the English
practice during the last half of the eighteenth century. In the important case of Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 235 decided in 1774, Lord Mansfield
stated that knowledge of the laws of a foreign country is secured "by
admitting them to be proved as facts, and the court must assist the jury
in ascertaining what the law is." The purport of this passage is obscure
inasmuch as Lord Mansfield's opinion does not specify what facet of
the foreign-law issue was to be submitted to the jury or in what way
the court was expected to "assist the jury." It also must be appreciated that Mostyn was the first case in which Kings Bench seriously
junctive quality of the Enabling Act's text-"such rules .•• shall preserve the right
of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution"-leaves open the argument that the jury-trial right immunized against
the activities of the rulemakers is broader than the right preserved by the seventh
amendment. The interrelationship between the rulemaking power and Rule 44.1 is
discussed at text accompanying notes 515-19 infra.
233. See Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, in 3 LAw: A
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342 (1937). The notion of the jury as a body of men chosen
from the locale of the events in suit was not altered by statute until 1705. See 4 &: 5
Ann, c. 16, § 6 (1705). In the seventeenth century and even well into the eighteenth
century, English courts felt compelled to justify their assertion of jurisdiction over
cases arising in a foreign country by requiring a fictitious allegation of venue in
England. See, e.g., Dutch West India Co. v. van Moses, 1 Strange 612, 93 Eng. Rep.
733 (K.B. 1795); Ward's Case, Latch. 3, 82 Eng. Rep. 245 (K.B. 1662).
234. See BEST, EVIDENCE § 33 (5th ed. 1870); CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
130 (5th ed. 1957); DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws 1107-10 (Morris ed. 1958); 1 TAYLOR,
EVIDENCE § 5, at 8 (3d ed. 1858).
235. 1 Cowp. 161, 174, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1028 (K.B. 1774).
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considered applying foreign law in a personal tort case. Much of the
opinion is devoted to the propriety of taking jurisdiction in such
actions and to the obstacles presented by the English tradition of
laying venue in and choosing a jury from the place where the events
in dispute occurred. In context, therefore, the references in Mostyn
to "proved as facts" and "assist the jury" may not have been conscious statements that all issues of foreign law were to be ascertained
by the jury. They may simply reflect the type of verbal imprecision
that usually accompanies doctrinal parturition and represent a
vestige from the period in which all issues other than the domestic
law of England were characterized as issues of fact. 236 Lord Mansfield's remarks also may betray a degree of uncertainty as to the
proper judge-jury relationship in this context-an uncertainty
caused by the extensive revision of the jury institution during the
centuries preceding Mostyn from a body of witnesses to a group of
fact-finders. 237 Finally, the words "proved as facts" may refer to the
mode of proof and not to the mechanics of adjudication. Some support for this hypothesis can be extrapolated from Lord Mansfield's
fairly extensive discussion in Mostyn of the mode of proving foreign
law in Privy Council and Chancery, neither of which employed a
jury.
In Male v. Roberts,238 an action for assumpsit at Common Pleas
decided a quarter of a century after Mostyn, Lord Eldon observed
that the law of Scotland "should be given in evidence to me as a
fact." 239 In another part of the same opinion he stated that "I cannot take the fact of what that law is, without evidence."240 This language from Male is inconsistent with Mostyn if the latter is read as
236. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
237. It was not until the beginning of the seventeenth century that English juries
were permitted to determine foreign facts. See Richardson v. Dowdele, Cro. Jae. 55,
79 Eng. Rep. 47 (K.B. 1605). See also Sack, supra note 233, at 346-49.
238. 3 Esp. 163, 170 Eng. Rep. 574 (C.P. 1800).
239. Id. at 164, 170 Eng. Rep. at 574. A similar statement was made by Lord
Kenyon in Iloehtlinck v. Schneider, 3 Esp. 59, 170 Eng. Rep. 537, 538 (C.P. 1799). In
Inglis v. Usherwood, 1 East 515, 102 Eng. Rep. 198 (K.B. 1801), the plaintiff secured a
verdict in an action in trover for certain goods delivered in Russia. When the case
came before the full bench, the law of Russia, as reflected in a mercantile order, was
quoted, construed, and applied by 'the court without any discussion of how it had
been proven. Blad v. Banfield, 3 Swans. 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674) was a suit
by a Dane to enjoin an Englishman from suing at law to redress a seizure of the
Englishman's property in Iceland by the Danish authorities. The Dane claimed that
the seizure was justified by a patent from the King of Denmark. The chancellor issued
the injunction saying that the Dane's rights were clear and that "to send it to a trial
at law, where either the Court must pretend to judge of the validity of the king's
letters patent in Denmark ••• or that a common jury should try whether the English
have a right to trade in Iceland, is monstrous and absurd." Id. at 607, 36 Eng. Rep.
at 993.
240. 3 Esp. at 165, 170 Eng. Rep. at 574.
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requiring jury trial of issues of foreign law. To harmonize the remarks in Male and the suggested analysis of Mostyn, the following
generalization is offered: at the close of the eighteenth century,
English courts insisted that foreign law be proved in the same manner as facts but the evidence was addressed to the bench for determination and application. This thesis is consistent with the emergence of the fact theory of foreign law at approximately the time
Mostyn and Male were decided.
A case that is difficult to align with either the suggested analysis
or the jury-issue conclusion of the English text writers is Trimbey
v. Vignier, 241 an action on two promissory notes at Common Pleas in
1834. At trial a witness testified as to the law of France and translated a portion of its Code de Commerce. In reply to a series of
inquiries by the court, the jury concluded that an endorsement of
the notes was invalid under French law. The court then directed
judgment for the defendant "reserving all questions of law." Subsequently, the plaintiff obtained a rule ordering the defendant to
show cause why a new trial should not be directed or why judgment
should not be entered for the plaintiff. The rule also called for
further opinions on French law. At Nisi Prius, Chief Justice Tindal
directed judgment for the defendant after re-examining and applying French law de novo. The reported opinion is too delphic to
permit a description of the respective roles of court and jury with
any confidence, although the treatment given the foreign-law issue
at Nisi Prius belies any strong commitment on the part of the English judiciary to jury trial on such issues.
In 1920, Parliament enacted the Administration of Justice Act,242
section 15 of which provides that when foreign law must be ascertained, "any question as to the effect of evidence given with respect
to that law shall, instead of being submitted to the jury, be decided
by the judge alone." Arguably, passage of this statute implies that
prior practice was to the contrary, although one could as easily conclude that the statute codified the existing practice. Unfortunately,
the parliamentary history does not inform us which is the correct
legislative premise. Even if it did, query whether it would illuminate the nature of English practice in 1791.
The limited evidence that can be gleaned from the opaque
pronouncements by the English courts between 1750 and 1850, the
241. 1 Bing. (N.C.) 151, UH Eng. Rep. 1075 (C.P. 1834).
242. 10 &: 11 Geo. V., c. 81; see Lazard Bros. &: Co. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1933]
A. C. 289 (H.L.). The 1920 Act was replaced by § 102 of the Supreme Court of
Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 &: 16 Geo. V., c. 49.
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conclusory passages in the textbooks, and the current English statutory provision is simply too skeletal to justify the conclusion that
there was a settled practice of allowing the jury to ascertain the
content of foreign law at the time the seventh amendment was added
to our Constitution. Only a monumental exercise in reconstructing
history could yield a persuasive case as to the existence or nonexistence of such a practice. Inasmuch as the English judges did not even
begin to cumulate any substantial experience with foreign law until
the second half of the eighteenth century, the practice during the
crucial period probably was highly fluid and differed from court to
court. The inability to perceive a fixed English practice at the time
the seventh amendment was adopted renders it difficult to conclude
that the federal courts are constitutionally compelled by history to
leave foreign-law issues to the jury. 243
Turning to the practice in the United States, the jury-trial question was not treated uniformly by state courts during the period
following the formation of the Union. 244 In a few states, the courts,
either without relying on precedent or on the basis of extremely
questionable authority, held that every issue of fact had to be determined by the jury, including an issue of foreign law; the trial judge
in these states commented on the evidence of foreign-law but did
not give a direction on it. 245 Courts in a more significant number of
243. In Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943), petition for rehearing denied,
320 U.S. 214 (1943), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the directedverdict mechanism violated the seventh amendment because it differed from the jury
control devices available in 1791. The Court's opinion seems to be a counterpoint of
a number of themes. First, "the amendment did not bind the federal courts to the
exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in
1791" but "was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most
fundamental elements ••••" Id. at 390, 392. Second, the rules regulating "the jury's
role on questions of fact" had not become "crystallized in a fixed and immutable
system." Id. at 391. Third, "the passage of time has obscured much of the procedure
which then may have had more or less definite form ...•" Id. at 392. Fourth, "apart
from the uncertainty •.• which follows from an effort at purely historical accuracy,
the consequences flowing from the view" may be "sufficient to refute it." Id. at 392.
But cf. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
244. See generally Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof,
45 CALIF. L. REv. 23, 27 (1957); Annot., Determination of Question Relating to Foreign Law as One of Law or of Fact, 34 A.L.R. 1447 (1925); Annot., Construction and
Effect of Foreign Statutes or Judicial Decisions as Question for Court or for Jury, 68
A.L.R. 809 (1930).
245. See Dyer v. Smith, 12 Conn. 384 (1837); Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517
(1823); Ingraham v. Hart, 11 Ohio 255 (1842) (one justice dissenting). The cases relied
upon by the Connecticut court in Norton and Dyer all are readily distinguishable
and the two decisions apparently were overturned by the Connecticut legislature in
1840. See Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 360 (1847). See also Hale v. New Jersey
Steam Nav. Co., 15 Conn. 539 (1843). The Ohio court in Ingraham did not cite any
authority to support its position. In THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
258 (1898), the author states that the practice of giving issues of foreign law to the
jury "has a wide acceptance" but cites no cases in support of that proposition. The
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jurisdictions limited their application of the fact theory to the mode
of proof and construed and applied foreign law without the aid of
a jury.246 In Pickard v. Bailey,241 for example, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court stated that "foreign law, like foreign judgments,
are to be proved as facts, and the better opinion is that the evidence
should be addressed to the court, and not to the jury."248 This appears to have become the predominant state practice by the middle
of the nineteenth century. In Massachusetts and a few other jurisdictions, the courts traditionally have left all uncontroverted issues
of foreign law and questions of statutory and decisional interpretation to the judge, but have permitted the jury to resolve conflicts
in expert testimony or draw any necessary inferences or analogies
therefrom. 249 Perhaps the best articulation of this view appears in
the North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Hooper v. Moore. 250
The court analyzed the authorities and was not
able to find any case where the question of the law of another
state, or foreign country, has been left to be decided by a jury, without instructions from the court, in regard to it, except the case of
Moore v. Gwyn, 5 Ire. Rep. 187 [sic] ....251
remark in de Sloovere, The Functions of Judge and Jury in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 46 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1086, 1104 n.71 (1933), that the number of cases holding
that foreign law is for the jury is "legion," clearly is an overstatement.
The early state cases in which the jury played a dominant role in the ascertainment of foreign law may be explained in terms of the enthusiasm for the jury and the
unpopularity of the royal judges during the colonial and revolutionary periods. See
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 253-57 (1898); Scott, Trial by Jury and
the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REv. 669, 677-78 (1918); Comment, The
Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 171-77 (1964).
Some of this sentiment undoubtedly survived the formation of the Union and makes
analysis of the judge-jury relationship and the fact-law dichotomy during the first half
of the nineteenth century hazardous and relatively unrewarding.
246. See, e.g., Inge v. Murphy, 10 Ala. 885 (1846); De Sobry v. de Laistre, 2 Har.
&: John. 164, 188-89 (Md. 1807); Charlotte v. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465 (1857); Pickard v.
Bailey, 26 N.H. 152 (1852); Sidwell v. Evans, 1 Pen. &: W. 383, 388 (Pa. 1830). See also
Christiansen v. William Graver Tank Works, 223 Ill. 142, 79 N.E. 97 (1906); Thomson•
Huston Elec. Co. v. Palroer, 52 Minn. 174, 53 N.W. 1137 (1893).
247. 26 N.H. 152 (1852).
248. Id. at 169. See also Hall v. Costello, 48 N.H. 176, 179 (1868); Ferguson v.
Clifford, 37 N.H. 86, 98 (1858); Fourth Nat'! Bank v. Bragg, 127 Va. 47, 102 S.E. 649
(1920), 11 A.L.R. 1034 (1921); Rood v. Horton, 132 Wash. 82, 89, 231 Pac. 450, 452
(1924).
249. See Electric Welding Co. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386, 86 N.E. 947 (1909);
Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Ellis, 172 Mass. 39, 51 N.E. 207 (1898); Ely v. James, 123 Mass.
36 (1877); cf. Wylie v. Cotter, 170 Mass. 356, 49 N.E. 746 (1898). See also Trasher v.
Everhart, 3 Gill&: Johns. 234 (Md. 1831); Harrison v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 168 N.C. 382,
84 S.E. 519 (1915); St. Louis &: S.F. Ry. v. Conrad, 99 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App.
1906); Hite v. Keene, 149 Wis. 207, 134 N.W. 383 (1912).
250. 50 N.C. 136 (1857).
251. Id. at 139. In, Moore v. Gwynn, 27 N.C. 138 (5 Ire. Law. 187) (1844) the North
Carolina court dealt with conflicting testimony as to the common law of a sister state.
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It went on to conclude that
if the existence of an unwritten law of another State, or foreign
country, is not presumed or admitted, then its existence must be
proved by competent witnesses, and the jury must then pass on the
credibility of the witnesses, and it is the province of the court to
inform the jury as to the construction, meaning, and legal effect
of the law, supposing its existence to be proven; and to this end,
the court shall avail itself of the judicial decisions of the State or
Country.252

The New York rule has been inconstant since the beginning of
this century. In Bank of China, Japan b The Straits, Ltd. v.
/iforse,253 foreign statutes and decisions were construed by the court
despite conflicting testimony; it was stated that although foreign law
raises an issue of fact, once proof has been submitted the issue is
subject to judicial determination. In subsequent decisions, however,
the New York Court of Appeals appears to have moved toward the
Massachusetts and North Carolina approach. In Hanna v. Lichtenhein,254 the Court stated:
On a trial of an issue of fact when the evidence furnished is
conflicting or inconclusive the law of a foreign state may be a question for the jury although ordinarily when the evidence is all furnished it is the function of the judge to decide as to the law of a
foreign state.255

This approach was elaborated upon again in Fitzpatrick v. International Ry.,256 this time with regard to foreign judicial decisions.
When these [court decisions] state the unwritten law of the foreign
jurisdiction with reasonable certainty and clearness their application should not be left to the speculation of twelve men. If instances
should arise, which will be rare, where the decisions are so perplexing or doubtful that the experts disagree on the law we shall
have to determine whether the question of the foreign law must
then be solved by the jury. How the jury can do this as well as the
judge, experienced in the law, I cannot quite appreciate. 25 7
At present, rule 45ll(c) of New York's Civil Practice Law and
Rules expressly provides that issues of foreign law are to be deter252. 50 N.C. at 140. See also Charlotte v. Chouteau, 33 Mo. 194 (1862); Knight v.
Wall, 19 N.C. 121 (1836); State v. Jackson, 13 N.C. 366 (1830) (criminal case); Oregon
v. Looke, 7 Ore. 43 (1879).
253. 168 N.Y. 458, 61 N.E. 774 (1901).
254. 225 N.Y. 579, 122 N.E. 625 (1919).
255. Id. at 583, 122 N.E. at 627. The court cited two Massachusetts cases at the
end of the quoted passage.
256. 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929), 68 A.L.R. 801 (1930).
257. Id. at 140, 169 N.E. at 117.

680

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:613

mined by the court and included in its charge to the jury. The
provision does not indicate what is embraced by the term "determine" but it presumably empowers the New York courts to ascertain
the substance of foreign law and to resolve any conflict in the testimony.25s
The early federal foreign-law cases are not particularly enlightening on the jury-trial question. In Talbot v. Seeman, 259 decided in
1803, the Supreme Court intoned the monotonous refrain that
foreign law cannot be judicially noticed and has to be "proved as
facts." Since the case was in admiralty, any attempt to divine its
jury-trial implications would be profligate. A year later, the Court
decided Church v. Hubbart, 260 an action on the case involving two
policies of marine insurance. The question before the court was
whether the insured's brig had been seized by the Portuguese for
illicit trade, a risk excluded by the policies. Documents purporting
to be copies of edicts issued by the authorities at the place of seizure
were introduced. The Supreme Court concluded that it was improper to place these documents before the jury because they were
defectively authenticated. Unfortunately for present purposes, the
Court did not indicate why the documents had been offered to the
jury. Inasmuch as the edicts pertained to the seizing of the plaintiff's
ship, they probably were introduced to show that the ship had been
seized by the Portuguese for involvement in illicit trade rather than
to establish the Portuguese law of illicit trade. The former is a
traditional fact question. If this hypothesis is correct, Church was
not a foreign-law case in the sense that the jurisprudence of a foreign
country provided the rules of decision, but was a domestic action in
which the d~tails of a foreign occurrence were properly ascertained
by the jury; as such it may be of little probative value for the current
inquiry. A case more in point is United States v. Turner, 261 a midnineteenth century decision in which the Court recognized and com258. The question whether the predecessor of rule 45ll(c), N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
New York Constitution was
raised but left open in Graybar Elec. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 292 N.Y.
246, 250, 54 N.E.2d 811, 812 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944). In Jongebloed v.
Erie R.R., 297 N.Y. 534, 74 N.E.2d 470 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 855 (1948), the
same argument, which apparently had been rejected below, was not considered by
the Court of Appeals. Although it cannot be stated categorically that the issue has
been foreclosed, the nonchalant treatment accorded it by New York's highest court
would certainly so indicate. See Note, 18 ST. JoHN's L. R.Ev. 73 (1943). Compare SoMMERICH & BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 20-21 (1959), with
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 43-44, 131 n.(b) (2d ed. 1959).
259. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 38 (1803).
260. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 238 (1804).
261. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 663 (1850).
§ 344-a violated the jury-trial guarantee in the
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mented upon the absurdity of leaving issues of foreign law to the
jury:
Witnesses, it appears, were examined in the District Court, to
prove that this instrument was a perfect and complete grant by the
laws of Spain then in force in the province of Louisiana in relation
to grants of land; and the counsel for the appellees moved for an
issue upon this point, to be tried by the jury. This motion was
properly refused by the court, and the issues which the court directed were confined to questions of fact. The Spanish laws which
formerly prevailed in Louisiana, and upon which the titles to land
in that State depend, must be judicially noticed and expounded by
the court, like the laws affecting titles to real property in any other
State. They are questions of law and not questions of fact, and are
always so regarded and treated in the courts of Louisiana. And it
can never be maintained in the courts of the United States that the
laws of any State of this Union are to be treated as the laws of a
foreign nation, and ascertained and determined as a matter of fact,
by a jury, upon the testimony of witnesses. 262

The Turner Court did add the following dictum, however.
[I]f the Spanish laws prevailing in Louisiana before the cession to
the United States were to be regarded as foreign laws, which the
courts could not judicially notice, the titles to land in that State
would become unstable and insecure; and their validity or invalidity would, in many instances, depend upon the varying opinions of
witnesses, and the fluctuating verdicts of juries, deciding upon
questions of law which they could not, from the nature of their
pursuits and studies, be supposed to comprehend.263

Because Turner involved the Spanish law in force in Louisiana
before that state entered the Union, which brings it under one of
the four traditional exceptions to the proof requirement, 264 the
Court's dictum cannot be regarded as a definitive statement on the
jury-trial issue. Nonetheless, it is the most illuminating discussion of
the relationship between jury trial and issues of foreign law that
can be found in the Supreme Court decisions prior to the beginning
of this century.
Two early cases decided by Mr. Justice Washington on circuit
may indicate that the usual practice in the federal trial courts
shortly after those tribunals were established was for the judge to
decide issues of foreign law absent special factors. In the first case,
Seton v. Delaware Ins. Co.,265 the Justice set out the substance of
262. Id. at 668.
263. Ibid.
264. See text accompanying notes 138-50 supra.

265. 21 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 12675) (C.C.D. Pa. 1808).
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certain Cuban commercial regulations in his charge to the jury and
apparently limited the jury's function to applying the facts to the
Cuban law as charged. In Consequa v. Willings, 266 the question
whether certain trade customs existed in Canton, China was left
to the jury. In an extended discussion, Mr. Justice Washington
concluded that normally foreign law, both written and unwritten,
must be proved as a fact, but that after the submission of proof it
was the court's task to ascertain the alien law and decide its effect.
He added that when a custom or usage is sufficiently established to
be treated as assimilated into the foreign country's law, it also is
subject to judicial determination. However, when the existence of
a custom or usage is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the court
may leave that limited question to the jury. Noting that the existence of the particular usage in issue had not been established
beyond reasonable doubt, Mr. Justice Washington held that no
error had been committed in submitting the question to the jury;
neither its precise content nor its application to particular facts was
before the jury.
Reconstructing the federal practice in the years preceding the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it seems reasonable to say that
when an issue of foreign law involved the interpretation of statutes,
textual material, or judicial decisions it was treated as one of law
for the court, as historically has been the case with all written documents.267 This approach seems best exemplified by a Supreme Court
dictum from Finney v. Guy: 268
Although the law of a foreign jurisdiction may be proved as a fact,
yet the evidence of a witness stating what the law of the foreign
jurisdiction is ... is really a matter of opinion ... and courts are
not concluded thereby from themselves consulting and construing
the statutes and decisions which have been themselves proved, or
from deducing a result from their own examination of them that
may differ from that of a witness upon the same matter. In other
words, statutes and decisions having been proved or otherwise
properly brought to the attention of the court, it may itself deduce
from them an opinion as to what the law of the foreign jurisdiction
is, without being conclusively bound by the testimony of a witness
who gives his opinion as to the law, which he deduces from those
very statutes and decisions.269
266. 6 Fed. Cas. 336 (No. 3128) (C.C.D. Pa. 1816).
267. Cf. Trasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill&: Johns. 234 (Md. 1831); Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co. v. Pollard, 94 Va. 146, 26 S.E. 421 (1896); Di Sora v. Phillipps, 10 H.L. Cas. 624,
637-42, 11 Eng. Rep. 1168, ll74-75 (1863).
268. 189 U.S. 335 (1903).
269. Id. at 342. See also Eastern Bldg. &: Loan Ass'n v. Williamson, 189 U.S. 122,
126 (1903); Mexican Nat'l R.R. v. Slater, 115 Fed. 593, 608 (5th Cir. 1902), afj'd, 194
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The contours of federal practice were somewhat less certain when
the expert testimony used to establish foreign law was in conflict.
In Compania Transcontinental de Petroleo, S.A. v. Mexican Gulf
Oil Co.,21° the Second Circuit stated that when the construction of
a foreign statute is controverted, the court's conclusion is one of
fact. Since a jury had been waived, the court expressly avoided the
question under discussion. Nonetheless, in defining the scope of
appellate review it did treat the lower court's resolution of the
testimonial conflict as a fact determination. But in another pre-1938
case, Merinos Viesca y Compania, Inc. v. Pan American Petroleum b
Transport Co.,211 the same court stated: "The meaning of a foreign
statute is for the court notwithstanding the conflict of testimony of
experts." 272
Since 1938, a number of federal judges have determined foreignlaw issues without the aid of a jury and have justified their actions
simply in terms of the jury not being a proper tribunal for such
matters. 273 The Fifth Circuit gave extensive consideration to the
issue in Liechti v. Roche,274 which involved the availability of damages for pain and suffering under Panamanian law. The trial court
had refused to submit the matter to the jury. After a review of many
of the earlier federal cases, the appellate court simply concluded that
"it was the judge's function to determine the state of the foreign
law.... " 2711 On the basis of Liechti, the District Court for the Western District of Texas, in Daniel Lumber Co. v. Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 216 treated a portion of a special verdict dealing with
Honduran law as advisory and made its ovm "findings of fact" as to
U.S. 120 (1904); Shelton v. Canadian No. Ry., 189 Fed. 153 (C.C.D. Minn. 19ll). In
Barielle v. Bettman, 199 Fed. 838 (S.D. Ohio 1912), the court commented that the
"existence" of foreign law is a matter of fact triable by a jury. The only authorities
cited for that proposition were two old Ohio state court decisions. One, Evans v.
Reynolds, 32 Ohio St. 163 (1877), does not deal with jury trial at all and the other,
Ingraham v. Hart, 11 Ohio 255 (1842), makes the unsupported statement that foreign
law is for the jury.
270. 292 Fed. 846 (2d Cir. 1923).
271. 83 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1936).
272. Id. at 242. See also Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
273. See Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1952); Harris v. American Int'!
Fuel 8: Petroleum Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1954). But cf. United States v.
Baumgarten, 300 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1962) (criminal case in which weight of expert's
testimony left to jury). See also Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222
(N.D. Tex. 1963), modified on other grounds, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965). In one case
in which local law was applied pursuant to the presumption that it was the same
as the applicable foreign law, the court apparently formulated the law of the case
for the jury. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638, 642 (10th Cir. 1962).
274. 198 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1952).
275. Id. at 177.
276. 215 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955).
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certain facets of that law. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit examined
many of the authorities and concluded that the trial court had committed no error in deciding the foreign-law issues itself. Finally, in
Jansson v. Swedish American Line,211 Judge Magruder observed, in
dictum, that "a question of foreign law, though commonly stated to
be one of fact, is for the court, not the jury." 278
b. History and policy applied. No federal case involving foreign
law has been found in which the jury-trial question was considered to
be of constitutional dimensions. 279 The federal courts apparently have
neither felt themselves constrained by the English precedents nor
considered it necessary to advance any historical or constitutional
defense for the judicial determination of issues of foreign law; they
have thought it sufficient merely to point out the deficiencies of
leaving foreign law to the jury. Although federal courts have characterized issues of foreign law as "questions of fact" or "matters to
be proved as facts" on innumerable occasions, these somniferous
phrases apparently have encompassed only the manner in which
evidence is presented to the court.280 Rather than statements of
actual practice, the few existing judicial intimations favoring jury
trial appear to be loose dicta, undoubtedly the result of a failure to
distinguish foreign law as a "fact" for purposes of proof from foreign
law as "law" for purposes of either assigning it for determination or
defining the appropriate scope of appellate review. When the federal
experience is examined against the backdrop of the early English
and state court decisions, the irresistible conclusion is that there is
no historic tradition of submitting foreign-law issues to the jury that
is of sufficient clarity to warrant a present-day federal judge to hold
that he is bound to do so as a constitutional matter.
Even if venerable decisions did show that foreign law was triable
by jury in 1791, there are at least two reasons why a shift in federal
practice since then does not necessarily violate the integrity of the
277. 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950).
278. Id. at 216. The same statement appears in Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel,
196 F.2d 950, 957 n.6 (1st Cir. 1952).
279. It is interesting to note that only one writer has seriously suggested the possible existence of a constitutional problem if foreign-law issues are determined by the
judge. See McKenzie, The Proof of Alien Law, A.B.A. SEC. INT'L &: COMP. L., PRO·
CEEDINGS 50, 51 (1959). See also McKenzie & Sarabia, The Pleading and Proof of Alien
Law, 30 TuL. L. R.Ev. 353, 357-60 (1956). The point also is raised in a footnote in
Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 318, 322 n.38 (1958).
280. In Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222, 229 (N.D. Tex. 1963),
modified on other grounds, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965), the court said: "Even in a
jury case, the trial judge is the trier of fact as to the existence of foreign law and
has the responsibility of construing it, if he finds it to exist."
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seventh amendment. First, the rationale of any eighteenth century
jury-trial practice would have been the fact characterization of
foreign law, which means that the practice was an administrative,
logical, by-product of the nomenclature of the day, rather than an
attempt to effectuate any of the basic policies of the jury-trial guarantee. It would make little sense to preserve an eighteenth-century
practice based on the fact theory-an approach that today has no
significance, either procedurally or substantively, in light of our
changed attitudes toward foreign law and the accessibility of information about legal systems operating beyond our borders. Furthermore, one result of the second sentence of Federal Rule 44.I will
be that foreign-law issues will not be presented in a form that fits
the traditional pattern of proof to the trier of fact. Because of the
inapplicability of the rules of evidence and the trial court's freedom
to do its own research, foreign law will not be placed in evidence in
the adversarial format upon which effective jury deliberation depends. It thus will be difficult, if not impossible, to integrate the jury
mechanism into the current motif for establishing foreign law.
The second, perhaps obvious, point is that the seventh amendment's jury-trial guarantee is not immutable; over the years it has
proven to be sufficiently flexible and malleable to survive the constant remolding necessitated by new problems and changed circumstances in many areas of the law. 281 Professor Austin Wakeman
Scott has described the range within which jury-trial practice may be
modified to meet changing conditions as follows:
Only those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent
in and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond
the reach of the legislature. The question of the constitutionality of
any particular modification of the law as to trial by jury resolves
itself into a question of what requirements are fundamental and
what are unessential, a question which is necessarily, in the last
analysis, one of degree. The question, it is submitted, should be approached in a spirit of openmindedness, of readiness to accept any
changes which do not impair the fundamentals of trial by jury.
It is a question of substance, not of form. 282
Several years after Professor Scott wrote these lines the Supreme
Court, in Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.,283 up281. The status and function of the jury also has been altered by political and
social shifts in our society. See Comment, The Changing Role of the Jury in the
Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
282. Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. REv.
669, 671 (1918).
283. 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931). See also Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.R.R., 165 U.S.
593, 596 (1897) (special interrogatory procedure not a violation of seventh amend-

Michigan Law Review

686

[Vol. 65:613

held the partial new trial procedure against a seventh-amendment
challenge. It said:
[T]he Constitution is concerned, not with form, but with substance.
All of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of fact be submitted for determination with such instructions and guidance by the
court as will afford opportunity for that consideration by the jury
which was secured by the rules governing trials at common law....
Beyond this, the Seventh Amendment does not exact the retention
of old forms of procedure. It does not prohibit the introduction of
new methods for ascertaining what facts are in issue....284
In Ex parte Peterson 285 the Court was asked to pass upon the
appointment of an auditor of a type unknown at common law to
investigate and file a report simplifying, but not determining, the
disputed issues. Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, validated the procedure and commented that the seventh amendment
"does not prohibit the introduction of new methods for determining
what facts are actually in issue, nor does it prohibit the introduction
of new rules of evidence."286 Admittedly this case is not directly
analogous to the problem under discussion because the auditor in
Peterson was not given express power to "determine" the facts.
Nonetheless, Peterson does exemplify the permissibility of delegating the tasks of issue simplification and definition, which by their
nature entail some degree of qualitative fact analysis and ascertainment. Moreover, Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion does emphasize the
need to manipulate the jury institution to make it an efficient instrument for the administration of justice.
In addition, federal courts have taken judicial notice of a variety
of factual matters under Rqle 43(a) whenever state practice has provided the necessary authorization, without any suggestion that the
seventh amendment has been violated. It is difficult to see how this
practice differs from court determination of foreign law under Rule
44.1 in any way that is material to the jury-trial right. Moreover, the
federal courts always have taken judicial notice of the law of all the
states, international and maritime law, and the law, usages, and
customs in force in a territory prior to its incorporation into the
United States. 287 Is it reasonable to conclude that there is a constitument); Hosie v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 282 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 814 (1961) (separation of liability and damage issues upheld).
284. 283 U.S. at 498.
285. 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
286. Id. at 309.
287. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1892); Jones v. United States,
137 U.S. 202, 214-16 (1890); Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885); Pennington v.
Gib§OP.1 57
(16 How.) 65, 81 (1853); United States v. Turner, 52 U.S. (11 How.)

v.s.
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tional right to have a jury ascertain the law of Spain but not the
Spanish law in force in the territory of Louisiana prior to its purchase by the United States? Of Italy but not of Indiana? How is the
"vital significance" of the jury-trial right violated when a federal
district judge in New York ascertains Italian law, instructs the jurors
on its contents, and allows them to apply these instructions to the
facts-the time-honored procedure employed by the New York federal courts in lawsuits governed by Indiana law?
Once constitutional qualms are laid to rest, the most obvious and
germane consideration of all-one that has been alluded to throughout this discussion-is the simple, indisputable fact that the most
appropriate organism in the judicial system for manipulating foreign legal materials is the judge, not the jury. The Supreme Court
made it clear in Galloway v. United States288 that when history does
not compel the conclusion that a jury trial right is constitutionally
based, it is appropriate for the court to weigh the merits and demerits of utilizing the special talents of the respective arbiters. In
the context of foreign law, the position of the scales is clear. To
permit jurors to wrestle with foreign statutes or judicial decisions
hardly seems calculated to minimize fortuity or maximize rationality
in the litigative process. To assume that jurors can digest and then
apply foreign legal materials with any degree of accuracy or dexterity, no matter how carefully the court may indoctrinate them, is to
engage in a fantasy. Jurors always have been viewed as less competent than judges to ascertain local law; why should we indulge in
the hypocritical assumption that jurors are more qualified than
judges to ascertain foreign law? The difficulties encountered and
the expertise employed in determining foreign law are so similar to
the problems and skills involved in a trial judge's daily manipulation of domestic law that a supervening justification, seemingly
absent here, is necessary for extracting foreign law from his competence.289
663, 668 (1850); Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607, 625 (1835); Talbot v. Seeman, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 37-38 (1801).
288. 319 U.S. 372, 392-96, petition for rehearing denied, 320 U.S. 214 (1943). Galloway is discussed in note 243 supra.
289. Virtually all of the scholars who have voiced an opinion on this subject have
expressed the view that foreign-law issues should be left to the court. See, e.g., 1
GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 486 (15th ed. 1892); SroRY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 638 (3d ed.
1846); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2558 (3d ed. 1940); Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury
Trials, 4 HARV. L REv. 147, 171-72 (1890). See also 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 621.5
(1935); TSAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 257-58 (1898); 1 WHARTON,
EVIDENCE § 303 (1877). But see WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw § 413 (1859). On
the question of relative competence, see also Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the
Law-fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1867, 1922-24 (1966).
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The prospect of jury intrusion into the determination of foreign
law is not made significantly more attractive by attenuating the
jury's function. Even though the jury's historic role has been to
weigh inferences and evaluate contradictory evidence regarding
events and physical facts, 290 the court is more competent to resolve
testimonial conflicts concerning the interpretation of foreign law.
In many cases the divergence between the competing evidentiary
displays will be more apparent than real and will stem from semantic debates engaged in by partisan experts rather than from fundamental jurisprudential disputes. Is there any doubt that a judge is
in a better position than a jury to ferret out the real area of contention and analyze its dimensions? A fortiori when a basic disagreement does exist as to the content of foreign law, the training and
talent of a judge should be brought to bear to resolve the issue. A
mature system, like prudent people, should entrust the process of
examination, diagnosis, and treatment of its problems to a clinician
rather than to an ad hoc group of dragooned laymen.
It also is relevant that judicial determination of foreign law
under Rule 44.1 clearly would be consistent with the tenor of present day Anglo-American practice. All of the federal judges who have
dealt with the question in recent years have ascertained and applied
foreign law without the aid of a jury, and almost all state judges do
the same under section 5 of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act, section 4.03 of the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act, or similar legislation.291 Moreover, recent decisions
in states that do not have any statutory directive on the subject have
held that the only sensible approach is to leave issues of foreign law
to the trial judge.292
4. Appellate Review of Foreign Law Determinations
Prior to the promulgation of Federal Rule 44.1, the scope of
review given a determination of foreign law varied among the cir290. A rough analogy can be drawn between construing and determining the effect
of foreign legal materials and doing the same with written commercial instruments.
In the latter context the function traditionally has been one for the court. See, e.g.,
Bell v. Bruen, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 169 (1843); Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180
(1805); Crowe v. Gary State Bank, 123 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1941). See also THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 202-07 (1898).
291. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 1761 (1956); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. &: R. 4511(c); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-4 (1953); cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1699 (1958). See also UNIFORM
RULE OF EVIDENCE

10(4).

292. E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. O'Grady, 97 Ariz. 9, 396 P.2d 246
(1964); Choate v. Ransom, 74 Nev. 100, 323 P.2d 700 (1958) (sister-state law). A statefederal divergence in assigning the function of determining foreign law might motivate forum shopping on the part of the plaintiff in diversity cases. See the discussion
at text accompanying notes 395-405 infra.

February 1967]

Federal Rule 44.1 and Foreign Law

689

cuits. Although several courts of appeals fully reviewed a district
court's disposition of foreign-law issues, 293 a trial court's findings
occasionally were characterized as determinations of fact and subjected only to limited re-examination. 294 The latter approach represents another manifestation of the fact theory and, before proceeding,
it seems appropriate to invoke the reasons advanced throughout this
article for equating issues of domestic and foreign law and to incorporate them as evidence of the desirability of giving the two types
of issues identical treatment on appeal.
Presumably, appellate courts have been assigned the task of
reviewing a trial court's legal conclusions because of their special
expertise and competence in determining the existence, relevance,
and application of rules of law. These particular qualities certainly
are as valuable when the law of a foreign country is under examination as they are when the law of the forum is in issue. Indeed, the
utilization of an appellate court's talents probably is of even greater
importance in the case of foreign law than domestic law because
of the special logistical difficulties encountered when dealing with
the former. Inasmuch as reviewing courts usually have access to the
legal materials offered and considered at trial, and in many instances
have better foreign-law facilities at their disposal than do district
courts, it is useful to permit appellate tribunals to re-examine
foreign-law issues and apply their collegial powers exactly as is
done on issues of domestic law. A more restrictive review of foreign293. See, e.g., Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1952) (dictum); Mexican
Nat'! R.R. v. Slater, 115 Fed. 593, 608 (5th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 194 U.S. 120 (1904). See
also Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.
1930). In a number of cases, courts of appeals have re-examined the trial court's
determination of foreign law without commenting on the question of the proper
scope of review. See, e.g., Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d
465 (2d Cir. 1965); Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 196 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1952).
See also Daniel Lumber Co. v. Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465 (5th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955).
294. See Reissner v. Rogers, 276 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 816
(1960); Shapleigh v. Mier, 83 F.2d 673, 676-77 (5th Cir.), af!'d, 299 U.S. 468 (1936);
Compania Transcontinental de Petroleo, S.A. v. Mexican Gulf Oil Co., 292 Fed. 846
(2d Cir. 1923); Hudson River Pulp & Paper Co. v. H. H. Warner & Co., 99 Fed. 187
(2d Cir. 1900). See also Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 922 (1955) (foreign law "is as reviewable as any other fact issue');
Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 23,
27-28 (1957); Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review and
Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARV. L. REv. 318 (1958). In McKenzie & Sarabia, The
Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 TuL. L. REv. 353, 355-56 (1956), the authors,
after cloaking themselves in the mantle of the fact theory, proclaim that foreign-law
material "is evidentiary in nature and hence exclusively for the lower court." (Emphasis in original.) Fortified by this "fact-evidence" schematic, they conclude that the
test with respect to the correctness of the result reached in the trial court on an
issue of foreign law should be whether there is "any evidence to sustain the trial
court's finding."
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law determinations than is usually accorded domestic law seems
justifiable only when the oral testimony on alien law offered at trial
is in conflict and the circumstances justify according special weight
to the district judge's ability to evaluate credibility and demeanor. 295
To further its objective of treating foreign and domestic law
alike to the extent feasible, the final sentence of Rule 44.1 provides
that the trial court's determination of foreign law is to be viewed
"as a ruling on a question of law.'' 296 This statement should resolve
the confusion that formerly existed among the courts of appeals concerning the scope of review of issues of foreign law and should give
the appellate courts greater latitude than is permitted by the "clearly
erroneous" test applied under Federal Rule 52(a) to findings of
fact. 297 Similar provisions appear in section 3 of the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act and section 4.03 of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act.
Effective plenary appellate review of foreign-law issues will be
even more significant under Rule 44.1 than it was under former
federal practice because of the district court's increased authorization to determine foreign law, engage in its own research, and examine materials not presented by the parties. Full appellate review
of the trial court's utilization of these powers seems necessary both
as a restraint against abuse and as a precaution against the possibility
of trial-court error. An unintended side effect of increasing both the
district court's involvement in the determination of foreign law
and the number of cases in which foreign law actually is ascertained
295. See Remington Rand, Inc. v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A., 188 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The value of demeanor
evaluation in the case of expert testimony on foreign law should not be overemphasized, however. It seems unlikely that the physical appearance and emotional state
of a foreign-law expert will be sufficiently distinctive to provide insights into his
competence that are not available from the record of his testimony.
The argument for full review of trial-court determinations of foreign law may
be compromised by the fact that plenary appellate review of a construction of forum
law is partially justified on the value of the resulting stare decisis effect, see Brown,
Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 55 HARV. L. R.Ev. 899, 905 (1943); decisions as to
foreign law generally are not given such effect, see Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1034-35 (1941). However, in a number of contexts
foreign-law determinations have been relied upon in subsequent litigation. See Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965); Wood &:
Sellek, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 944 (2d Cir. 1930);
cf. Mary Duke Biddle, 33 B.T.A. 127 (1935), afj'd, 86 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1936), afj'd,
302 U.S. 573 (1937). See also Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate
Review and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARv. L. REV. 318, 324-28 (1958).
296. The full text of Rule 44.1 is set out in note 5 supra.
297. This test appears to have been applied to a foreign-law issue in Reissner v.
Rogers, 276 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 816 (1960); Remington Rand,
Inc. v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales S.A.,
188 F.2d lOll (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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by the court may prove to be an increase in the number of appeals
and a higher incidence of trial-court error on such issues. 298
A reasonable inference to be dra·wn from the new Rule's last
sentence and the foreign-domestic law analogy is that appellate
courts have the same freedom to examine foreign-law materials as
is given to the trial courts under the second sentence of the new
Rule. 299 Thus, a court of appeals is free to consider not only the
fruits of the trial court's independent research and the materials
introduced by the parties in the lower courts, but also any information that it has unearthed itself. By the same token, the attorneys
should be permitted to present new foreign-law materials on appeal,
subject, of course, to the usual caveats about overreaching and
prejudice.soo
A question that probably will occur more frequently under the
new practice than it has in the past is the proper disposition of a
case when the appellate court is convinced that the wrong foreign
law was applied at trial, either because counsel failed to bring the
correct law to the court's attention or because the choice-of-law rule
was misapplied. The circuits appear to be divided as to whether this
permits a direction for the entry of judgment or whether it constitutes reversible error or necessitates a remand.301 In ]annenga v.
Nationwide Life Insurance Co.,302 the court took a mediate position
298. With the possible exception of appeals from those districts whose judges are
particularly conversant with the law of a certain foreign country, the courts of appeals should not afford the trial judge's foreign-law findings the same prima facie
effect as often is given to his forum-law findings in diversity cases. See, e.g., RuddMelikian, Inc. v. Merritt, 282 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1960); Massachusetts Bonding 8e Ins.
Co. v. Julius Seidel Lumber Co., 279 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1960); Cranford v. Farnsworth
&: Chambers Co., 261 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1958). See also H. K. Porter Co. v. Wire Rope
Corp., 367 F.2d 653, 662-63 (8th Cir. 1966).
299. Federal appellate courts have exercised this prerogative in the past. See, e.g.,
Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434 {2d Cir. 1949).
300. See generally Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review
and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARv. L. REv. 318, 319-22 (1958).
301. Compare Prudential Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 126 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1942), and
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irrigation Co., 265 Fed. 594 (8th Cir. 1920), with
Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958), and United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 144 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1944). See also Pecheur Lozenge
Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942); McClure v. United States Lines Co.,
368 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966). In Busch, When Law Is Fact, 24 FORDHAM L. REY.
646, 657 (1956), the author suggests that when an appellate court discovers new material on foreign law it must "remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
proof with respect to those ••• authorities, thus permitting the parties to be heard
on the subject before a final decision is reached." No reason is given why the parties
cannot be heard in the appellate court. Undoubtedly, the brooding omnipresence of
the fact theory and the long standing practice of using common-law methods of proof
lie at the root of the quoted passage. See also Currie, On the Displacement of the
Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 964, 984-85 (1958).
302. 288 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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and held that the judgment below need not be impeached unless the
trial court's misapplication of foreign law resulted in perceptible injustice. This resolution of the question certainly is desirable from the
perspective of giving the appellate courts sufficient freedom of action
to avoid unnecessary reversals. The test is objectionable, however, because it seems to be little more than a paraphrase of the harmlesserror rule and because it interjects a somewhat elusive standard into
the process of appellate review-a process already choked by an excessive number of verbalisms-that may generate more uncertainty and
controversy than the problem warrants. 303 Moreover, the ]annenga
approach makes remand mandatory whenever "prejudice" is shown,
without regard to whether the prejudice can be rectified on appeal.
It seems more desirable to permit the appellate tribunal to apply the
proper foreign law whenever it can do so on the basis of the record
on appeal and a supplementary presentation by counsel; this is a
common practice when domestic law has been misapplied by the
trial court.304 Remand then would be necessary only when an effective or fair application of foreign law is impossible without a new
trial or when jury-trial considerations are paramount.aois Abandonment of the fact theory of foreign law vitiates any justification for
an absolute rule that alien law initially be determined by a trier of
fact. Therefore, remand should be necessary only when the shift in
the choice of foreign law is radical or when the magnitude of the
presentations by the parties on the foreign law selected by the appellate tribunal would be too great an imposition on its energies.
C. Consequences of Failing To Establish Foreign Law
The federal courts have displayed as much diversity of opinion
with regard to the consequences of a failure to establish the content
of foreign law as have the state courts.306 This lack of judicial con303. See 14 STAN. L. REY. 162 (1961).
304. E.g., Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 168 N.E.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960).
305. Under some circumstances due process considerations may come into play if
the appellate court concludes that the trial court's choice of law was erroneous, decides
to apply the law of a different country, and fails to provide the party prejudiced by
the shift with an opportunity to present evidence on the new law or to contest the
court's application of it. Cf. Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917).
306. See text accompanying notes 74-98 supra for a discussion of state practice.
The problem of a failure of proof can confront a defendant as well as a plaintiff.
For example, in Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kennedy, 199 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C.
1961), rev'd on other grounds, 319 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965
(1964), a failure to establish a defense of impossibility under Hungarian law led to the
granting of summary judgment against the defendant. The quantum of evidence
needed to discharge the burden of proof on an issue of foreign law often depends
on the character of the case. Thus, in Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.
1958), the court held that the government had not sustained what was characterized
as a heavy burden of proof in a denaturalization proceeding.
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sensus is exemplified by the different attitudes of the Second and
Fourth Circuits in admiralty cases. In the Fourth Circuit, a failure
to prove foreign law has led to the application of general American
maritime law.307 In the Second Circuit the impact of Cuba R.R. v.
Crosby 308 is more evident; a failure to establish the existence of a
cause of action under the applicable foreign law has resulted in a
dismissal of the action.309
Despite the elevated status of the Crosby case and the prevalence
of the vested-rights philosophy during the nineteenth century and
the first half of the twentieth century, most federal cases involving
a failure to prove foreign law have not resulted in the direction of
a judgment on the merits against the party who has the burden of
establishing alien law. The harshness of Crosby has been avoided by
employing the previously discussed exceptions to the proof requirement.310 Thus, federal courts have resorted to the rudimentary or
fundamental principles concept in a number of cases to cure a failure
of proof311 and in other cases forum law has been applied on the
307. See, e.g., Heredia v. Davies, 12 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1926); Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. The City of Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1949).
308. 222 U.S. 473 (1912). The case is discussed at text accompanying notes 79-82
supra.
309. See Ozanic v. United States, 165 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1948); Banque de France v.
Chase Nat'! Bank, 60 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1932); The Hanna Nielsen, 273 Fed. 171 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 653 (1921); Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co., 211
F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); McQuade v. Compania de Vapores San Antonio, S.A.,
131 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also Rosden v. Leuthold, 274 F.2d 747, 748 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (dictum); Lauro v. United States, 162 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1947); Panama
Elec. Co. v. Moyers, 259 Fed. 219 (5th Cir. 1919) (refusal to direct verdict against
plaintiff for failing to prove Panama law held erroneous); Tsakonites v. Transpacific
Carriers Corp., 246 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Gonzalez v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). At one point, the Ninth Circuit appeared to have cast its lot with the Second Circuit. In Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945
(9th Cir. 1958), 75 A.L.R.2d 523 (1961), an action for defamation governed by Peruvian law, no proof of foreign law was presented. Relying on Crosby, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the Washington District Court's dismissal. "Where one country's judicial
system is based on the Common Law and the other's on the Civil Law, both systems
having been modified by statutory changes, there is little to recommend the employment of a presumption that the law of one is the same as the law of the other." Id.
at 948. But an imposing string of other Ninth Circuit cases, some of which, like Philp,
originated in Washington, have applied the presumption of identity between forum
and foreign law. See 1700 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. GBR Associates, 354 F.2d 993 (9th Cir.
1965); San Rafael Compania Naviera, S.A. v. American Smelting 8: Ref. Co., 327 F.2d
581, 587 (9th Cir. 1964) (dictum); Medina v. Hartman, 260 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1958)
(habeas corpus proceeding); Gerking v. Furness, Withy 8: Co., 251 F. Supp. 781 (W.D.
Wash. 1961). See also Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Gorter, 254 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.
1958).
l!IO. See text accompanying notes 138-50 supra. See generally Commissioner v. Hyde,
82 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1936); Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE
L.J. 1018, 1035 (1941).
311. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962); E. Gerli 8: Co.
v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931); Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v.
Rivers, 211 Fed. 294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 727 (1914); Rosenthal v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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theory that it was the only law before the court312 or in the belief
that the parties agreed that forum law governed.313 In an apparent
plurality, or perhaps even a majority, of cases involving a failure to
prove alien law, federal courts have presumed that foreign law is
identical with forum law and have required the party claiming a
divergence between them to prove it.314
Unfortunately, most of the federal opinions involving a failure
of proof of foreign law lack any extensive or enlightening analysis
of the factors leading to the particular disposition. The courts
usually have not indicated whether they based their decisions on
general federal principles or applied the law of the state in which
the federal court was sitting. In several cases in which the latter
course was clearly adopted, the court either expressed a belief
that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tomkins3 15 compelled the application of the forum state's law316 or failed to delineate the considerations that motivated its decision.311
312. Barrielle v. Bet_tman, 199 Fed. 838 (S.D. Ohio 1912).
313. El Hoss Eng'r &: Transp. Co. v. American Independent Oil Co., 183 F. Supp.
394 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 837 (1961). There may be some due-process limitation on the direct application
of forum law when there is an insufficient connection between the litigants and the
forum. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See also Morgan, Choice of Law
Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1944); CALIF. LAw REv. COMM'N, REPORTS
RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES I-20 (1957).
314. See, e.g., 1700 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. GBR Associates, 354 F.2d 993 (9th Cir.
1965); San Rafael Compania Naviera, S.A. v. American Smelting&: Ref. Co., 327 F.2d
581, 587 (9th Cir. 1964) (dictum); Pedersen v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 95 (D. Guam
1961); Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D. 385 (D. Neb. 1947); The Hanna
Nielson, 25 F.2d 984 (W.D. Wash. 1928); The Fort Gaines, 18 F.2d 413 (D. Md. 1927).
See also Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1966); Fowler v.
Pennsylvania Tire Co., 326 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1964); Compania de Aquaceros, S.A. v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 256 F. Supp. 658 (D.C.Z. 1966); Messina v. Mutual Benefit Health
&: Acc. Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1964), af/'d, 350 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1965)1 cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966); Gerking v. Furness, Withy &: Co., 251 F. Supp. 781 (W.D.
Wash. 1961). In Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 913 (1952), the court presumed that since Japanese law had been in force in
Okinawa prior to World War II and no change in jurisprudence had been shown,
Japanese law was still in effect.
315. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
316. E.g., Waggaman v. General Fin. Co., 116 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1940); Bostrom v.
Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963), modified on other grounds,
347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965). Federal courts in several diversity of citizenship cases
have assumed that the Erie decision has modified the traditional federal-court practice of taking judicial notice of the law of all the states and have applied the presumptions employed by the forum-state's courts. See, e.g., Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. v.
Fein, 342 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1965). See also Petersen v. Chicago, G.W. Ry., 138 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1943). In a more significant number of cases, however, the federal courts
continue to take judicial notice of the law-at least the Constitution and statutesof the several states. E.g., Schultz v. Tecumseh Prods., 310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962)
(application of Erie expressly rejected); J. M. Blythe Motor Lines Corp. v. Blalock,
310 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1962); Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 183 F.2d 640 (7th Cir.
1950); Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941). See also note 425 infra.
317. E.g., San Rafael Compania Naviera, S.A. v. American Smelting & Ref. Co.,
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Neither Federal Rule 44.1 nor the accompanying Advisory Committee Note attempts to describe the effect of a failure to prove foreign law. Two considerations may have contributed to this silence.
The first, a concern on the part of the draftsmen that an attempt to
regulate this subject, which is a complex admixture of conflict of
laws and burden of proof doctrines, would transgress the limits of
the Supreme Court's rule-making power or would run afoul of the
Erie doctrine. 318 The second, a belief that a failure to prove foreign
law under Rule 44.1 will be a rara avis because the Rule greatly
increases a party's ability to establish foreign law and reinforces this
capacity by giving the trial judge both extensive discretion to consider foreign-law materials and power to engage in his own research.
Inasmuch as the failure-of-proof problem will have new dimensions
under Rule 44.1, which could not be discerned at the time the Rule
was drafted, it probably was thought appropriate to leave the matter
to judicial development.
The consequences of a failure to prove foreign law should be
viewed from two perspectives: as an exercise in conflict of laws, and
as a problem of burden of proof. Separation of the two is useful
solely for analytical purposes, because any attempt to divorce them
is arbitrary. The conflicts approach necessitates an inquiry as to
when a federal court is obliged to turn to the law of a foreign country as a source of decisional rules. Not all issues of foreign law raise
conflicts problems. In many lawsuits foreign law is relevant only to
a particular factual element or to the determination of a single
issue319 and the rules governing the rights and liabilities of the parties are found in domestic law. In these situations the application
of foreign law to a particular facet of the case does not involve a
choice of law, and conflicts theory does not offer any guidelines for
dealing with a failure of foreign-law proof.
Of course, it is the forum's conflicts principles that determine
when foreign law is to be the source of decisional rules in particular
cases. This article is not the place to recapitulate or assay the debate
between the advocates of the vested-rights theory of conflict of laws
and the proponents of the various new methodologies that seek out
327 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964) (dictum); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th
Cir. 1962); Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Gorter, 254 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1958);
Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D. 385 (D. Neb. 1947).
318. The rule-making power is discussed at text accompanying notes 429-519 infra;
the effect of Erie on Rule 44.1 is dealt with at text accompanying notes 376-428 infra.
319. See, e.g., Crashley v. Press Publishing Co., 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904)
(whether alleged libelous statement printed by the defendant was an imputation of
a crime under Brazilian law).
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a controversy's "center of gravity," weigh governmental interests, or
use forum law absent a strong policy motivation to look elsewhere.320
It is sufficient for the present discussion to point out that the preRule 44.1 practice regarding a failure to prove foreign law, which
through Crosby, was appended to the vested-rights philosophy, left
much to be desired. A pattern that permits a federal court to take judicial notice of the law of England, Mexico, or Spain as of a certain
date because it happened to have been in force in a territory that has
since become part of the United States, but requires a dismissal on
the merits for a failure to establish the present-day equivalent of the
same law, has a touch of factitiousness to it.321 A scheme of this type
makes even less sense under Rule 44.1 because its primary application would be in cases in which foreign law could not be ascertained
despite the diligent efforts of both counsel and the trial judge. It
simply is not fair to bar a party from recovering when neither his attorney nor the court is able to conjure up the content of the governing law. To speak of a failure of proof or to assume that the party
has no rights under the controlling law in these circumstances is
inappropriate.
Turning to the burden of proof tangent, it is easy to state the
traditional allocations. One of the by-products of the Crosby case
and the vested-rights tradition is that the burden of proving foreign
law generally has fallen on the party whose cause of action or defense
320. The "new" conflicts methodologies are exemplified in cases such as Bernkrant
v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1961); Clark v. Clark,
222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1964); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395
P.2d 543 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). In admiralty cases, the federal courts have used the "center of gravity" approach to determine the applicable law for some time. E.g., Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d
212 (1st Cir. 1950); Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See
also McClure v. United States Lines Co., 368 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). Some of the
recent scholarly writing on the new approaches to conflict of laws include: CAVERS,
THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS passim (1965); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives
in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, reprinted in CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON
THE CoNFUCT OF LAws 177 (1963); Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts
Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L. REV. 377 (1966); Symposium on New Trends
in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 673 (1963) (especially the articles
by Professors Cavers, Currie, Ehrenzweig, and Reese). Although the analyses and
semantic formulations offered by the scholars differ widely, they seem to lead to substantially the same results in application. See Kay, Book Review, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 341
(1966).
321. The contrast is not entirely academic. In Loree v. Abner, 57 Fed. 159 (6th Cir.
1893), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the Circuit Court in the District
of Kentucky were called upon to apply the colonial law in force in Pennsylvania 170
years earli~r. Moreover, the logic of the rule would require the pre-1867 law of Tsarist
Russia to be judicially noticed by a federal court in Alaska, whereas a federal court
in the Second Circuit would dismiss an action based on current or Tsarist Russian
law in the absence of sufficient proof,
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is based on it. In those jurisdictions employing the presumption of
identity between local and foreign law, this burden has been shifted
to the party asserting a lack of identity between the two. 322 One unsettled point is whether the presumption has the effect of shifting
only the burden of production or affects the burden of persuasion
as well. Although it probably is too early in the development of the
new conflicts theories to predict with any certainty, it seems likely
that if existing notions of burden of proof are retained in the context of foreign law, both burdens will remain on the party whose case
depends upon the contents of foreign law.
When an irremedial failure of proof does occur under Rule 44.1,
at the least the federal courts have the freedom to continue applying
the variety of exceptions to the proof requirement that they have
utilized in the past, assuming that the Erie considerations discussed
below are not an impediment.323 Hopefully, the courts will be able to
exercise substantially greater flexibility. If the trend away from the
Crosby case and the strict territorial notion of conflict of laws continues, the crazy-quilt of exceptions and presumptions developed
over the years can be replaced by a more cohesive and rational
scheme. Even though these judicial doctrines have been extremely
useful as safety valves for the pressures created by Crosby and have
achieved desirable results in particular cases, they are interstitial in
character and have acted as palliatives for a judicial unwillingness
to accept the consequences of the vested-rights doctrine. If the courts
have nurtured the existing inroads on the integrity of the vestedrights system, they should be willing to exercise greater flexibility in
dealing with failures in foreign-law proof than is currently practiced.324
In an attempt to formulate a better approach to the problem, it
might be helpful to examine a situation in which th~ conflicts rule,
whether it be of the new or old genre, clearly points to the law of a
particular foreign country. To provide a tangible background for
the inquiry, posit a lawsuit similar to Walton: 325 an action involving
322. Indeed, the word "presumption" in this context appears to be a euphemism
for declaring a shift in the burden of producing evidence or in the burden of persuasion. See Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH.
L. REv. 195, 199-203, 205-08 (1953).
323. See text accompanying notes 407-28 infra. The traditional exceptions to the
proof requirement are discussed at text accompanying notes 138-50 supra.
324. In Seguros Tepeyac, S.A. v• .Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168, 174 n.3 (5th Cir. 1965),
the court commented:
In the interest of arriving at a just adjudication, the trial judge should have
discretion in determining whether the law of the forum, with or without the
disguise of a presumption, should prevail. This discretion should be especially
broad in a state with a civil law background.
325. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
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a foreign tort in which the plaintiff is content to have his claim
measured by forum law and demonstrates no desire to invoke foreign law, whereas the defendant perceives some advantage in applying the law of the place where the tort occurred and has given notice
under Rule 44.1 that he intends to challenge the existence of a cause
of action under the governing law.
Despite the siren call of countless cases applying burden-of-proof
notions to a failure of foreign-law proof, the rejection of the fact
characterization of alien law by Federal Rule 44.1 makes it clear that
under the new federal practice the failure-of-proof problem does not
involve burdens of production and persuasion in any classical sense.
Many of the considerations involved in assigning responsibility for
proving the facts demonstrating the defendant's negligence or the
plaintiff's contributory negligence are inapposite to the question
who should establish the content of the foreign law. In the latter
context, the text of Rule 44.1 requires the court and counsel for the
parties to share the responsibility for ascertaining the relevant rules
of law, as they do in cases governed by domestic law, thereby rendering the traditional objectives of burdens of proof irrelevant. This is
emphasized by the passages in the new Rule giving the trial court
authority to do its own research and directing that foreign-law determinations be treated as rulings on questions of law.326 The most
effective way of insuring that the joint obligation of court and counsel is properly discharged is by giving the trial court discretion to
allocate the workload entailed in establishing foreign law in light
of such factors as convenience and economy; to insist upon the application of traditional burdens of proof is as ill-advised as it is illogical.
Even if one is hesitant about completely severing the umbilical
cord to the past, a modicum of rationality can be provided within
the confines of the existing burden-of-proof structure. Admittedly,
there is something superficially attractive about the following set of
alternative propositions: (1) a plaintiff who seeks relief on a cause
of action that can be maintained in a federal court only if it can be
asserted in the country in which the operative events occurred (either
because the forum does not recognize the plaintiff's cause of action
or because the forum does recognize it, but the applicable conflicts
principle requires the application of foreign law) should bear the
burden of establishing the content of that law; or (2) forum law
should be applied unless a party who seeks to gain some advantage by
displacing it with foreign law assumes the burden of establishing
326. The text of Rule 44.1 is set out in note 5 supra.
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the latter. Allocation of the task of establishing foreign law in terms
of an alleged symbiotic relationship between conflict of laws rules and
burdens of proof hardly seems inevitable, however. The burden of establishing a cause of action or defense under the controlling foreign
law normally should rest on the party who would bear that burden
if the litigation were governed by forum law. Thus, if the identity
presumption is followed and the defendant wishes to overcome it,
he should not be required to do more than produce enough evidence
to show that the presumption is unrealistic in the particular case;
the plaintiff ought to have the ultimate task of persuading the court
that a cause of action exists under foreign law. Phrased somewhat
differently, the party who raises a foreign-law issue should bear the
initial burden of production but not necessarily the ultimate burden
of persuasion.827 This allocation is a rough equivalent of the view that
a party who pleads the existence of a fact has the burden of presenting the first evidence with regard to it.328 The suggested approach is
somewhat more difficult to employ if the court adopts the "new" conflict of laws approach and uses an interest analysis in selecting the
governing law. Sound application of that technique requires the
court to analyze the content of the various potentially controlling
laws before one is chosen. Thus, neither party has a burden with
regard to ascertaining the applicable law in any meaningful sense.
Nonetheless, it still might be advantageous to divorce the process of
showing the character of foreign law for purposes of determining
whether it should govern the lawsuit from the question of who has
the burden of establishing a right to relief under the law ultimately
chosen.
In the context of the hypothetical, the approach suggested in the
327. There is a conflict among the commentators as to the effect of a presumption
on these two burdens. Compare THAYER, A PREUMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 339
(1898), and 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940), with Morgan &: Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. R.Ev. 909, 913 (1938), and Reaugh,
Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 36 ILL. L. R.Ev. 703, 819 (1942). See also Kales,
Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 HARV. L. R.Ev. 401 (1906).
The suggestion in text finds support in Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Gorter,
254 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1958), in which the appellee, an administratrix, sought damages
for wrongful death stemming from the grounding of one of the appellant's airplanes
in the tidal waters of the Pacific off the Dominion of Canada. The trial court presumed that the law of the place of injury was the same as Washington law and
ignored the airline's motion after trial but prior to the entry of judgment to amend
its answer to show that the Dominion of Canada had jurisdiction over the place of
injury and that the applicable wrongful death act barred recovery. The Ninth Circuit, applying Washington law, stated that "the presumption of identity to Washington law of the law of another country disappears when evidence to the contrary is
introduced." Id. at 653 n.3.
328. See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 306-07 (1954). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2489 (3d ed. 1940).
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preceding paragraphs simply means that if the federal court concluded that the dispute is governed by the law of the country in
which the tort occurred, the burden of proving that country's law
of negligence, contributory negligence, and any other significant
legal principles would be assigned in accordance with the allocation
normally made of those issues in domestic actions or, when the
forum's conflicts principles require, in accordance with the burdens
prescribed by the applicable foreign law. The same treatment would
be appropriate when the issues of foreign law are collateral to the
main dispute and there is no choice-of-law problem.
Whatever treatment is accord.ed the burden problem, it must
contain a degree of flexibility. In certain situations it may be proper
to permit the trial court to exercise considerable discretion in assigning the burden. For example, if the parties have unequal access to
foreign-law materials, fairness and litigation economics may warrant
a departure from the traditional approaches. Thus, if the hypothetical is embellished by adding such facts as an accident in Afghanistan
between an American plaintiff who has had no contact with Afghanistan other than his presence there at the time of the accident and an
American corporate defendant with continuous and extensive commercial dealings in that country, it may be appropriate to ask the
defendant to establish the content of Afghanistan law or at least to
present whatever relevant legal materials are available to him, even
though the burden normally would be on the plaintiff.820 A full or
partial reassignment of the burden also would be justifiable if one
of the litigants is an Afghan or if the party with superior access to
information concerning Afghan law has assiduously avoided mentioning its relevance.830 A substantial number of additional variables,
including the importance and character of the action, the level of
the forum's interest in the dispute, the complexity of foreign law,
and the difficulties of determining it, bear on the court's willingness
to manipulate the burden. Although trial court discretion to reallocate the burden in order to minimize the number of cases in
329. See Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 AM. J. Cm,IP. L. 60,
62, 66 (1954); Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018,
1042-43 (1941).
330. Although some of the commentators have expressed a lack of enthusiasm for
assigning burdens of persuasion in terms of relative access to information, they do
recognize that the burden-allocation process lacks a "key-principle" and generally
retreat either to prior practice or to notions of "convenience, fairness and policy" to
support their positions. See, e.g., McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318 (1954); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2486, 2488 (3d ed. 1940). The importance of the relative access to information is supported by the use of presumptions for procedural convenience. See
McCORllUCK, EVIDENCE § 309 (1954). See also Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv.
255 (1937).
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which foreign law cannot be ascertained may be viewed as a degree
of flexibility approximating anarchy, it is not completely heretical
as far as burden-of-proof doctrine is concerned and it is in accord
with the new Rule's objective of maximizing the ability to establish
foreign law.
The ultimate question, of course, is what is the appropriate
denouement when the court has decided that foreign law controls
and has allocated the burdens of production and persuasion, but
the party with the latter burden has failed to discharge it? One obvious answer is that the normal consequences of a failure to discharge
a burden should accrue. When the foreign-law issue merely is incidental or collateral to the controversy, this probably is sound. When
foreign law is the source of the rules of decision, however, the justification for this approach is less apparent, especially if the forum's
conflicts principles have any degree of elasticity. In any sensitive
system for selecting the applicable law, an initial choice in favor of
foreign rather than domestic law is tentative and to some degree
presumes a capacity and willingness to ascertain the chosen law.
Indeed, the court may have gravitated toward alien law because its
content was thought fairer to the parties than domestic law or because the court believed that the nexus between the foreign country
and the controversy was stronger than the tie between the forum and
the dispute. If the party with the burden cannot (or occasionally
even when he will not) establish foreign law, at least one of the
premises upon which the court based its original decision to apply
foreign law has proven to be inaccurate. Inasmuch as continued insistence on foreign law may result in the plaintiff's dismissal despite
the possibility that a valid cause of action actually exists under foreign
law, the court may wish to reappraise its initial reference to foreign
law and consider the application of forum law. For example, when
one or both of the litigants is a citizen of the forum and the failure
to establish foreign law is not deliberate but stems from its esoteric
or underdeveloped character,331 there is little reason not to apply
331. See VON MERREN&: TRAUTMANN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 99 (1965).
Conversely, if neither party is a citizen of the forum state or if the federal court
does not have any strong interest in the outcome of the litigation and does not find
any rational basis for reallocating the burden or applying local law, it may choose
to dismiss the action on the basis of forum non conveniens. The advantage of this
escape valve is that it avoids an adjudication on the merits based on a failure to
prove foreign law that will bar the losing party from seeking relief in another
forum under more advantageous circumstances. Normally, however, the mere fact that
proof of foreign law may be difficult is not a sufficient basis for granting a forum-nonconveniens motion. See Horowitz v. Renault, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
cf. La Electronica, Inc. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 260 F. Supp. 915 (D.P.R. 1966).
See also Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1966).
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domestic law. The reasons for reassessing the decision to apply alien
law become even more persuasive if, as suggested, the concept of
burden of proof is considered inapposite to a failure to ascertain
foreign law under Rule 44.1.

D. The Implications of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
I. Setting the Stage
Probably no Supreme Court decision rendered during this century has had as significant an impact on the distribution of judicial
power between the federal government and the states as has Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins. 332 Viewed narrowly, the case merely rejected the
prevalent pre-1938 notion that section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, the so-called Rules of Decision Act, 333 requires a federal court
in diversity litigation to apply the statutes and certain limited categories of local rules and customs, but not the common law, of the
states.334 In doing so the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
332. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In view of the massive amount of literature on the Erie
doctrine and the emphasis given it in current law-school curricula, it would be profligate to state the case's facts. Throughout this discussion case recitation will be
minimized.
333. 1 Stat. 92 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
334. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See also WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 54 (1963). The Erie doctrine is neither applicable to all diversity cases nor
limited to diversity cases. Occasionally, its relevance will depend on the source or
nature of the right being asserted and the litigation's impact on national policies
rather than on the technical character of the federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., HART 8e WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 697-99
(1953); Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L.
REv. 66 (1955); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1953);
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957); Vestal,
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248 (1963). Since this facet of
Erie jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this article, the textual discussion proceeds
with the relatively uncluttered diversity case as its model.
Viewing Erie solely as an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1964), Federal Rule 44.1 would not present an Erie problem if it could be
brought under the aegis of the specific exemption in that act for matters that are the
subject of federal statute. Arguably, a Federal Rule promulgated pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964), either has the status of a United States
statute or is a matter with a sufficient nexus to a federal statute to fall within the intended coverage of the Rules of Decision Act. See Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REv. 467, 480 (1957). The Enabling Act is discussed in detail at text accompanying notes 475-519 infra.
The precise status of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been a subject of
considerable debate. The dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312
U.S. l (1941), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 655 (1941), concurred in by three other Justices, contains a statement that the Rules cannot be equated with federal statutes. A
majority of the Court appears to have taken a contrary view. See Note, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1031 (1949); Note, State
Jurisdictional Limitations Applied to Diversity Cases, 1957 WIS. L. REv. 339. See also
Levin 8e Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in
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Rules of Decision Act and simply invalidated the judicial construction given it during the reign of Swift v. Tyson. 335 However, Mr.
Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court purports to rest the case
partially on constitutional considerations. In the third part of his
opinion, the Justice argued:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter
of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or
"general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And
no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon
the federal courts.336

The possibility that Mr. Justice Brandeis intended this passage as
a flourish or make-weight to add force to his rationalization of the
drastic changes worked by Erie caused the lower federal courts to
take little notice of the case's constitutional basis for almost twenty
years and led several writers to question the significance of that
aspect of the Erie opinion.337
Then in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,338 decided in 1956, the
constitutional foundation of Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie
was resurrected by the Supreme Court. The issue in Bernhardt was
whether the federal Arbitration Act should be applied in a diversity
case to a New York employment contract when the law of the forum
state permits the revocation of an agreement to arbitrate at any time
before an award is made. The Court interpreted the Arbitration Act
narrowly to avoid a constitutional problem it described as follows:
"Erie . . . indicated that Congress does not have the constitutional
authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases."339 According to the Court, the issue being
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1958); Note, 29 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 543; 54546 (1941). The quasi-statutory nature of the Rules seems to have been reinforced by
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See text accompanying notes 364-74 infra.
335. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
336. 304 U.S. at 78.
337. See, e.g., COOK, THE LOGICAL LEGAL BASIS OF nm CONFLICT OF LAws 138-43
(1942); Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot-Extensions of the Erie Case, 31 KY. L.J. 99
(1943); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278-79 (1946); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy,
66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1013, 1024-35 (1953); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme
Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 186, 188-204 (1957). See
also Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
338. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
339. Id. at 202.
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avoided was "whether arbitration touched on substantive rights,
which Erie . . . held were governed by local law, or was a mere
form of procedure within the power of the federal courts or Congress
to prescribe." 340
Although the Bernhardt opinion does not deal directly with the
status of matters of procedure under Erie, the last portion of the
second passage quoted above seems to leave federal procedure within
Congress' competence.341 Given the language in Bernhardt, one
might expect that the federal courts would have reached the conclusion that the Rules Enabling Act,342 which is limited by its terms to
practice and procedure, is a valid exercise of congressional power
and is immune to an Erie challenge, and that any Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure falling within the legitimate scope of the act also is
invulnerable to an attack under Erie.343 This conception of the interrelationship between Erie and the Federal Rules apparently had
support immediately following the Erie decision344 but the support
atrophied when the Supreme Court transmuted the Erie philosophy
in order to effectuate policies that had been expressed sotto voce in
the original decision; as shall be seen below, however, this attitude
may now be enjoying a renascence in a slightly modified form.
340. Ibid. Although dictum, this language carries the implication that Erie disenabled Congress from enacting any legislation applicable in diversity litigation that
"touched on substantive rights." See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 56, at 196-98
(1963); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 427, 441 (1958);
Whither, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution
of Their Conflict, 37 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 549, 550-54 (1959).
341. Mr. Justice Reed remarked in his concurring opinion in Erie: "The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over
procedure." 304 U.S. at 92.
342. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1964).
343. See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. R.Ev. 940, 1046-49 (1961).
An unstated premise in this analysis is that "substance" and "procedure" have similar
meanings in both the Enabling Act and Erie contexts. For some time the propriety of
this premise was considered extremely doubtful. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play
on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. R.Ev. 711, 715 (1950). Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965), may well have had the effect of bringing the two standards together, at least
with regard to testing the validity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See text
accompanying notes 364-74 infra. Nonetheless, the argument that the Erie concept of
"substantive"-that which the Constitution declares untouchable by Congress-is narrower than the Rules Enabling Act concept of "substantive"-that which Congress has
declared untouchable by the Supreme Court and their rulemakers-cannot be consigued to oblivion.
344. In Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650
(1940), Judge Magruder commented:
[I]t is not doubted that Congress has the power to prescribe the "procedure" for
the federal courts, and this would certainly include a power to include within
the domain of "procedure" subject-matter falling within the borderland between
substance and procedure, and rationally capable of classification within either
category.
Id. at 756 n.4. See also Holtzoff, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie RailToad Co. v. Tompkins, 24 J. AM. Juo. Soc'Y 57 (1940).
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Between 1938 and Bernhardt, the Supreme Court gave the Erie
doctrine an everwidening scope. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co.,845 the Court held that in diversity cases the federal judiciary
was obliged to apply the conflict-of-laws principles of the forum state
because "otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in co-ordinate state
and federal courts sitting side by side."346 Thus, the elimination of
shopping as between state and federal fora, a pernicious characteristic
of the Swift v. Tyson era but hardly the leitmotiv of Mr. Justice
Brandeis' opinion in Erie, became a rationale for tying the federal
judiciary to state conflicts rules.347 The Klaxon case also made clear
what was implicit in Erie: the words "substance" and "procedure"
take on new meanings in the Erie environment, and categorizations
evolved in other contexts are not necessarily apposite.
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 348 the Supreme Court considered
the propriety of a federal court granting equitable relief when a state
court would have been foreclosed from awarding similar relief by
the relevant state statute of limitations. The Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, refused to apply the so-called equitable
remedial rights doctrine and stated, in a passage that is indelibly
inscribed on the minds of a generation of law students and Erietic1ans:
Here we are dealing with a right to recover derived not from the
United States but from one of the States.... [T]he forms and mode
of enforcing the right may at times, naturally enough, vary because
the two judicial systems are not identic. But since a federal court
adjudicating a State-created right solely because of the diversity of
citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another
court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover
is made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the
enforcement of the right as given by the State.
And so the question is not whether a statute of liznitations is
deemed a matter of "procedure" in some sense. The question is
345. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
346. Id. at 496.
347. See also Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); Griffin v. Mccoach,
313 U.S. 498 (1941); Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor, 365 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1966). For a criticism of the Klaxon result in terms of constitutional power, see Hill,
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 541, 543-68 (1958). Variant
appraisals of Klaxon are found in CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 216-24 (1965);
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 57 (1963); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System,
16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 732 (1963); Hart, The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 489, 513-15 (1954).
348. 326 U.S. 99 (1945), 44 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1945), 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 145 (1946),
31 VA. L. REV. 948 (1945).
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whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and the means
by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced,
or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the
aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard
a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the
same claim by the same parties in a State court?
It is therefore immaterial whether statutes of limitation are
characterized either as "substantive" or "procedural" in State court
opinions in any use of those terms unrelated to the specific issue
before us. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to
formulate scientific legal terminology. It expressed a policy that
touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between
State and federal courts. In essence, the intent of that decision was
to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties,
the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. The nub of the
policy that underlies Erie . . . is that for the same transaction the
accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead
of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially
different result.a49

Thus emerged the outcome-determinative test-an attempt to prevent a federal court in diversity litigation from reaching a decision
at variance with the result that would obtain in a state court in a
comparable case.350
The Supreme Court decided two cases in 1949 involving "clashes"
between the outcome-determinative test and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co.,351 the plaintiff commenced a tort action pursuant to Federal
Rule 3 by filing a complaint within the Kansas two-year limitations
349. Id. at 108-09. Mr. Justice Rutledge, with whom Mr. Justice Murphy joined,
dissented and warned of the "danger . . • of nullifying the power of Congress to
control not only how the federal courts may act, but what they may do by way of
affording remedies ...•" Id. at 116. See also Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S.
514 (1953).
350. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), 35 CoRNELL L.Q. 420
(1950), 44 ILL. L. REV. 533 (1949), 24 IND. L.J. 418 (1949), 28 TEXAS L. REv. 444 (1950);
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). Note that the outcome-determinative test is
not necessarily constitutionally based but may be an attempt to determine Congress'
intent in the Rules of Decision Act or, with regard to the test's application to the
Federal Rules, in the Rules Enabling Act. Premonitions of the York result were
sounded in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650
(1940); Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REv. 153, 158, 195 (1944);
Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Rail•
road v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271, 278 (1939).
351. 337 U.S. 530 (1949), 35 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950), 38 GEO. L.J. 115 (1949), 48
MICH. L. REv. 531 (1950).
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period but service on the defendant was not made until after that
period had expired. Under Kansas law a statute of limitations was
not tolled until the defendant was served. The Court concluded that
the tolling provision was an integral part of the limitations statute
and held the action barred in the federal courts because it was barred
in the state courts. "Since that cause of action is created by local law,
the measure of it is to be found only in local law. . . . Where local
law qualifies or abridges it, the federal court must follow suit."352
In the second case, Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,353 the
Court applied a New Jersey statute obliging a plaintiff in a stockholder derivative action to post security for litigation expenses even
though former Federal Rule 23(b), now Rule 23.1, did not contain
a similar requirement. The Court reasoned that the New Jersey
statute created an independent right of action for costs and expenses
in favor of the defendant that was protected by the security provision, and that this substantive policy had to be effectuated by the
New Jersey federal court.
Although Ragan and Cohen do impinge upon the integrity of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, their impact probably is less drastic
than some writers have indicated.354 The cases did superimpose state
substantive law on the application of the Federal Rules but they did
not invalidate Rule 3 or former Rule 23(b). In Ragan the action
clearly was "commenced" within the meaning of Rule 3 for purposes
of filing the action and measuring various time periods under the
Federal Rules; the substantive rights created by Kansas law were
rendered unenforceable in a federal court because they were not
asserted within the time limits established by that state's law. In
Cohen, New Jersey's policy of securing the defendant's ability to
enforce the plaintiff's liability for the expenses of an unsuccessful
derivative action was believed sufficiently strong to warrant its application by the federal court in addition to the safeguards already
provided for the defendant in Rule 23(b). When viewed as instances
of the cumulation of state and federal law, rather than as a displacement of the latter, Ragan simply means that Rule 3 does not determine the point at which certain state-created rights are extinguished
and Cohen merely holds that compliance with Rule 23 does not
352. Id. at 533.
353. 337 U.S. 541 (1949), 35 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950), 48 MICH. L. REV. 706 (1950),
35 VA. L. REv. 789 (1949).
354. See HART &: WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 674-78
(1953); Clark, Book Review, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 181 (1950). Other writers have been less
pessimistic. E.g., Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law,
19 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 78-79 (1964).
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automatically guarantee a federal forum when the state imposes
additional impediments to access to its own courts in shareholder
derivative suits.355
However, neither Ragan nor Cohen considered the possibility
that the Federal Rules and the inferences emanating from them embody significant federal policies that should not have been subordinated to the policies reflected in the state statutes applied in those
cases. Thus, for example, even if the statute involved in Cohen expressed New Jersey's desire to restrict shareholder derivative suits,
might not former Federal Rule 23(b) represent a policy permitting
comparatively easy access to the federal courts in such actions-a
policy based upon a panoply of judicial administration factors different from the considerations that led the New Jersey legislature
to constrict access to its own courts? Even if the New Jersey statute
reflected that state's appraisal of the balance to be struck between
corporations and their shareholders, should not the policy underlying Federal Rule 23(b) at least have been revealed and evaluated?
In short, the holdings in Ragan and Cohen appear to be based on
either (I) the unstated premise that the Supreme Court, despite the
Rules Enabling Act, is impotent to promulgate a rule touching on
matters of "substantive" law that will be operative in diversity litigation if it conflicts with state policy or (2) the unexpressed assumption
that Federal Rules 3 and 23(b) do not reflect significant federal policies but merely articulate relatively banal procedural objectives.
Untrammelled application of the outcome-determinative formulation of York and its extension in Cohen and Ragan would require
abandoning any hope of obtaining procedural uniformity among
the national trial courts in diversity cases; almost any procedural
rule may assume outcome-determinative dimensions in particular
contexts.356 Similarly, nothing short of obsequious conformity to
state practice could eliminate forum shopping; even the relative
condition of court calendars and the different qualities of state and
federal judges might influence a litigant's forum choice. Moreover,
the fact that the Constitution does not bestow power on the Congress
or the federal courts to enact substantive law for diversity cases does
not mean that the Constitution requires unerring identity of outcome between state and federal courts. That view ignores the exis355. Cf. Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom.
Carlin v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960).
356. See Clark, supra note 354, at 183; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitu•
tion, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 427, 450-51 (1958). For a catalog of the Federal Rules that
might be affected by an unremitting quest for identity of outcome, see Hill, supra at
432-35.

February 1967]

Federal Rule 44.1 and Foreign Law

709

tence of the Constitution's grant of diversity jurisdiction. By casting
a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction in the role of a servile
state tribunal, much of the desired protection theoretically afforded
out-of-state litigants may be compromised. A strict outcome-determinative approach also ignores the value of preserving the equity
powers traditionally exercised by federal courts and misses the importance of insuring an impartial adjudication of federal rights,
which often are involved in diversity cases. This failure to give
weight to the independence of the federal judiciary and to the frequent presence of important federal policies in diversity cases represents the weakest aspect of the York doctrine. 357
The most recent chapter in the Erie saga indicates that the trend
established by York, Ragan, and Cohen has been reversed. It starts
with Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-operative, Jnc., 358 decided
two years after Bernhardt, in which the crucial question was whether
the dispute was subject to the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, and therefore resolvable only through the state administrative procedures, or could be heard in the federal courts. A jury verdict
in the plaintiff's favor was reversed by the Fourth Circuit. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to permit the plaintiff to present evidence as to whether he was an employee of the defendant, which would determine whether the plaintiff fell within the
Workmen's Compensation Act; the plaintiff had been denied that
opportunity in the lower court. The Court, holding that South
Carolina's practice of having the court determine an issue of the
act's coverage was not an integral or substantive part of the state's
Workmen's Compensation Act but was "merely a form and mode of
enforcing the immunity . . . and not . . . intended to be bound
up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties,"359
directed the District Court to leave the question to the jury. Apropos
of the York rule, the Court observed that if "outcome" were the only
factor, the federal court might well be required to follow state practice.
But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here. The federal system is an independent system for administering
357. It has been suggested that the test should be predictability prior to the time
the forum is chosen. See Blume &: George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49
MICH. L. R.Ev. 937, 953, 956 (1951). See also Horowitz, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test
To Determine Those Rules of State Law to Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 So. CAL.
L. REv. 204, 214-15 (1950). Although this approach might cure the forum-shopping
aspect of Erie, it may not always meet the problem of avoiding results in the federal
courts that differ from those reached in the state courts.
358. 356 U.S. 525 (1958), 72 HARv. L. REV. 147 (1958), 43 MINN. L. R.Ev. 580 (1959).
359. Id. at 536.
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justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential
characteristic of that system is the manner in which ... it distributes
trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influenceif not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury. . . . The policy of
uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations . . .
cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule-not bound
up with rights and obligations-which disrupts the federal system of
allocating functions between judge and jury.... Thus the inquiry
here is whether the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed
fact questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in
the federal court and another way in the state court.300

The Court's decision seems to have been influenced by its belief that
it was unlikely that the outcome of the case would be different if
heard by a federal jury rather than by a state judge.861
At first glance, Byrd seems limited by its peculiar facts. Even
though the Court did not base its decision on the seventh amendment, the "brooding omnipresence" of the constitutional status of
the jury-trial right offers a basis for containing the application of the
case's expansive language.362 Moreover, no "likelihood of a different
result" was shown in Byrd, which may mean that substituting a jury
for a court determination does not raise a York problem. Despite
these reasons for a conservative reading of Byrd, several courts of
appeals have used the case to bypass Erie and preserve the integrity
of the Federal Rules.363 These courts have taken the position that
360. Id. at 537-38. See also Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); Shenandoah Life
Ins. Co. v. Hawes, 256 F. Supp. 366 (E.D.N.C. 1966). A pre-Byrd decision of like tenor
is Pogue v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1957).
361. "We do not think the likelihood of a different result is so strong as to require
the federal practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to yield to the state
rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome.'' 356 U.S. at 540. In Bernhardt the Court
had said that "the change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a
radical difference in ultimate results.'' 350 U.S. at 203. Note, however, that the difference in "ultimate result" in Byrd is not predictable as it was in the York case.
362. 356 U.S. at 537 n.10. The commentators have expressed widely divergent views
on the importance of Byrd. See Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76
HARV. L. REv. 275, 292-301 (1962); Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power,
49 VA. L. R.Ev. 1082, 1098-99 (1963); Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye
View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 Tut. L. R.Ev. 443 (1962); Weintraub,
The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Law Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228, 235-37 (1964);
Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution
of Their Conflict, 37 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 549, 554-63 (1959).
363. In Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Carlin
v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960), the Second Circuit permitted substitution of an outof-state administrator as plaintiff under Federal Rule 25(a)(l), although New York
law would not have permitted substitution and the action could not have been maintained in a state court. Judge Friendly rejected the application of York on two
grounds: first, whereas York involved a defined state policy embodied in a statute,
he could find no such policy prohibiting revivor against a foreign administrator;
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Byrd requires any relevant federal policies that will be encroached
upon by the application of state law to be balanced against the
desiderata of achieving identity of result and respecting state substantive policies. In addition, a number of decisions in which particular Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been upheld support
the proposition that the Rules express federal attitudes on the
second, in York there was no federal legislation or clear federal policy covering the
point in issue. Byrd was cited for the proposition that considerations other than mere
"outcome" were relevant. Said the court:
Our holding is only that in this limited area Congress may use its power to
"provide for service of process anywhere in the United States" in such a manner
that in all suits properly in the Federal courts by or against United States citizens,
including diversity suits, substitution of their personal representatives may be
had on their decease. This is an area which the positive inference from Article
III and the "necessary and proper" clause outweighs the negative inference from
the limited grant of legislative power in Article I, § 8, and the Tenth Amendment that must have afforded the basis for the constitutional precept of Erie.
Id. at 48.
Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 {5th Cir. 1960), held that a prior inconsistent statement of an officer of the defendant corporation was admissible in the
federal courts under Rule 43{a), although a Florida statute seemed to exclude it.
Again, Byrd was construed to indicate that:
[A]11 does not necessarily fall in the path of uniformity of result. So to determination of whether the application of the state rule would likely affect the
outcome in a significant way must now be added the further one. Are there
countervailing considerations reflecting substantial federal polices which outweigh
in final balance the aim of like result? ••.
Not the least of these countervailing considerations is the indispensable necessity that a tribunal, if it is to be an independent court administering law, must
have the capacity to regulate the manner by which cases are to be tried and facts
are to be presented in the search for the truth of the cause.•.• A United States
District Court clothed with power by Congress pursuant to the Constitution is
not a mere adjunct to a state's judicial machinery. In entertaining diversity cases
it is responding to a constitutional demand made effective by congressional action
and ..• has a constitutional duty to hear and adjudicate.••.
• • • An important countervailing policy consideration in the Blue Ridge sense
therefore is the historic purpose of the Federal Rules and the forces which led
Congress to pass the Rules Enabling Act.
Id. at 406-08. As in Iovino, the Fifth Circuit in Monarch engaged in an analysis of
the underlying premises of the Florida rule of exclusion. Finding no policy that
would justify exclusion of the evidence in a federal court, it was held admissible.
The Monarch decision was referred to by the Fifth Circuit in Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 {5th Cir. 1961), as standing for the proposition that the admissibility of evidence "is procedural, not substantive." The Dallas
County case reaffirmed the proposition and held that the admissibility of a fifty-eight
year old newspaper clipping was within the discretion of the federal court. The same
result is implicit in Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 {2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962), although the Erie issue is discussed only in the
dissenting opinion by Judge Moore. The majority opinion in Hope approvingly cites
the Monarch discussion of Rule 43(a) and the problems posed by Erie. See also
McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1966). For a further discussion of various circuit court decisions, see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 59 (1963).
Se\'cral post-Byrd circuit court cases applied the outcome-determination test of
York, however. E.g., Hardwick v. Smith, 286 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1961); Summers v.
Wallace Hosp., 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1960); Aponte v. American Sur. Co., 276 F.2d
678 (1st Cir. 1960). An excellent Chautauqua on Byrd was conducted by Judges Clark
and Friendly in Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), and
Jafte.x Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
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administration of justice in the district courts and that they reflect
a congressional desire for a uniform, national procedural system
applicable in all civil actions regardless of the basis of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Thus, Byrd has produced a series of ad hoc analyses of
the policies underlying various Federal Rules and a series of evaluations of whether those policies are sufficiently important to outweigh
contrary state practices. This process imposes a difficult burden upon
the courts, often results in abstract distinctions, and requires decisions that on many occasions are made without knowing whether the
ruling will have any practical impact on the case. Nonetheless, the
Byrd approach seems preferable to the complete absence of concern
for federal interests that pervaded the York, Ragan, and Cohen
regime.
In 1965, the Supreme Court again had occasion to consider the
impact of the Erie-York-Byrd complex on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This time the vehicle was Hanna v. Plumer.364 At issue
was whether a plaintiff in a Massachusetts diversity action, brought
against an executor for personal injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff
in South Carolina by the defendant's testatrix, could commence the
lawsuit by substituted service under Federal Rule 4(d)(l) or was
obliged to comply with a Massachusetts statute365 requiring service
"by delivery in hand" within one year after an executor posts bond
for the performance of his duties. Both the district court and the
First Circuit, concluding that the propriety of service of process
should be tested with reference to the Massachusetts statute, granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment because timely inhand service had not been made on the executor. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, concluded that Rule 4(d)(l) "neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule is therefore the standard against
which the District Court should have measured the adequacy of
the service."366
The Court disposed of the argument that the "outcome-deter364. 380 U.S. 460 (1965), 54 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1382, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 551, 1966 DUKE
L.J. 142, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 345, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 413 (1966).
365. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (1955).
366. 380 U.S. at 464. In retrospect, Hanna appears to have been foreshadowed by
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), which also involved the
validity of serving on an agent under Rule 4(d)(l). In upholding service, the Court
impliedly rejected Mr. Justice Black's argument in dissent that the agency was invalid
under the forum state's law and that the foreign defendants had been deprived of
their right to be sued in their home state, a right the Justice felt was guaranteed
them by Erie.
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minative" test required application of the Massachusetts statute as
follows:
The difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts
rule is applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at
this point "outcome-determinative" in the sense that if we hold the
state rule to apply, respondent prevails, whereas if we hold that
Rule 4(d)(l) governs, the litigation will continue. But in this sense
every procedural variation is "outcome-determinative." For example,
having brought suit in a federal court, a plaintiff cannot then insist
on the right to file subsequent pleadings in accord with the time
limits applicable in the state courts, even though enforcement of the
federal time-table will, if he continues to insist that he must meet
only the state time limit, result in determination of the controversy
against him.... Though choice of the federal or state rule will at
this point have a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation,
the difference between the two rules would be of scant, if any,
relevance to the choice of a forum. Petitioner, in choosing her forum,
was not presented with a situation where application of the state
rule would wholly bar recovery; rather, adherence to the state rule
would have resulted only in altering the way in which process was
served. Moreover, it is difficult to argue that permitting service of
defendant's wife to take the place of inhand service of defendant
himself alters the mode of enforcement of state-created rights in a
fashion sufficiently "substantial" to raise the sort of equal protection
problems to which the Erie opinion alluded.a61
In a later portion of his opinion, the Chief Justice concluded that

Erie considerations do not determine the validity or applicability of
a Federal Rule. He argued that "the Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule"; 368 Cohen, Ragan, and similar cases
were distinguished as instances in which the Federal Rule did not
cover the point in dispute. According to the Chief Justice, a clash
between a Federal Rule and local law--clearly present in Hannais resolved by applying the Federal Rule unless it can be demonstrated that "the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred
in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses
neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions."369 Although Byrd was not cited in the Court's discussion of
the Federal Rules, its philosophy seems implicit in the notion that
the Federal Rules are to be given effect despite contrary state law
367. 380 U.S. at 468-69. In redefining tbe Erie and "outcome-determination" policies, tbe Court emphasized tbe elimination of forum shopping and tbe "inequitable
administration of tbe laws." The Chief Justice's opinion clearly manifests a lessened
preoccupation witb uniformity of outcome. See McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie
Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884, 888-901 (1965).
368. 380 U.S. at 470.
369. Id. at 471.
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because of the federal policy inherent in "the constitutional provision for a federal court system" and the exercise of "congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those
courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which,
though falling within the uncertain area between substance and
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either."370
But has the pendulum swung too far? In a concurring opinionthere were no dissents-Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that it has and
chastised the Court for straying too far from the basic precepts of
Erie. He believed that the Chief Justice's opinion unduly sanctified
the Federal Rules because if "a reasonable man [and those charged
with the responsibility for formulating the rules "are presumably
reasonable men"] could characterize any duly adopted federal rule
as 'procedural,' the Court ... would have it apply no matter how
seriously it frustrated a State's substantive regulation of the primary
conduct and affairs of its citizens."371
Hanna seems to require that a federal court confronted with a
challenge to a Federal Rule decide initially whether the Rule actually conflicts with state law or whether it is narrower in scope and
permits the superimposition of state law, as in Ragan and Cohen.372
If a conflict does exist,373 the court must then determine whether the
Federal Rule falls within the ambit of articles I and III of the Constitution and the delegation in the Rules Enabling Act. 374 Apparently abandoned (especially if Mr. Justice Harlan's appraisal of the
majority opinion is accurate) is the notion derived from Byrd by
several courts and commentators that competing state and federal
practices must be balanced and that state practice can be permitted
370. Id. at 472. The Court also remarked that "neither York nor the cases following
it ever suggested that the rule there laid down for coping with situations where no
Federal Rule applies is co-extensive with the limitations on Congress to which Erie
has adverted." Ibid.
371. Id. at 476. Mr. Justice Harlan believed the question to be whether "choice of
a rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct
which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation." Id. at 475.
372. See Kuchenig v. California Co., 350 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 985 (1966).
373. See Sylvestri v. Warner &: Swasey Co., 244 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), in
which Judge Wyatt expresses the view that Ragan would not be followed after Hanna.
That conclusion is not inevitable. Indeed, two circuits have concluded that FED. R.
CIV. P. 3 does not purport to deal with the question of when an action is commenced
for purposes of measuring the relevant limitations period. Groninger v. Davison, 364
F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966); Sylvester v. Messler, 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965). The same
approach can be taken toward Cohen. See also Pinewood Gin Co. v. Carolina Power 8:
Light Co., 41 F.R.D. 221 (D.S.C. 1966) (Rule 17(a) applied under Ranna despite contrary South Carolina practice).
374. See text accompanying notes 429-519 infra for a discussion of the Rules Ena•
bling Act.
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to prevail only when it is "bound up with the definition of the rights
and obligations of the parties."375

2. Rule 44.1 and the Erie Doctrine
Given the tortuous evolution of the Erie doctrine and the new
analytic framework provided by Hanna, what is the status of Federal
Rule 44.1 in diversity cases? Approaching the Rule anatomically,876
the provision in the first sentence requiring that the court and adverse
parties be given "reasonable written notice" of an intent to rely on
foreign law appears immune from challenge. Procedures for giving
notice and pleading are among the most traditional "practice" subjects. If they are held outcome determinative, the goal of uniform application of the Federal Rules in diversity litigation is unobtainable.
Even during the heyday of Erie and York the courts preserved the
integrity of the pleading provisions in the Federal Rules, 877 and a
contrary conclusion with regard to Rule 44.1 hardly seems conceivable. The notice-giving or quasi-pleading character of the first sentence of the new Rule falls under the aegis of the Erie-York era pleading cases and unquestionably is the beneficiary of the expanded protection accorded the Federal Rules by Hanna. 878
To the extent that the second sentence of Rule 44.1 merely serves
to render the exclusionary evidence rules inapplicable and to expand the court's permitted scope of examination on a question of
foreign law, it is a rule of admissibility in the style of Rule 43(a).
375. 356 U.S. a~ 536. See text accompanying notes 358-63 supra; Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 66, 97 (1955). In its
concluding paragraph, the Court does not completely shut the door on either the balancing approach or outcome determination by stating:
[A] court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the
Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to
which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray
from the course it would follow in state courts ••..
380 U.S. at 473. Moreover, one aspect of determining whether a Federal Rule applies
in a particular situation is an inquiry into the policies underlying the Rule, which
may necessitate a weighing of the relevant federal, and any competing state, interests.
Neither the interest-balancing technique nor the many other emanations from the
Byrd decision seem to have been atrophied by Hanna outside the realm of matters
directly covered by the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co.,
365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966); McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593 (10th
Cir. 1966); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965); Bolick v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 249 F. Supp. 735 (D.S.C. 1966).
376. The text of Federal Rule 44.1 is set out in note 5 supra.
377. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). See also Follenfant v. Rogers,
359 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1966); Garcia v. Bernabe, 289 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1961).
378. Prior to the advent of FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1, at least two cases held that federal
pleading rules governed the manner of pleading foreign law in the federal courts
regardless of a divergent state practice. Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp.
727, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
57 F. Supp. 649, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
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Even before Byrd and Hanna, the lower federal courts held that
Erie, with certain exceptions not presently relevant, did not affect
matters of proof or admissibility and believed themselves free, inter
alia, to determine the proper scope of cross-examination379 and to
consider evidence that would have been excluded by a state court.380
Moreover, resort to federal rather than state practice will not be
outcome determinative when the new Rule is consistent with the
local practice regarding the receipt of foreign-law materials, as is the
case in an ever-increasing number of states. Even in a state in which
the cumbersome common-law methods of proving foreign law continue in vogue or a judicial-notice statute is in force, the possibility
of a case turning on a differential between the materials that can be
received and examined by state and federal judges is as remote and
incalculable as was the likelihood of an outcome differential in the
Byrd case. The mere fact that a different caliber of proof is needed to
379. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950).
380. Peoples Gas Co. v. Fitzgerald, 188 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1951); Franzen v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 51 F. Supp. 578 (D.N.J. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 837 (3d
Cir. 1944). See Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D.
429, 435-39 (1957); Comment, Federal Rule 4:J(a): The Scope of Admissibility of Evidence and the Implications of the Erie Doctrine, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1049 (1962). But
see Sibley, Delimitations of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 29 KY. L.J. 172, 174-75
(1941). For a post-Byrd pre-Hanna decision to the same effect, see Monarch Ins. Co. v.
Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Rain v. Pavkov, 357 F.2d 506 (3d Cir.
1966). Questions relating to the burden of proof have fallen prey to Erie. See Dick v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109
(1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d
754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940). But cf. text accompanying notes 407-28
infra.
The same fate probably is in store for at least some of the privileges, although
the Supreme Court never has passed on the question. See, e.g., Krizak v. ·w. C. Brooks
& Sons, Inc., 320 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1963); Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.
1955); Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953). See also Fraser v. United
States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944). A fundamental dispute exists among the commentators as to the impact of Erie on questions of privilege in the federal courts.
For the views of those who believe that the federal courts ·are not bound to apply
state privileges, see, e.g., 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE tJ 43.07, at 1333 (2d ed. 1951);
Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, IO VAND. L. REY. 467, 483
(1957); Pugh, Rule 4:J(a) and the Communication Privilege Under State Law: An
Analysis of Confusion, 7 VAND. L. REv. 556, 568 (1954). For the contrary view, see, e.g.,
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 93 (1963); Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence
in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341, 347 (1960); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and
Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 102 (1956); WeinsteiQ, Recognition in the United States of the Privilege of Another Jurisdiction, 56
CoLUM. L. REv. 535 (1956); Comment, Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts: A Time
for a Change, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 451, 463-65 (1960); Note, The Admissibility of Evidence Under Federal Rule 4:J(a), 48 VA. L. REv. 939, 943 (1962). The parol-evidence
rule, res ipsa loquitur, the statute of frauds, and various presumptions have been
categorized with privileges and burdens of proof. See Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc.,
192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952); Patterson-Ballagh Corp.
v. Byron Jackson Co., 145 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1944); Hotel Dempsey Co. v. Tell, 128
F.~d 673 (5th Cir. 1942).
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establish foreign law in a state court than is needed in a federal court
is not a variance of sufficient magnitude to raise an Erie problem;
indeed it seems indistinguishable from divergences between state
and federal practices as to required pleading detail or the availability
of pretrial discovery. The Erie doctrine, especially as reformulated
in Hanna, cannot be invoked whenever different state and federal
procedural rules reflecting the same broad objectives do not lead to
identical results in particular contexts.381 Finally, since it is unlikely
that a party ever will realistically expect the mode of proving foreign
law in a federal court to produce a different outcome than would
result under the forum state's proof-of-foreign-law procedures, the
availability of the liberal practice under the second sentence of Rule
44.1 will have "scant, if any relevance to the choice of a forum." 382
Thus, the mode of proof aspects of the second sentence of Rule 44.1
seem immune from debilitation by the Erie-York outcome-determination approach and seem even more secure given the Byrd-Hanna
assertions of federal power to regulate the penumbra! area between
substance and procedure.
Moving on to the last sentence of Rule 44.1, both its statement
that a determination of a foreign-law issue is to be treated as a ruling
of law and a federal-court practice of having such issues judicially
determined rather than jury tried seem to be unimpeachable by
Erie or York. It is difficult to perceive how the precepts of these cases
are violated by according the process of ascertaining foreign-law all
the indicia of a ruling on a question of law or by permitting a United
States court of appeals to use a review standard different from the one
employed by the forum state's appellate courts. It is highly unlikely
-probably to the point of being speculative-that a case's ultimate
result will change because the scope of review in the federal courts
is narrower or broader than that available in the state courts.883 The
remote possibility that a variance of this type will be outcome determinative or will encourage forum shopping renders any Erie or York
challenge to the final sentence of Rule 44.1 relatively impotent.
Even if Erie and York were thought relevant to the matters covered by the last sentence of Rule 44.1, its explicit text, as reinforced
by the Advisory Committee's Note, expresses a federal policy in favor
of treating foreign-law issues in a certain manner. Assuming the
Rule is a valid exercise of the Supreme Court's rulemaking power
381. Cf. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 412 (5th Cir. 1960).
382. 380 U.S. at 469.
383. See generally Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: Appellate Review
and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARv. L. REv. 318, 323-24 (1958).
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under the Rules Enabling Act,as4 Hanna requires it to be given
effect in diversity litigation even when the forum state's practice is
markedly different. The problem becomes somewhat more complex
if federal appellate courts decide to exercise the same flexibility that
Rule 44.1 now gives to federal trial courts with regard to ex parte
research and begin to consider foreign-law materials presented to
the court for the first time on appeal. 3 s5 In that eventuality, the arguments advanced for immunizing the trial courts from an Erie challenge for comparable conduct under the second sentence of Rule
44.1 can be advanced to defend the practice of the appellate courts.386
Admittedly, the absence of an express statement of federal appellate
policy in the Rule would attenuate any argument premised on
Hanna. Nonetheless, a court's freedom to consider any relevant legal
materials and to engage in independent research are incidents of
the review given a trial court's domestic-law findings and the review
given foreign-law findings should be similarly viewed in light of the
new Rule's statement that a determination of foreign law is to be
treated as a "ruling on a question of law." It is extremely doubtful
that a litigant could convince the Second Circuit that Erie requires
it to review the conclusions on New York law that were reached in
a diversity action by the District Court for the Southern District of
New York in the same way that a New York appellate court would
review comparable conclusions by a New York trial court. The same
should be true when sister-state or foreign law is involved.
The possibility that judicial rather than jury determination of
foreign law will create an Erie-York problem is minimal since issues
of foreign law are outside the jury's domain in almost every state.3 s7
Moreover, it is unlikely that, in the few states that permit some form
of jury involvement on foreign-law issues, state jury decisions would
vary from federal judicial determinations on the same issues with
any frequency or in any predictable way.ass Although Bernhardt did
indicate that altering the character of the adjudicatory tribunal
might lead to "a radical difference in ultimate result,"389 that case
is distinguishable from the question of leaving foreign-law issues to
the judge. Judicial adjudication rather than arbitration of a dispute
under an employment contract, the choice involved in Bernhardt, is
384.
infra.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

The bases for this conclusion are found at text accompanying notes 515-19
See
See
See
See
350

text accompanying notes 299-300 supra.
text accompanying notes 379-83 supra.
text accompanying notes 291-92 supra.
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Kielhom, 98 F. Supp. 288 ('V.D. Mich. 1951).
U.S. at 203.
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more likely to produce a difference in outcome than federal judicial
determination as opposed to state jury trial on an issue of foreign law
because the difference in the character of the two tribunals is of
greater magnitude in the former case than it is in the latter.
Actually, the situation presented by Byrd is more closely related
to the potential Erie impedimenta to judicial determination of
foreign law under Rule 44.1 than is Bernhardt. A federal practice
calling for the denial of jury trial on a particular issue is as much a
part of "the federal system of allocating functions between judge and
jury"390 as is a practice requiring that an issue be submitted to the
jury.301 This proposition had some acceptance in the federal courts
even before Byrd. In Diederich v. American News Co.,392 the Tenth
Circuit affirmed a directed verdict on the issue of assumption of the
risk despite a passage in the Oklahoma constitution requiring that
the issue be given to the jury. The court stated that a federal trial
court's obligation to discharge judicial functions and its puissance
to determine certain questions as a matter of law were essential elements of the seventh amendment.393 Inasmuch as the Supreme Court
did not rest its decision in Byrd on the Constitution, it is possible
to conclude that a federal practice of judicial determination of foreign-law issues supervenes a contrary state practice without reaching
the question whether trial by court instead of by jury is a constitutional right.
There are several additional Erie questions lurking at the periphery of the Rule that warrant discussion. First, does the total effect of
Rule 44.1 create Erie implications not revealed by a dissection of the
Rule's text? Second, is the new Rule contrary to the Klaxon imperative that in diversity actions a federal court is bound to apply the
conflicts rules of the forum state?394 Finally, does Erie disenable a
390. 356 U.S. at 538.
391. For example, in Kirby Lumber Corp. v. White, 288 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1961),
the court said that "the quantity and quality of proof necessary to make out a case
for submission to a jury in a federal court are determined by the Seventh Amendment •.• , the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the decisions of the Courts of
the United States.•.•" Id. at 573.
392. 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942). See also Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S.
91 (1931).
393. See also McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1966);
Pogue v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1957); Bowie v. Sorrell,
209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943); Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Hawes, 256 F. Supp.
366 (E.D.N.C. 1966); Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Co., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D.
Ore. 1939); cf. Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846
(1955).
394. Klaxon requires a federal court to apply the forum state's conflicts principles
in diversity litigation in the interstate situation. Quaere whether the Supreme Court
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federal court from developing a series of flexible rules for allocating
the task of proving foreign law and for fixing the consequences of a
failure to discharge that obligation?
One of the basic objectives of Federal Rule 44.1 is to maximize
the ability of counsel and the court to prove the content of foreign
law. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that there will be instances
in which a federal court will do its own research or accept foreignlaw materials that would be excluded by the forum state's less sensitive procedures for proving foreign law. The result of this discrepancy will be occasions on which a federal court would be able to
ascertain foreign law and adjudicate the case on the merits but a state
court would have to declare a failure of proof and direct the entry of
judgment against the party relying on foreign law. Thus, it may not
be accurate to say that Federal Rule 44.1 merely deals with the
mechanics of raising, proving, and determining issues of foreign law
and neither intrudes upon the forum's substantive law or public
policy nor upsets the equilibrium between the administration of justice in the federal and state courts.395 Although a federal judge's ability to decide a higher percentage of foreign-law issues than his state
counterpart seems too weak a foundation to support an Erie argument,
undoubtedly there are circumstances in which it will be outcome
determinative or a factor in the plaintiff's choice of forum. In a jurisdiction adhering to the Crosby philosophy,396 for example, the difference to a plaintiff whose right of action is based on foreign law will
be the difference between winning and losing.
At first glance, the dialectic in favor of federal court freedom of
action under Rule 44.1 does not seem to be enhanced by the Hanna
reconstruction of what constitutes outcome determination. Unlike
a divergence between state and federal practice with regard to serving process, which, as Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out, does
not cause a difference in outcome as long as the plaintiff adheres to
the procedural rules of the chosen forum, a divergence between the
respective practices regarding proof of foreign law may lead to a
totally different outcome even if the litigant does comply with the
practice of the forum. Arguably, therefore, the ability to establish
foreign law in a federal court and the inability to do so in a state
would, or should, extend Klaxon to the international situation, especially in the context of a case in which the forum state has little or no interest in the outcome of
the litigation. Klaxon is described briefly at text accompanying notes 345-47 supra.
395. See Baltimore &: O.R.R. v. Reaux, 59 F. Supp. 969 (N.D. Ohio 1945); Peterson
v. Chicago, G.W. Ry., 3 F.R.D. 346, 348 (D. Neb.), afj'd, 138 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1943).
See also Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960). But cf. Krasnow v. National
Airlines, Inc., 228 F.2d 326, 327 n.3 (2d Cir. 1955) (dictum).
396. Crosby is discussed at text accompanying notes 78-82 supra.
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court may well, in the words of the Hanna opinion, have "relevance
to the choice of a forum" and "raise the sort of equal protection problems to which the Erie opinion alluded." 397
One reply to this attack on Rule 44.1 can be extrapolated from
the fact that the broad federal discovery practice poses the same
type of variance between state and federal procedure as does Rule
44.1 but has not fallen prey to Erie challenges.398 Additional succor
may be derived from the idealistic notion that, since every state does
provide a mechanism for establishing foreign law, all a litigant need
do is work with it diligently, avoid becoming depressed by the spectre
of the Crosby and Walton cases, and truth will out. Thus viewed,
the only difference between state and federal practice is the relative
ease with which foreign law can be established. It also might be
argued that a lawyer would need the prescience of a Nostradamus to
choose a forum on the basis of a difference in outcome resulting from
disparate foreign-law practices, which again reduces the divergence
between state and federal practice to one of methodology. Although
these assertions are idyllic circumlocutions of the outcome-determinative quagmire and offer some solace to those who would preserve the
virtue of the Federal Rules against the rapacious qualities of the
Erie doctrine, they do not completely vitiate the concern that Rule
44.1 may violate, at least the spirit of, the important limitations on
federal power articulated in Erie and York.
Further analysis of Hanna, assuming the case is not viewed as
sufficiently distinguishable from the problem under discussion to
render it irrelevant, does offer a satisfactory thesis for protecting
Rule 44.1 from Erie and the outcome-determination test. In Hanna,
the Supreme Court made it clear that violation of one or both of
the so-called "twin aims" of Erie-discouraging forum shopping and
preventing the inequitable administration of the law399-does not
necessarily emasculate a Federal Rule in diversity litigation. As previously noted, 400 the Court in Hanna takes the position that a Rule is
valid unless shown to transgress the terms of the Enabling Act or
some constitutional restriction.401 For reasons detailed below,402 the
first avenue of attack on a Federal Rule left open by Hanna-a chal!197. !180 U.S. at 469. The Hanna notion of "inequitable administration of the
laws" is discussed in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 6!1-64 (4th Cir. 1965).
!198. See Hill v. Greer, !10 F.R.D. 64 (D.N.J. 1961); Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. !159 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1046-49 (1961). But cf. Reeves v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 8 F.R.D. 616 (D. Del. 1949).
.
!199. !180 U.S. at 468.
400. See text accompanying notes !168-75 supra.
401, !180 U.S. at 471.
402. See text accompanying notes 429-519 infra.
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lenge based on the Rules Enabling Act-is not likely to be a fruitful
endeavor with respect to Rule 44.1. The second possible point of
vulnerability-encompassed by the reference to "constitutional
restrictions"-is somewhat difficult to isolate. The structure of the
Court's opinion indicates that these words may apply to Mr. Justice
Brandeis' discussion in Erie of the impropriety of promulgating
federal rules of decision regarding matters that do not fall within
one of the specific constitutional grants of power to the national
government. 403 If this is the case, the reference to "constitutional
restrictions" does not affect Rule 44.1, which comes under the aegis
of the provision for a federal court system in article III of the Constitution, as reinforced by the necessary and proper clause.404 However, the words may refer to the type of equal-protection problem
that also troubled Mr. Justice Brandeis in Erie. This construction
would support the argument that even though a Federal Rule is a
legitimate exercise of federal power, it may be invalid if its application leads to the unequal administration of the law. The possibility
that a Federal Rule might be invalid in diversity litigation because
it causes a federal case to "stray from the course it would follow in
state courts" is faced squarely in Hanna as follows:
To hold that a Federal Rule ... must cease to function whenever
. it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to
disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal
procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the
Enabling Act.405

This passage precludes the revitalization of the outcome-determination test under the guise of the equal-protection doctrine, at least as
to any matter covered by a Federal Rule. Moreover, the concept of
equal protection has not been applied to prohibit variations in practice or to prevent the forum from using its own "procedure" even
though a different outcome might result.
The Klaxon problem is easily resolved. Although the draftsmen
of Rule 44.1 might have been inclined to deal with the choice-of-law
problem and the consequences flowing from a failure to prove foreign
law had Hanna antedated their efforts, the Rule as promulgated presupposes that the governing foreign law is determined in accordance
with state conflict of laws principles. Reliance on the forum state's
choice-of-law rules will minimize the possibility of a clash between
the Rule and the forum state's substantive law. Abrasion between the
403. See text accompanying notes 332-37
404. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
405. 380 U.S. at 473-74.

supra.
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two is especially unlikely when the forum's policy is to utilize its
own law absent a strong reason to apply foreign law. Even when the
local conflicts rules direct the application of the law of a foreign
country, tension between the Rule and state law is improbable except when the Rule enables foreign law to be ascertained and state
practice does not. Inasmuch as the forum state's interest is minuscule
when a foreign cause of action is being litigated and the forum's
substantive policies are not in issue, any thesis calling for the invocation of state procedures for ascertaining foreign law as an incident
or intrinsic element of the forum's choice-of-law system is weak.406
Two much more difficult analytical problems are whether a federal court is obligated to treat a failure to establish foreign law as a
state court would and whether a federal tribunal is required to use
state standards to quantify the evidence when ascertaining if a failure
of proof has taken place. These inquiries, which turn out to have
labyrinthine qualities, are intertwined with a further conundrum:
What freedom does Erie leave a federal court in diversity cases to
depart from state practice and manipulate the burden of proving
the content of foreign law?
The case for complete federal control over the consequences of a
failure of proof is premised on the assumption that Rule 44.1 is
intended to equate the process of determining foreign law with the
treatment of questions of domestic law. The result of this approach
together with the involvement of the trial judge is to dissipate the
adversarial character of the procedure and, as suggested earlier,407
to render the burdens of production and persuasion used in connection with factual issues inapposite to the proof of foreign law. Thus,
both the state burdens relating to the proof of foreign law and the
attendant set of consequences for failing to meet those burdens,
which were formulated on the basis of the fact characterization of
alien law, are irrelevant to the federal procedure for ascertaining
foreign law. As a result, Erie considerations are not germane to the
distribution of the various tasks involved in determining foreign
406. This approach, of course, lends support to the argument for federal conflicts
rules in interstate and international cases, in which the interest of the forum state
presumably is de minimis; it also would permit the development of a federal practice
on the consequences that flow from a failure to establish the applicable foreign law.
See generally Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541
(1958). The view that international and interstate conflicts problems should be treated
differently has been expressed by at least two leading scholars. CAVERS, THE CHOICE·
OF-LAW PROCESS 117-19 (1965); EHRENZWEIG, CONFUCT OF I...Aws § 6 (1962); Ehrenzweig,
Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REv.
717 (1957). The interrelationship between Klaxon and the separation of international
and interstate conflicts is not dealt with in the cited materials.
407. See text accompanying notes 325-31 supra.
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law in the federal courts under Rule 44.1. This theme will be renewed shortly.408
Even if the traditional fact burdens of proof are considered relevant, federal court independence in the realm of foreign law can
still be premised on the argument that Erie does not require a federal
court to apply state burdens on foreign-law issues or state standards
for deciding when there has been a failure of proof and the consequences of such a failure. The effect of Erie on burdens of proof has
been before the Supreme Court on three occasions. On the first, Cities
Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,409 the question was whether the Texas
federal courts were obliged to follow a Texas rule placing the burden
of proving a bona fide purchase on the party challenging the legal
title to property and asserting a superior equity. The Supreme Court,
reversing both lower courts, held yes. According to Mr. Justice
McReynolds, the state rule "relates to a substantial right upon which
the holder of recorded legal title to Texas land may confidently
rely." 410 The second case presented a situation closer to the problem
being discussed. In Palmer v. Hoffman 411 the Supreme Court held
that Federal Rule 8(c) "covers only the manner of pleading. The
question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a
question of local law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship
cases ... must apply." 412 The third case, Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co.,413 involved the application of a North Dakota practice that
under certain factual circumstances an insured's death is presumed to
be accidental and not suicide. No Erie issue was involved since both
parties assumed North Dakota law governed. However, the Court,
through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, did comment: "Under the Erie
rule, presumptions (and their effects) and burden of proof are 'substantive' and hence respondent was required to shoulder the burden
during the instant trial." 414
A burden of proof is outcome determinative within the meaning
of York when no proof is adduced or the proof presented is in equilibrium; in either situation, the case will tum on the allocation of
the burden. It is questionable whether the importance of the burden
in these exceptional cases warranted the broad pronouncements by
the Court in Dunlap, Palmer, and Dick. Burdens certainly are not
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

See text accompanying notes 416-28 infra.
308 U.S. 208 (1939). See also Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1938).
308 U.S. at 212.
318 U.S. 109 (1943).
Id. at 117.
359 U.S. 437 (1959).
Id. at 446.
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outcome determinative in the run of the mine case or when they
only identify the party who must come fonvard with proof on a
particular issue. Nonetheless, reflecting on the matter in 1967, the
presence of three Supreme Court decisions and a substantial body of
scholarly opinion to the same effect415 make it unprofitable to argue
that the impact of Erie on burdens of pro~£ should be limited to
cases in which it is highly probable that the burden allocation will
be outcome determinative. Indeed, the uncertainty generated by
such a standard might well make its adoption unwise as a policy
matter.
Perhaps a somewhat narrower exception to the application of
state burdens of proof in diversity cases can be articulated. The
burden issues in Dunlap, Palmer, and Dick can be readily distinguished from the burden questions likely to arise under Rule 44.1.
In each of the Supreme Court cases, both the burden and the substantive rules on which the burden operated were formulated by
the same jurisdiction.416 Since the process of molding a substantive
right takes account of the identity of the litigant who will be called
upon to establish various elements of the right or the defenses to
its assertion, it is entirely proper for a federal court to honor the
forum state's allocation of the relevant burdens. Although application of the forum's burdens makes eminent sense when the forum
also created the substantive right to which the burden attaches, it
makes less sense to require a federal court to impose the forum
state's burdens of proof on a cause of action or defense created by
the law of another jurisdiction and it is even less justifiable when the
forum's burden simply identifies the party who must establish the
law of the other jurisdiction. In the latter context the burden, even
though it is technically part of the forum's choice-of-law system, is
not bound up with the foreign substantive right. By definition, the
415. See Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REv. 275, 283,
298-99 (1962); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 117 (1956). See also Ladd, Uniform Evidence
Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REv. 692 (1963). The study that preceded the
formation of an Advisory Committee to draft rules of evidence for the federal courts
concluded that the subject of burdens of proof was beyond the rule-making power.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE, A PREUMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBIUTY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 39-40 (1962).

416. In Dunlap and Dick the law of the forum state governed both the cause of
action and the burden of proof. In Palmer the federal trial court in New York was
directed to follow New York's conflicts rule, which required the court to apply the
Massachusetts burden on contributory negligence to two Massachusetts statutory
causes. Two Massachusetts common-law causes also were involved but the court did
not resolve the burden question with regard to them because a proper exception had
not been taken below.
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burden of proving the existence and content of foreign law, as opposed to the burden of proving a right to recover under that law,
is not inextricably interwoven with substantive rights and duties
created by the forum's law or, for that matter, with rights and duties
created by the foreign country's law. It is simply the forum's mechanism for assigning responsibility for establishing the legal framework in a particular class of lawsuits. Only after this has been accomplished are the traditional functions of burdens of proo~ called into
play to determine if the elements of the previously ascertained substantive law have been proven.
It therefore seems unwise to extend Dunlap, Palmer, and Dick
and require a federal court to pay obeisance to a state burden dealing with the proof of foreign law in all circumstances. At the least,
resort to state law should depend upon the results of an inquiry as
to whether the forum's burden reflects a legitimate state policy of
sufficient importance to be honored by a federal court at the expense
of countervailing federal procedural norms. In jurisdictions adhering to the vested-rights approach to conflicts, the burden is a concomitant of the view that the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he
establishes a valid cause under the law of the territory in which his
cause of action accrued. Quite logically this burden is placed on the
party with the affirmative and fulfills at least one traditional function ascribed to burdens-insuring that one party is obligated to
come forward with evidence; 417 note, however, that the placement
of the burden seems to be a matter of trial administration and has
no necessary nexus with the substantive elements of the plaintiff's
cause.
In jurisdictions that presume an identity between local and
foreign law, the justification for imposing the burden on the party
asserting a difference between the two is not immediately apparent.
It is unlikely that the forum is attempting to favor one class of litigants-citizens, for example-over other classes. The adventitious
way in which parties become aligned in litigation, as exemplified
by the Walton case,418 would make such a goal difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. But even assuming that the forum state's goal,
or one of them, is to favor a particular group at the expense of
another, a federal court is not obligated to promote this discrimination absent some substantial and rational justification for it.
Since the identity presumption is based on an assumption, ap417. See Note, State Trial Procedure and the Federal Courts: Evidence, Juries,
and Directed Verdicts under the Erie Doctrine, 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1516, 1518-19 (1953).
418. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
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parently unsupported by any empiric data, that local and foreign
law are identical, the explanation for the burden allocation may be
the forum's desire to minimize the expenditure of judicial time and
effort in ascertaining and applying foreign law. If so, Erie does not
oblige federal judges to expend their time and energy the way state
judges consume theirs. Going one step further, even if we assume
that the state's policy of frugality with regard to devoting resources
to foreign-law issues includes a desire to conserve the energies and
assets of litigants, neither the Erie principle nor its derivative postulates require a contest in the federal courts to cost a party the
same sum and take the same time as would a corresponding proceed. ing in the local courts. To generalize, in any situation in which a
state's burden of establishing the content of foreign law simply
reflects administrative considerations, the state does not have a legitimate interest in how the burden of ascertaining foreign law is
allocated in the federal courts. Nor is the efficacy of this conclusion
altered when one of the litigants is a citizen of the forum state.
The impropriety of encumbering the national courts with the
forum state's notions of how to expend judicial and party resources
is manifest whenever there is a competing federal interest. If Byrd
and Hanna preach anything, it is that federal policies, particularly
those germane to the functioning of the federal judicial system,
should not be cavalierly shunted aside in favor of state practices
simply to pursue the grail of result identity. If a significant federal
policy is discernible, whether its substance is captured in a federal
statute or court rule or is merely an unarticulated or inherent characteristic of a judicial system, it should be given effect despite a
contrary state rule; certainly this is true when the federal policy is
pitted against a fragile state interest of the type apparently at the
root of state-created burdens of proof on foreign-law issues.
A number of policies concerning the treatment to be given
foreign-law issues in the federal courts are embodied in the text of
Federal Rule 44.1. First, the Rule reflects the belief that litigants
should be able to raise foreign-law issues with a minimum of formality and without "unfair surprise." Second, it purports to establish
an optimum environment in which everything relevant to a foreignlaw issue can be brought to the court's attention. Third, it gives
federal trial judges the freedom to do independent research, thereby
indicating that the accurate determination of foreign law is a sufficiently important and desirable goal to warrant the expenditure of
federal judicial resources. Fourth, it insures plenary appellate
review by dealing with determinations of foreign and domestic law
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in the same fashion, thus reaffirming the judgment that the accurate
resolution of foreign-law issues is considered a worthy utilization of
a federal judge's time and energy.
The cumulative effect of these points is that Rule 44.1 expresses
a philosophy that federal courts should ascertain foreign law accurately whenever possible. Consequently, the use of state burdens of
proof and presumptions that do not insure the best possible presentation of foreign-law materials is antithetical to the federal approach
to the determination of alien law. Accordingly, it is desirable for
federal judges to exercise the type of discretion previously suggested419 in assigning functions concerning the proof of foreign law
in order to secure optimum advantage from the flexibility provided
by Rule 44.1. Liberating federal judges from the constraints of
burdens of proof that are part of foreign-law practices differing
markedly from Rule 44.1 will maximize their ability to utilize the
subtle pressures associated with proof burdens and help to insure
as effective a foreign-law presentation as the parties can muster.
Much the same reasoning dictates that the federal courts should be
free to treat a failure of proof of foreign-law in the discretionary
manner suggested earlier420 and should not be tied to what often
are Draconian state rules.
Admittedly, the panoply of federal policies distilled from Federal
Rule 44.1 do not have the magisterial dignity of the judge-jury
relationship involved in Byrd. Nonetheless, the Rule was recommended by a federal commission, was adopted by the Supreme Court
pursuant to a federal statute, and does represent a directive from the
nation's highest court-augmented by whatever congressional imprimatur can be attributed to the latter's silent acquiescence in the
Rule's promulgation-that federal trial judges treat the determination of foreign law in a certain manner. Of equal importance is the
fact that the existing potpourri of state techniques does not appear
to articulate any significant counterbalancing policies.421 Moreover,
the argument that the mantle of Hanna is not broad enough to cover
the burden-of-proof aspect of determining foreign law because Rule
419. See text accompanying notes 320-31 supra.
420. Ibid.
421. A broad interpretation of Byrd that seems to be in harmony with the views
expressed in the text appears in Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76
HARV. L. REv. 275, 292-301 (1962). It may be more difficult to characterize a state's
interest as de minimis when the foreign law relates to a collateral issue than when
it governs the rules of decision for the entire case. When a case is controlled by forum
law and foreign law must be established to prove a given factual element, the state's
burden on the issue may be of considerable importance to the enforcement of the
substantive right.
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44.1 fails to deal specifically with the problem is not persuasive.
Hanna should not be limited to those matters expressly dealt with
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; its philosophy applies to
numerous aspects of federal practice that are found in the interstices
and beyond the language of the Federal Rules. Even if Hanna
technically does not apply in the present context, nothing in that
case suggests that the interest-balancing technique of Byrd has been
displaced on matters outside the ambit of Hanna or that Byrd does
not provide an adequate framework for a federal approach to the
problem of a failure to prove foreign law. 422
Many of the contentions and conclusions offered in the preceding pages are reinforced by an analysis of the problem in terms of
several situations in which a collision between state and federal practice is conceivable. Friction is most likely to occur when the party
in a federal diversity action who is required under the law of the
forum state to establish foreign law fails to do so, but the court,
exercising its prerogatives under Rule 44.1, is able to ascertain the
applicable law on its own. Even though the party has not discharged
his burden, there probably has not been a "failure of proof" of the
type that normally brings the state's sanctions into play. Thus, the
federal court should proceed to apply foreign law and adjudicate the
case, either on the theory that there is no conflict with state law
inasmuch as foreign law has been revealed or on the premise that
Federal Rule 44.1 controls.
But suppose that neither the parties nor the court are able to
unearth enough information to ascertain foreign law despite diligent efforts to do so. Must the federal judge impose the state consequences of a failure of proof? To the extent that the state practice
regarding failure of proof is based on the notion that foreign law is
a fact and that one of the parties has the responsibility for establishing that fact, the state rule is inapplicable in a federal court. Federal
practice is governed by a Rule that treats foreign law as an issue of
law and purports to socialize the process of ascertaining foreign
law; Rule 44.1 does not pivot on the concept of party responsibility.
Since it is within the competence of the national government to
promulgate a rule recasting the traditional characterization and
treatment of any element of procedure, the federal courts are not
obliged to follow a state practice formulated to operate in an environment completely different from that encountered in the federal
courts. Thus, whenever a state's attitudes regarding the burden of
proving foreign law and the consequences of failing to discharge
422. See note 375 supra.
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that burden are based on assumptions and conditions markedly
different from those prevailing in the federal courts, they need not
be honored despite a possibility that a difference in outcome will
result. 423
A more difficult case is presented when the forum state has a
provision identical to Federal Rule 44.1 or Article IV of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act and its courts have
concluded that a plaintiff whose cause of action is predicated on
foreign law must lose if neither the parties nor the court are able to
ascertain foreign law. A strong argument can be made that the ErieYork doctrine, as embellished by Klaxon, requires a federal court to
impose the same consequences on the plaintiff as would have befallen
him had he litigated in a state court. A contrary result is plausible
only if the federal court is willing to assume that the goals of Rule
44.l are not identical to those of a comparable state enactment and
that the federal courts' right to control their own trial procedure
can be best effectuated by allowing them to reach their own conclusions as to the consequences of a failure of proof. A decision to this
effect should be reached only after a careful analysis of the premises
for the state's dismissal of an action for failure of proof and an appraisal of the role played by Rule 44. l and its state equivalent. If
the federal courts use Rule 44. l to develop their own allocation of
functions relating to the proof of foreign law, it would be desirable
to permit the federal practice to prevail as against a contrary state
practice even though the effect might be outcome determinative,
especially if there is no strong policy basis for the state practice. This
result is amply supported by the theoretical foundation provided by
the Byrd and Hanna decisions.
Keeping the burden of proof on foreign-law issues outside the
Erie arena also finds support in the attitude of many federal courts
toward judicial notice and a variety of foreign-law presumptions.
The post-Erie decisions have been virtually unanimous in sanctioning a federal court's continued application of the practice of taking
judicial notice of the law of all the s~ates without pleading or proof,424
423. Much of the Supreme Court's discussion of outcome determination in Hanna
seems to support this conclusion. The same thinking is implicit in the use of Federal
Rule impleader in D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958),
despite the absence of impleader in Rhode Island practice and even though it enabled
the federal court to adjudicate a case that could not have been determined by the
Rhode Island state courts within the applicable state limitations period.
424. In Erie itself, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the application of
Pennsylvania law, although at that time New York, the forum state, did not judicially
notice the law of sister states. See Goodrich, Mr. Tompkins Restates the Law, 27
A.B.A.J. 547 (1941).
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regardless of the forum state's rule on the subject.425 In a number of
instances counsel's invocation of the Erie doctrine has been expressly
rejected. 426 In another group of cases, federal courts have not followed
state presumptions as to the content of sister-state law or as to the
identity of sister-state law and the law of the forum state. 427 Although
special policy considerations underlie a federal court's taking judicial
notice of state law, 428 the strong analogy between that practice and
the suggested practice of permitting a federal court to ignore a
state's burden-of-proof rules and sanctions for an inability to prove
the law of a foreign country cannot be ignored.
425. See Schultz v. Tecumseh Prods., Inc., 310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962); J. M. Blythe
Motor Lines Corp. v. Blalock, 310 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1962); Reeves v. Schulmcier, 303
F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962); Jannenga v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 288 F.2d 169 (D.C.
Cir. 1961); Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958);
Wm. J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. Ems Brewing Co., 164 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 863 (1948); Alcaro v. Jean Jordeau, Inc., 138 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1943)
(Goodrich, J., concurring); Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 643 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1943), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 322 U.S. 709 (1944); Newman v. Clayton
F. Summy Co., 133 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1942); Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1941); Tarbert v. Ingraham Co., 190 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1960); Mullaly v. Carlisle
Chem. Works, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 588 (D.N.J. 1959). See also 2B BARRON & HoLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 963 (Wright ed. 1961); IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r,r 0.316[2], [4], [5] (2d ed. 1961); 5 id. ,I 43.09; Comment, Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law, 38 WASH. L. REV. 802, 817 (1963). But see Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, Sense
and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664, 686-88 (1950). A contrary
view was expressed in Waggaman v. General Fin. Co., 116 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1940),
but this case appears to have been overruled by later decisions in the Third Circuit.
In the Second Circuit, at least three cases have relied on state practice, thereby overlooking the traditional federal practice and other authority in the Circuit. Gediman v.
Anheuser Busch, Inc., 299 F.2d 537, 544 n.6 (2d Cir. 1962); Anderson v. National
Producing Co., 253 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958); Affiliated
Enterprises, Inc. v. Courter Amusement Co., 32 F. Supp. 11 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). See also
Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. v. Fein, 342 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1965). On occasion, judicial
notice is taken without reliance on the established federal practice. For example, in
Eliscu v. Fiber, 157 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1946), the Third Circuit authorized judicial
notice of New York law but only referred to the New Jersey enactment of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. The complete absence of any discussion of
the proper basis for taking judicial notice in a federal court indicates that the court
may not have adverted to the question. See also 14 STAN. L. REv. 162, 166 (1961).
Moreover, in a later case the Third Circuit affirmed per curiam a district court decision stating that judicial notice of the law of the states is a question of federal law.
Hassenplug v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Pa.), afj'd per curiam, 163
F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1947).
426. E.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Reaux, 59 F. Supp. 969 (N.D. Ohio 1945); Petersen
v. Chicago, G.W. Ry., 3 F.R.D. 346 (D. Neb.), affd, 138 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1943). See
also Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
427. In Tarbert v. Ingraham Co., 190 F. Supp. 402, 406 (D. Conn. 1960), the court
remarked that "such presumptions are not 'substantive' in the sense of shifting evidentiary burdens; they are more in the nature of judicial notice taking by the court."
The court then proceeded to reject application of the state presumptions on the
ground that their use would be inconsistent with the Federal Rules and would adversely affect the functioning of the pretrial process in the federal courts. But see
Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. v. Fein, 342 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1965).
428. See text accompanying notes 149-51 supra.
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E. The Rule-Making Power and Foreign Law
To conclude this discussion of Federal Rule 44.1 it is appropriate,
especially in view of the doubts raised as to the Rule's integrity in
diversity of citizenship cases,429 to investigate the possibility that the
new Rule exceeds the power delegated to the United States Supreme
Court by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act to prescribe rules of
practice and procedure for the district courts.430 If the Rule is vulnerable at all, its weakness lies in the second and third sentences.
The first sentence deals with traditional practice and procedure
subjects-pleading and notice giving-that are well within the language of the Enabling Act even if that statute is narrowly construed.
However, the second sentence affects matters of evidence and the
mode of proof in the federal courts; the third sentence pertains to
the relationship between the trial and appellate courts and, by implication, to the interaction between federal trial and appellate
courts and federal juries. Since these are matters of considerable significance, a closer analysis of the Rule's status under the Enabling
Act seems justified.
l. An Historical Prologue

Historical examination of civil procedure in the federal courts
begins with section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Rules of
Decision Act, which originally provided that, absent a supervening
federal regulation, "the laws of the several states ... shall be regarded
as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States . . . ." 431 The text of the statute as enacted-it has
since been modified-precluded its application to equity proceedings. Other sections of the Judiciary Act that dealt with procedure
include section 17 (b),432 which gave the courts rule-making power for
"conducting business" in an orderly way, and section 30,438 which
provided that the "mode of proof" in civil actions be by oral testimony and that witnesses be examined in open court.434
The Rules of Decision Act was augmented by the Process Act of
429. See text accompanying notes 376-428 supra.
430. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). Similar delegations have been enacted for admiralty
causes, 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1964), criminal cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964), and bankruptcy
matters, 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964).
431. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
432. 1 Stat 73, 83 (1789).
433. 1 Stat 73, 88 (1789).
434. Section 30 of the Act initially applied to equity and admiralty cases as well
as common-law cases, but subsequently was restricted to actions at common law.
REV. STAT. § 861 (1875).
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1792,435 which directed that "the forms and modes of proceedings"
in common-law actions conform to those in the state in which the
federal court was sitting; the lower federal courts were given "discretion" to depart from state practice, and the Supreme Court presumably could do the same under the grant of rule-making power in
section 17 (b) of the earlier act. One of the effects of the 1792 act
was that federal courts in the original states had to conform to local
practice as it existed in September, 1789. Federal courts in states
admitted to the Union after that date generally were instructed by
statute to follow state procedures as of later, but equally arbitrary,
dates; 436 in the case of states joining the Union between 1842 and
1872, the conformity principle was incorporated directly into the
enactments granting statehood or was extended by judicial construction of those statutes.437
The Supreme Court's rule-making power was strengthened in
1842 by a statute giving it
full power and authority . . . to prescribe, and regulate, and alter,
... the forms and modes of framing and filing libels, bills, answers,
and other proceedings and pleadings, in suits at common law or in
admiralty and in equity . . . and also the forms and modes of
taking and obtaining evidence, and of obtaining discovery, and
generally the forms and modes of proceeding to obtain relief, . . .
and generally to regulate the whole practice of the said courts, so as
to prevent delays, and to promote brevity and succinctness in all
pleadings and proceedings therein....43 8

Despite this expansive delegation, rules regulating the practice on
the law side of the federal courts were not promulgated for almost
another century. Further legislative development also was sparse.
Between 1842 and 1872 Congress saw fit to enact only three relatively narrow statutes dealing with the competency of witnesses in
federal civil actions.439
435. 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1789).
436. See, e.g., 4 Stat. 278 (1828); 5 Stat. 499 (1842). These statutes were a reaction
to the Supreme Court's decision in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) 1 (1825),
in which Chief Justice Marshall applied the Process Act of 1792 to an execution on
a judgment despite a post-1789 Kentucky statute on the subject. See also HART 8:
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 582-84 (1953); Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. R.Ev. 421, 436 (1930).
437. See, e.g., 5 Stat. 742-89 (1842), construed in United States v. Council of Keokuk,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 514 (1867); 12 Stat. 128 (1861), construed in Smith v. Cockrill, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 756 (1867).
;
438. 5 Stat. 516, 518 (1842).
439. The first provided that the laws of the state in which the federal court was
sitting were to be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses. 12 Stat.
588 (1862). The second prohibited the exclusion of a witness because of his color or
because he was a party to or interested in the litigation. 13 Stat. 351 (1864). See also
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The inadequacy of the static conformity created by the various
Process Acts and unrelieved by the 1842 rule-making delegation became intolerable in the third quarter of the nineteenth century
when the states began to promulgate new procedural codes patterned after New York's Field Code of 1848.440 Because the federal
courts adhered to state practice as it existed on fixed dates prior to
the advent of these codes, the notion that the procedure in a given
federal court was identical to that employed by the courts in the
state in which it was sitting was a chimera.441
In response to this degenerating situation, Congress, in 1872,
enacted the Conformity Act, section 5 of which provided:
That the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in
other than equity and admiralty causes ... shall conform, as near as
may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the
State within which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule
of court to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, however, That
nothing herein contained shall alter the rules of evidence under the
laws of the United States, and as practiced in the courts thereof.442

In addition to the rejection of static conformity, the Act is noteworthy because it does not reaffirm the 1842 delegation of rulemaking power to the Supreme Court. Other than the existence of
a firm congressional desire for procedural uniformity between state
and federal courts within each state, there is no apparent explanation for this omission.
The proviso at the end of the section is another curiosity. Under
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal courts, including
the Supreme Court, applied state rules of evidence in the absence of
a federal statute.443 The Process Act of 1792 and the enactments
supplementing it generally were not relied on as sources of rules of
evidence. Inasmuch as the Conformity Act did not vitiate the practice under the Rules of Decision Act, the pre-1872 practice would
have continued in the proviso's absence. Its inclusion, therefore, supports the argument that rules of evidence were viewed as matters of
13 Stat. 374 (1864) (District of Columbia). The third limited the testimony of a sur•
vivor in actions involving a dead man's representative. 13 Stat. 533 (1865). The three
acts were later combined. REv. STAT. § 858 (1875).
440. See CLARK, ConE PLEADING § 8 (2d ed. 1947).
441. See generally Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REv.
546, 557-70 (1930).
442. 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872).
443. See, e.g., Ryan v. Bindley, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 66 (1863); Vance v. Campbell, 66
U.S. (1 Black) 427 (1861); Sims v. Hundley, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 1 (1848); McNeil v.
Holbrook, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 84 (1838),
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federal concern in 1872 and that Gongress intended federal-court
uniformity rather than conformity to state practice in this area,
although, as pointed out below,444 this does not appear to be the
judicial interpretation uniformly given the Conformity Act. In any
event, the proviso was eliminated in 1878,445 which argµably gives
rise to a diametrically opposite inference.446
The early federal decisions intimating that evidence in the federal courts was governed by state law under the Rules of Decision
Act were buttressed by similar language in opinions written after
the Conformity Act was passed and the proviso in section 5 removed. 447 In later decisions, however, it was concluded that the
Conformity Act governed evidence.448 An additional deviation from
the pre-Conformity Act doctrine took place when several circuits,
presumably influenced by Swift v. Tyson, 449 concluded that only state
statutory rules of evidence were binding on the federal courts and
applied "general" federal law absent a statute; other circuits, however, continued to adhere to the prior practice and used state rules
of evidence, whether statutorily or judicially enunciated.450 The un444. See text accompanying notes 447-51 infra.
445. REY. STAT. § 914 (1875). Federal evidence statutes prevailed over state practice
in Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885) (Mode of Proof Act); Potter v. National Bank,
102 U.S. 163 (1880) (Competency of Witnesses Act).
446. In Bryant v. Leyland, 6 Fed. 125, 127 (C.C.D. Mass. 1881), the court commented on the removal of the proviso as follows: "The reason for omitting it may
be assumed to be that the rules of evidence are no part of the practice, or forms or
modes of proceeding, as they certainly are not in general, though the mode of
obtaining evidence is."
447. See Nashua Sav. Bank v. Anglo-American Land, Mortgage 8e Agency Co., 189
U.S. 221 (1903); Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125 U.S. 555, 582 (1888); Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U.S. 250 (1884). See also Pure Oil Pipe Line Co.
v. Ross, 51 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1931).
448. See, e.g., De Soto Motor Corp. v. Stewart, 62 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1932); Keur v.
Weiss, 37 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1930).
449. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
450. Compare Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Luray Supply Co., 6 F.2d 218 (4th Cir.
1925) (complete conformity), with Camden &: S. Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900)
(statutory conformity), and Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Mcclish, 115 Fed. 268 (6th Cir.
1902) (statutory conformity). See also DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 160 (1928). Some
courts applied "general" law across the board. See, e.g., Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149
(1894); Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 656 (1935); Hawthorne v. Eckerson, 77 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1935). See also JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COM!lffITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 4-6 (1962); Callahan &:
Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 622,
627-30 (1936); Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV.
554, 569-77 (1930); Note, The Admissibility of Evidence in Federal Courts Under Rule
43(a), 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 267 (1946). An apparent conflict on the subject existed within
the Eighth Circuit, compare Chicago &: N.W. Ry. v. Kendall, 167 Fed. 62 (8th Cir.
1909), with van Crome v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 11 F.2d 350 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 271
U.S. 664 (1926), although in the latter case the court cited one statute but apparently

736

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:6U

certainty as to the source of evidence rules for the federal courts in
actions at law was symptomatic of numerous difficulties encountered
under the Conformity Act. 451 Because the act only required conformity "as near as may be," it was doomed from the outset to a
variegated interpretation by the lower federal courts.
Practice in equity initially was governed by the Process Act of
1789,452 which provided that "the forms and modes of proceedings
in causes of equity ... shall be according to the course of the civil
law." 453 Three years later Congress enacted the following statement
as part of the Process Act of 1792:
That the forms of writs, executions and other process, except their
style and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits . . . in . . .
equity ... [shall be] according to the principles, rules and usages
which belong to courts of equity . . . , subject however to such
alterations and additions as the said courts respectively shall in their
discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme
Court of the United States shall think proper from time to time by
rule to prescribe. . . .454

The conformity principle presumably was not extended to equity
because several states did not develop any substantial equity jurisprudence until long after the Revolution. 455 The Process Act of 1792
remained the primary directive regarding federal equity procedure
until the fusion of law and equity in 1938.456
intended to apply the other. At least one decision seemed to indicate that the matter
was one of judicial discretion. Royal Ins. Co. v. Eastham, 71 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 557 (1934). See also Donm, FEDERAL PROCEDURE §§ 139, 160 (1928).
451. See generally HART &: WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND TIIE FEDERAL
SYsrEM 584-86 (1953); Clark &: Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J.
387, 401-11 (1935).
452. l Stat. 93, 94 (1789).
453. Although the Rules of Decision Act applied only to actions at common law,
equity courts generally looked to the law of the states for rules of substantive law.
See, e.g., Meade v. Beale, 16 Fed. Cas. 1283 (No. 9371) (C.C.D. Md. 1850). This was
not the situation, however, with remedies and matters of practice, which generally
were considered to be matters of federal uniformity. See Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S.
101 (1915); Neves v. Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268 (1851); Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 648 (1838). See also Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REv.
1013, 1024-31 (1953); Note, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine: Past and Present,
67 HARV. L. REv. 836 (1954). As a result of the fusion of law and equity and the
traditional application of state substantive law in equity, the Rules of Decision Act
was made applicable to equitable actions in 1948. See Revisor's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1964).
454. l Stat. 275, 276 (1792).
455. See Fisher, The Administration of Equity Through Common-Law Forms in
Pennsylvania, l L.Q. REv. 455 (1885), reprinted in 2 SELEcr EssAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 810 (1908); Woodruff, Chancery in Massachusetts, 5 L.Q. REv. 370 (1889).
456. The only other noteworthy enactments relating to equity were a restatement
of the Supreme Court's rule-making power, 5 Stat. 516, 518 (1842), its consolidation
into the Mode of Proof Act in 1878, Rev. Stat. § 862 (1878), and the three Compe-
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The first equity rules were promulgated in 1822.457 They did not
refer directly to rules of evidence or to the proof of foreign law but
they did provide for the taking of testimony by commission,458 gaye
the circuit courts power to promulgate further rules and regulations, 450 and stated that in all matters not covered by the rules "the
practice of circuit court shall be regulated by the practice of the
high court of chancery in England." 460 The rules of 1822 were supplanted in 1842 by more detailed provisions,461 which included rules
for the taking of testimony and explicit provisions on examination,
cross-examination, and admissibility. 462 The courts were empowered
to appoint masters to regulate proceedings, including matters of evidence,463 and the reference to practice in the High Court of Chancery was retained. 464 The Supreme Court's final equity rule-mctking
effort took place in 1912 when it promulgated a set of extre~ely
comprehensive rules. 465 Rule 46 detailed the manner in which evidence was to be presented, objected to, and its admissibility reviewe~
on appeal, 466 the 1842 provisions for pretrial discovery and courtappointed masters were expanded, a number of rules dealing with
matters of evidence were added, 467 and the reference to English
chancery practice was deleted (probably because of the unification
of the English courts in 1873).468 Little equity rule-making activity
occurred between 1912 and 1938.469
The nature and source of the evidence rules to be applied in the
tency of Witnesses Acts, which were combined in 1878, Rev. Stat. § 858 (1878). See
note 439 supra. The Mode of Proof Act specifically gave the Supreme Court power
to prescribe rules for "the mode of proof in causes of equity."
457. See RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF THE UNITED STATES, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) xvii (1822).
458. Equity R. 24-26, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xvii, xix-xx (1822).
459. Equity R. 32, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xxi (1822).
460. Equity R. 33, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xxi (1822).
461. See Rules of Practice in Suits in Equity in the Circuit Courts of the United
States, 42 U.S. (I 7 Pet.) xii (1842).
462. Equity R. 67-70, 42 U.S. (17 Pet.) xii, lxxii-lxxiii (1842). See also Equity R. 8081, 42 U.S. (17 Pet.) xii, lxxv (1842).
463. Equity R. 77, 42 U.S. (17 Pet.) lxxv (1842).
464. See Equity R. 90, 42 U.S. (17 Pet.) lxxvi (1842).
465. See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S.
627 (1912). Between 1842 and 1912 the rules were modified sporadically but by and
large the changes were of a trivial nature.
466. See also Equity R. 47-49, 51, 64, 226 U.S. 627, 661-63, 668 (1912).
467. See, e.g., Equity R. 62, 64-65, 226 U.S. 667-68 (1912).
468. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 &: 37 Viet., c. 66. See Bowen,
Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian Period, in 1 SELECT
EssAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516-57 (1907); Sunderland, The English
Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARv. L. REv. 725 (1926).
469. See generally Lane, Twenty Years Under the Federal Equity Rules, 46 HARV.
L. REv. 638 (1933); Talley, The New and the Old Federal Equity Rules Compared, 18
VA. L. REV. 663 (1913).
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federal equity courts under the 1822, 1842, and 1912 Rules raised
questions that were never satisfactorily resolved, in part because of
the dearth of federal equity decisions on points of evidence.470 Authority existed for the proposition that the rules of evidence in equity
were the same as those applied at law, the only difference being that
an objection to evidence was noted on the record for purposes of
appeal. 471 This view was supported by one reading of the ambiguous
statement in Rule 46 of the 1912 Rules to the effect that "the court
shall pass upon the admissibility of all evidence offered as in actions
in law." A second hypothesis was that the English rules of 1842 were
the source of evidence rules in federal equity courts,472 a proposition supported by the reference to English chancery practice in the
1822 and 1842 Rules. Furthermore, the text of the Process Act of
1792 and the inapplicability of the conformity principle in equity
could be interpreted as indicating that Congress desired uniformity
in the federal equity courts-a goal most easily accomplished by the
incorporation of English practice.473 A third approach was based
upon the premise that federal equity practice was not encumbered by
any rules of evidence, especially those dealing with admissibility;
the theory was that there is no reason to exclude any potentially
relevant material absent a jury.474 This view has the attraction, as
does the second, of being consistent with the notion that the federal
equity courts were an independent legal system, unfettered by the
conformity principle and free to develop a unitary national practice.
In the end, no single theory achieved ascendancy over the others.

2. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934475 empowers the Supreme Court
to prescribe general rules governing "the forms of process, writs,
470. The lack of judicial opinions on the subject results from the fact that improperly admitted and improperly excluded evidence, which was required to he set
forth in the record, usually was ignored on appeal or considered by the court without comment, and rarely served as a basis for reversal. See I ,vmMORE, EVIDENCE § 6,
at 172-73 (3d ed. 1940). For a statistical analysis indicating the unimportance of
questions of admissibility in federal equity cases, see Callahan &: Ferguson, Et1ide11ce
and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 622, 625 (1936).
471. See, e.g., Harmer v. Gwynne, 11 Fed. Cas. 551 (No. 6,075) (C.C.D. Ohio 1851);
l BATES, FEDERAL EQUITY PROCEDURE § 388 (1901); GRESLEY, LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE
COURTS OF EQUITY 2-6 (2d ed. 1848); Green, The Admissibility of Evidence Under the
Federal Rules, 55 HARV. L. REv. 197, 201-02 (1941).
472. See I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6, at 172 (3d ed. 1940) (opinion of Russell Wiles,
Esq.).
473. Cf. United States v. American Lumber Co., 85 Fed. 827, 829 (9th Cir. 1898).
474. See Carson v. American Smelting &: Ref. Co., 25 F.2d 116, 119 (W.D. Wash.
1928); Callahan &: Ferguson, supra note 470, at 625; cf. Manhat v. United States, 220
F.2d 143 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 966 (1955).
475. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). The language of the
act was revamped in 1948 to take account of the merger of law and equity.
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pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil
actions at law" in the United States District Courts and the courts
of the District of Columbia. The rules cannot "abridge, enlarge, or
modify" the substantive rights of any litigant. Section 2 of the
original act gave the Court authority to merge law and equity
"provided ... that in such union of rules the right of trial by jury
as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the
Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."476
At first glance, the Enabling Act merely reinstates the Supreme
Court's rule-making power, which had existed with respect to the
law courts before the Conformity Act and had been in force in
equity after the Process Act of 1792, and grants the power to fuse
law and equity. The efforts entailed in securing the enactment of the
act and the conditions that motivated those efforts, however, belie
the simple language of the statute. The Enabling Act was the culmination of more than twenty years of concerted pressure by the bar
to eliminate the uncertainties of federal practice under the Conformity Act and the Equity Rules of 1912.477 Its failure to trumpet
any grandiose legislative purpose merely reflects the indecision of
the act's draftsmen and sponsors as to whether uniformity of practice
among the state and federal courts in the same jurisdiction was more
desirable than uniformity among the federal courts throughout the
country. This ambivalence ultimately was resolved and a plan
emerged to adopt uniform rules for the federal district courts that
also would serve as a model for procedural reform in the states.478
There always has been a consensus among the commentators that
the Rules Enabling Act delegates sufficient authority to the Supreme
Court to permit the promulgation of rules of evidence for the federal courts479 (and for the moment Rule 44.1 is being subsumed
476. The first legislative step toward fusion was the Law and Equity Act of 1915,
38 Stat. 956, which made equitable defenses available at law and permitted the transfer of cases brought on the wrong side of the court.
477. See Clark &: Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935);
Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United
States, 32 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1116 (1934); Taft, Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A.J.
34 (1922).
478. Debate over the primary goal of the reform movement continued until the
statute actually was passed. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
75th Cong., 3d Sess., serial 17, 1-26 (1938). See generally Sunderland, supra note 477.
The decision to unify law and equity and to appoint an Advisory Committee was not
made until mid-1935. See generally IA MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r,i 0.501(2), 0.511
(2d ed. 1966).
479. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON Rur.ES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBIUTY
OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM RUI.ES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 2936 (1962); Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARv. L. REv. 275, 277-87
(1962): Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341
(1960); Estes, The Need for Uniform Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts, ~4
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under the rules of evidence). This also appears to have been the conclusion of the Advisory Committee that drafted the original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.480 The Committee did not incorporate
rules of evidence in its draft primarily because its members considered the task beyond their energies and one better left to
another group or to gradual judicial development. In addition, it
was felt that the delay resulting from an attempt to formulate evidence rules might have jeopardized the expeditious adoption of the
other rules. Thus, Rule 43(a) was inserted as a temporary expedient.481 Actually, several other Rules touch upon matters of evidence, including Rule 44, which governs the admissibility of official
documents, and Rules 26-37, 4l(b), 43(b)(c)(d)(e), 45, 46, 50, 59(a),
60, 61, 68, and 80.482 None of these Rules has been challenged successfully as being beyond the scope of the Enabling Act.
Obviously, however, the Enabling Act is not infinitely elastic.
The jugular issue in determining the validity of a Federal Rule
under the act's rule-making delegation is whether the rule relates
F.R.D. 331 (1960); Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D.
429 (1958); Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REv.
467; 484 (1957); Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power
Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 601 (1940); Sullivan, Evidence Rules in the
Federal Courts: A Time for a Change, 38 TEXAS L REv. 451 (1960); Sunderland,
Character and Extent of the Rule Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme Court and
Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404, 406-07 (1935); Sweeney, Federal or
State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 394, 398 (1932). But see
Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the United States Supreme Court, 13 TEXAS
L. R.Ev. 1, 23-25 (1934); Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting
Procedure, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 462-64 (1937). The early Supreme Court decisions in
Doe ex dem. Patterson v. Winn, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 233 (1831), and Mills v. Bank of the
United States, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 431 (1826) (dictum), in which evidence rules promulgated by lower federal courts were invalidated, are not relevant because of the absence
of any congressional delegation of rule-making power to those courts.
480. See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 186
(1938) (Cleveland meetings). That the Advisory Committee realized it was dealing
with matters of evidence is made abundantly clear by the following passage from its
note to Rule 43(a):
The second and third sentences on admissibility of evidence and Subdivision (b)
on contradiction and cross-examination modify U.S.C., Title 28, § 725 (Laws of
states as rules of decision) in so far as that statute has been construed to prescribe
conformity to °state rules of evidence. • . • The last sentence modifies to the
extent indicated U.S.C., Title 28, § 631 (Competency of witnesses governed by
state laws).
ADVISORY COMl\HTrEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, NOTES TO THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 37 (1938). Thus, the Congress was on notice prior to its approval of the
Federal Rules that the Advisory Committee had construed the Enabling Act as extending to matters of evidence. An excellent analysis of the circumstances surrounding
the enactment of the Enabling Act and the adoption of the Federal Rules is found
in Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 278-82 (1962).
481. See Clark, Foreword to Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10
RUTGERS L. REV. 479 (1956).
482. See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, op. cit. supra note
479, at 12-14; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6c (3d ed. 1940).
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to "practice and procedure" or affects "substantive rights." The legislative history is inconclusive as to how these words apply to rules of
evidence. A version of the statute submitted to Congress many years
before the Enabling Act's ultimate enactment specifically provided
for "taking and obtaining evidence"483 but the absence of this passage
in the final enactment is of de minimis probative force. The Revisor's
Note to the Rules Enabling Act for admiralty484 states that a reference
to "modes of proof," which historically encompassed rules of evidence, was deleted because it was believed covered by the words
"practice and procedure." A transmutation of this reasoning to the
Civil Rules context supports the conclusion that evidence is within
the compass of the Rules Enabling Act.
Nonetheless, the history of federal procedure prior to the Enabling Act does not foreclose the argument that rules of evidence
were "rules of decision" under section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, rather than matters of "practice, pleadings, and forms and
modes of proceedings" within the meaning of the Process, Mode of
Proof, and Conformity Acts. The thrust of this thesis is that rules of
evidence deal with "substantive rights" and are outside the delegation in the Rules Enabling Act. Recall that pre-Conformity Act decisions relied upon the Rules of Decision Act to bind federal courts
to state rules of evidence absent a federal statute, and that a number
of federal courts reached the same conclusion even after the Conformity Act was enacted.485 Furthermore, a sharp distinction occasionally
was drawn in the post-Conformity Act cases between practice and
rules of evidence. In Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Kendall, 486 it
was held that a federal court's power to compel a plaintiff to submit
to a physical examination was a matter of practice and not of evidence. The Eighth Circuit, citing the Supreme Court's decision in
Wayman v. Southard,481 went on to state that the Rules of Decision
Act did not apply to the process and practice of the federal courts.
In Wayman the Supreme Court had remarked that "the thirty-fourth
section ... has no application to the practice of the court, or to the
conduct of its officer, in the service of an execution."488 Unfortu483. See S. REP. No. 892, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1917). Judicial rule-making in the
realm of evidence on the state level is discussed in Clapp, Privilege Against Selflncrimination, IO RUTGERS L. REv. 541, 562-73 (1956); Kaplan &: Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury,
65 HARV. L. REv. 234 (1951); Levin &: Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial
Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. I (1958).
484. 28 u.s.c. § 2073 t<J964).
485. See text accompanying notes 443-51 supra.
486. 167 Fed. 62, 65 (8th Cir. 1909).
487. 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) l (1825).
488. Id. at 6.
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nately, the passage's punctuation renders it ambiguous. One commentator has argued that Wayman supports the proposition that the
Rules of Decision Act did not require conformity to state practice.489
This view is bolstered by language in United States v. Eckford,490
which appears to be a lineal descendent of the statement in the
Wayman syllabus that section 34 "does not apply to the process and
practice of the [federal] courts. It is a mere legislative recognition of
the principles of universal jurisprudence as to the operation of the
lex . . . ." 491 It is doubtful, however, that the Court's opinion in
Wayman actually supports the passage in the syllabus. In addition
to Kendall, at least one other post-Conformity Act case held that
although methods for obtaining evidence were matters of practice
and procedure, rules of evidence were not.492
Given this historical background the following syllogism can be
constructed: if matters of evidence were governed by the Rules of
Decision Act, and if the Rules of Decision Act did not extend to
matters of practice and procedure, then evidence is not a matter of
practice and procedure. Although the judicial opinions on the status
of evidence prior to the Enabling Act do not use the terms "substance" and "procedure," the allocation of matters between the Rules
of Decision and Conformity Acts may reflect a primordial substanceprocedure dichotomy for ascertaining the source of governing law
in the federal courts.493 If the syllogism is correct and evidence is
within the ambit of the Rules of Decision Act,494 the failure to modify
that statute at the time the Enabling Act was passed coupled with
the similarity of the language in both the Enabling and Conformity
Acts lends additional textual support for characterizing evidence as
"substantive" and beyond the scope of the Enabling Act's delegation.
This hypothesis clearly is quite tenuous, however. In contrast to
the views expressed in cases such as Kendall, several Supreme
Court495 and lower federal court496 decisions contain dic.!a to the
489. Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the United States Supreme Court,
13 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 24 (1934).
490. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 484 (1867).
491. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 2; cf. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6b, at 195 (3d ed. 1940).
492. Bryant v. Leyland, 6 Fed. 125 (C.C.D. Mass. 1881); cf. Easton v. Hodges, 8
Fed. Cas. 271 (No. 4258) (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1877), rev'd on other grounds, 106 U.S. 408
(1882). See also McKeon v. Central Stamping Co., 264 Fed. 385 (3d Cir. 1920); McBride
v. Neal, 214 Fed. 966 (:'th Cir. 1914); DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 139 (1928).
493. See Blume 8: George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MICH. L. REv.
937, 938 (1951).
494. The limited legislative history of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
sheds no light on the intended significance or compass of its reference to state law.
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV.
L. R.Ev. 49, 81-88 (1923).
495. See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 385 (1897); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S.
221, 231 (1882).
496. See De Soto Motor Corp. v. Stewart, 62 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1932); Keur v.
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effect that the Conformity Act and not the Rules of Decision Act
governed evidence rules. It also seems reasonably clear that whether
a court relied on one statute rather than the other depended upon
considerations other than a perception of the demarcation between
"substance" and "procedure."497 Judicial resort to the Rules of Decision Act on points of evidence before the enactment of the Conformity Act is understandable, since utilization of the static conformity of the Process Acts would have compelled the federal courts
to follow state practices as of wholly arbitrary dates. In McNeil v.
Holbrook, 498 for example, had the Supreme Court relied on the
Process Act of 1792, rather than on the Rules of Decision Act, an
extremely relevant Georgia statute enacted in 1810 (twenty-eight
years before the case reached the Supreme Court) probably would
not have been applied. Inasmuch as numerous pre-1872 opinions
referred to the Rules of Decision Act on matters of evidence, it is
not surprising that these pronouncements continued after 1872,
especially since it usually was of no moment which act served as a
source of law for evidence rules.
Finally, even if evidence matters were controlled by the Rules
of Decision Act, that alone is an insufficient basis for concluding that
rules of evidence are "substantive" under the Rules Enabling Act of
1934. Although a substance-procedure analysis was applied to several
legal problems before the Enabling Act, 499 it was not used with
reference to evidence or, for that matter, to determine the source of
law governing actions in the federal courts. Utilization of the dichotomy to ascertain the governing law in the federal courts is
largely a post-1934 phenomenon stemming from the Enabling Act's
wording and the amplification of the attention given the substanceprocedure syndrome following the decisions in Erie and York. 500
Indeed, there is no evidence that the Advisory Committee appointed
to draft the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure considered the
line between the Rules of Decision Act and the Conformity Act of
consequence in determining the boundaries of its mandate under the
Enabling Act.
The foregoing analysis makes it difficult to conclude that rules of
Weiss, 37 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1930); Battaglia v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 360 (N.D.
Ill. 1935).
497. See 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 43.02[2] (2d ed. 1966).
498. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 84 (1838).
499. See R.Esl'ATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 585, 595-98 (1934).
500. The writers who have alluded to the possibility of evidence falling within
the Rules of Decision Act rather than the Conformity Act have taken the position
that this allocation would not preclude the conclusion that evidence is a branch of
procedure. 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 43.02[2] (2d ed. 1966); Sunderland, Character
and Extent of the Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme Court and Methods of
Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404, 407 (1935).
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evidence are substantive and beyond the scope of the Enabling Act.
Construing the statute to exclude evidence is inconsistent with the
Enabling Act's purpose of providing a foundation for an effective
revision of federal practice. Furthermore, the thesis for classifying
evidence as substantive is unidirectional. It focuses entirely on the
history of practice on the law side of the federal courts and overlooks
the fact that neither the Rules of Decision nor the Conformity Act
applied to equity, which after 1822 was governed by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to a grant of authority similar
to the Enabling Act. It also is doubtful that Congress concerned itself
with what the precise contours of "practice and procedure" in the
federal courts should be when it enacted the Enabling Act, or that it
intended to constrict the Supreme Court's rule-making power in accordance with any classification scheme supposedly in existence before 1934. Congress appears to have been much more desirous of
wiping the slate clean and eliminating the statutory goulash created
by the Rules of Decision Act, the Process Acts, the Conformity Act,
the Competency of Witnesses Act, and the Mode of Proof Act. 601
The Supreme Court has examined the scope of the Enabling
Act on only a few occasions since the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.602 In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,603 the plaintiff
refused to comply with an order under Rule 35 to submit to a
physical examination, contending that although Rule 35 and the
mechanism for its enforcement in Rule 37 were rules of procedure,
they were beyond the Enabling Act's delegation to the Supreme
Court because they affected well-recognized "important" or "substantial" rights. The Court rejected this contention in a five-to-four
decision, stating:
The asserted right . . . is no more important than many others
enjoyed by litigants . . . before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered and abolished old rights or privileges and created
new ones in connection with the conduct of litigation. . . . If we
were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the
alleged right we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse
confounded. The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them. 504
501. See S. REP. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1926).
502. The Supreme Court failed to approve a proposed rule on the registration of
judgments, which appeared as Rule 77 of the Advisory Committee's 1937 draft. Conceivably, the Court felt that this rule affected substantive rights. See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 1.04[2] (2d ed. 1966).
503. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
504. Id. at 14. The question before the Court in Sibbach was raised again in
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The dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, did not
dispute the conclusion that matters involving the "economic and fair
conduct of litigation" are within the Enabling Act; instead, it argued
that Rule 35 impairs the historic immunity of the person.
In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 505 a unanimous
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the provision in Rule 4(£)
permitting a federal court's process to run throughout the state in
which it sits. The Court acknowledged that the Rule affected the corporate petitioner because it might not have been subjected to suit
outside a particular district in a multi-district state under prior
practice, but concluded that the Rule related only to the manner and
means of enforcing the respondent's claim and did "not operate to
abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which ... [the
district court] will adjudicate its rights." 506
Most recently, in Hanna v. Plumer, 507 which already has been
considered in detail, 508 Mr. Chief Justice Warren indicated that a
Federal Rule can be invalidated "only if the Advisory Committee,
this Court and Congress erred in their prima fade judgment that the
Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act
nor constitutional restrictions." 509 The Chief Justice's opinion unfortunately offers few insights into what "transgresses ... the terms
of the ... Act." A sentence at the close of the opinion that may apply
only to the Erie aspect of the case but nonetheless does demonstrate
the elevated status given the Rules, states: "To hold that a Federal
Rule ... must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enSchlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), with similar results and without any
dissent on the question of the Rule's validity.
505. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
506. Id. at 446. In Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub
nom. Carlin v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960), the Second Circuit made it clear that the
substance-procedure analysis employed in diversity litigation under Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins before Hanna v. Plumer does not apply to the process of defining the
scope of the Rules Enabling Act. In Iovino the court upheld Rule 25(a)(l) against the
contention that the substitution of parties permitted by the Rule would not be
permitted under state practice. The court stated:
[I]t would unduly restrict the grant of authority made by Congress to hold that
a rule contravenes the Enabling Act as abridging, enlarging or modifying substantive rights merely because a provision admittedly procedural in nature either
furthers or prevents the enforcement of such rights.
Id. at 46. The opposite conclusion regarding the same Rule had been reached in the
pre-Byrd decision in Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956). See also Bendix
Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1952); Hart v. Knox County, 171 F.2d
45 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
But cf. Provident Tradesmens Bank &: Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365
F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966), 80 HARv. L. R.Ev. 678 (1967); 65 MICH, L. REV. No. 5 (to be published March, 1967).
507. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
508. See text accompanying notes 364-75 supra.
509. 380 U.S. at 471.
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forcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt
to exercise that power in the Enabling Act." 510 Despite the lack of
elaboration in Hanna, that case clearly gives extremely wide latitude
to those who formulate the rules for the federal courts.
The history of practice and procedure in the federal courts and
the criteria derived from the cases construing the Rules Enabling
Act leave little doubt that the vast majority of evidentiary matters
relate to practice and procedure or to "the manner and means of
enforcing" rights, and therefore are within Congress' delegation to
the Supreme Court. Principles of admissibility and competency
historically have evolved judicially, either gradually by the decisional process or pursuant to rule-making delegations from legislative bodies. 511 Certain quasi-evidentiary subjects, such as privileges
and burdens of proof, have been thought to require special treatment512 because they frequently represent a conscious attempt to
balance one litigant's ability to enforce a right against another litigant's ability to defend against the assertion of that right. Furthermore, privileges and burdens of proof frequently have a legislative
genesis, as is especially true when they are associated with a statutory
cause of action,513 or embody important policies as to the handling
of certain information and confidential relationships by the courts.
In these sensitive areas, Congress may not have intended the Enabling
Act to give the Supreme Court power to overturn state or federal
legislative judgments. With these exceptions, the Supreme Court's
present effort to develop federal evidence rules appears to be a proper
exercise of their rule-making power.514

3. Rule 44.1 and the Enabling Act
In light of the foregoing, it seems reasonable to conclude that if
Federal Rule 44.1 is viewed as a rule of evidence, it is well within
the ambit of the Rules Enabling Act. Certainly the second sentence
510. Id. at 473-74. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan took exception to
what he believed to be the Court's "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional test.''
Id. at 476.
511. See Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429
(1957).
512. See, e.g., Louisell &: Crippens, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REv. 413
(1956); Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. R.Ev.
467, 483-84 (1957).
513. See Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D.
341, 346-48 (1959).
514. See 1961 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF nu:
UNITED STATES 31; Maris, Federal Procedural Rule-Making: The Program of the Judicial Conference, 47 A.B.A.J. 772 (1961).
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of the Rule falls in this category, given the strong analogy between
it and the general admissibility provision in Rule 43(a). Even if the
second sentence is not subsumed under the rules of evidence but is
classified as a sharp departure from the historic treatment accorded
foreign-law issues by the federal courts, it does not violate the
Enabling Act. The rejection of one practice and the substitution of
another conceived to be better suited to current conditions is a
permissible form of rule-making as long as substantive rights are not
affected, and such rights do not seem to be affected by this portion of
the Rule. A litigant does not have a substantive right to prove foreign
law or to have his opponent do so in a certain mode any more than a
litigant has a vested right to have contributory negligence pleaded in
a stylized manner by a particular party or to have a "cause of action,"
rather than a "claim for relief," set forth in his adversary's pleadings. 515 Thus, the fact that the Rule permits the court to consider
foreign-law material that may be inadmissible under traditional
evidence notions or to engage in its own research excursions does
not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right" of the litigants.
The new Rule's final sentence also seems invulnerable. It does
not exceed the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules governing the procedure "of the district courts," even though its content
tangentially affects the conduct of the appellate courts by shaping the
scope of review to be given a trial court's determination of foreign
law. The last sentence's characterization of a foreign-law determination as a ruling on a question of law is directed primarily at the
district courts. Its purpose is to define the methodology to be employed by the trial judge in handling foreign-law issues in such contexts as motions for summary judgment, new trial, and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Moreover, the last sentence of the new
Rule has no more impact on the appellate process than does the
provision in Rule 54(b) for final judgment on less than all the
claims in an action and the passage in Rule 73 dealing with
appeals to the courts of appeals, both of which have survived
Rules Enabling Act challenges. 516 To the extent that the last sentence in Rule 44.1 affects the scope of review given a trial court's
determination of foreign law, it is indistinguishable from the "clearly
erroneous" standard in Rule 52(a). Admittedly, the new Rule may
alter the pre-1966 scope of review in several circuits but the amplification of the appellate court's obligations vis-a-vis issues of foreign
515. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
516. See Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1952) (Rule 54(b));
Hart v. Knox County, 171 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1948) (Rule 73).
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law cannot be said to "modify the substantive rights of any litigant"
in a way that differs from numerous other procedural changes effected
by the Federal Rules, including the expansion of discovery, the
territorial reach of the district court's process, and the role of the
trial judge on post-trial motions. 1517
Finally, using Rule 44.1 as a fulcrum for developing a federal
standard with respect to allocating proof functions among the parties
or dealing with a failure to prove foreign law or for justifying judicial resolution of foreign-law issues without jury involvement will
not generate Enabling Act difficulties. By analogy to Cohen and
Ragan, and their ex post facto rationalization in Hanna, 1518 these
practices are not covered by Rule 44.1 and their validity will not be
tested under the rule-making power. Instead, they raise issues as to
the proper scope of federal power under the Constitution to regulate matters pertaining to the functioning of the national courts and
therefore should be tested by the same factors that were explored in
the discussion of the Erie doctrine and the interest balancing analysis
of Byrd.1519
IV. CONCLUSION
The rigid insistence by American courts upon the formal pleading and proof of foreign law during the nineteenth and early part
of the twentieth centuries was the by-product of the common-law
fetish of characterizing issues of foreign law as questions of fact. This
classification, which originally was employed by the English courts
for purposes that in retrospect appear to have little relevance to
existing conditions, permeated the entire process of proving alien
law and obfuscated the functional similarity between domestic and
foreign-law issues. The fact theory became so pervasive in the United
States that even the enactment of statutes designed to relieve courts
517. Since Rule 44.1 does not deal explicitly with the question whether foreign
law should be determined by a judge or jury, it does not run afoul of the express
preservation of trial by jury in the Enabling Act. A federal-court practice of judicial
determination of foreign-law issues would not abridge the seventh amendment's jurytrial guarantee. See text accompanying notes 231-92 supra.
518. See text accompanying notes 368-70 supra.
519. Cf. Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 1966)
("the unit of time type of argnment is not proscribed by federal statute or by the
federal rules"; "the propriety of the argument is a federal question"; "it is a matter
of federal trial procedure"; citing Byra). There are several intimations in National
Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), that federal law can be used to
fill the interstices of the Federal Rules. Presumably, the Byrd analysis will be superimposed on questions of this type. The Erie doctrine, its modification by Byrd, and
the relevance of the two cases to Rule 44.1 are discussed at text accompanying notes
332-428 supra.
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and litigants of much of the burden of pleading and proof failed
to liberate the judicial mind from established patterns of doctrine
and nomenclature. Not surprisingly, the federal courts fell heir to
much of the dogma and it was not until the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that any attempt was made to chip
away the encrustation that had formed on judicial habits in this area.
The adoption of Federal Rule 44.1 in 1966 has presented the
federal courts with a blueprint for handling foreign-law issues that
extricates them from the formalism and inefficiency of the fact
approach. The new Rule offers parties and trial judges a highly
malleable scheme for raising, proving, and determining foreign law
that is compatible with the clarion for the "just, speedy, and inexpensive" administration of justice sounded in Federal Rule I. If
the conceptual underpinnings and modus operandi of the Rule are
given effect by the federal judiciary, the pleading and proof of foreign
law will be modernized and brought into the mainstream of Federal
Rule practice. Given the increased incidence of foreign-law issues in
federal litigation during the past quarter century, it is imperative
that this be done in order to secure the full benefits of the new Rule.
Rule 44.1 does not deal explicitly with many of the problems that
are bound to arise in the future-some of these will be the timing of
the notice required by the Rule's first sentence, the allocation of
proof functions, the relative roles of the trial judge and the jury, the
consequences of failing to prove foreign law, and the precise scope
of appellate review. The expectation is that the various lacunae
in the Rule will be closed by the courts in ways consistent with the
norms established in analogous areas of federal procedure to the
extent that the peculiarities of proving foreign law permit. This
burden of innovative cross-fertilization and integration of the Rule
has appropriately been left to the federal bench.
In the event that Rule 44.1 is challenged under the Erie doctrine
or the Rules Enabling Act, due account should be taken of the federal
policies, both expressed and implicit, embodied in the Rule, the
extensive effort that has been expended in the last decade in every
quadrant of the federal government and by the bar to upgrade the
United States' international judicial co-operation practices, and the
fact that the new Rule is a working element of a comprehensive civil
procedure system. Distortion of the practice under Rule 44.1 may
have an adverse affect on other parts of the adjudicatory process and
on the federal government's overall schema for promoting international judicial assistance. In short, faithful and creative employ-
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ment of the new procedure for determining foreign law are highly
desirable policy objectives. Since the Supreme Court decisions in
Byrd and Hanna, doctrinal bases for achieving these objectives and
for preventing the emasculation of Rule 44.1 are available.

